Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25444 January 31, 1966
WENCESLAO RANCAP LAGUMBAY, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CESAR CLIMACO, respondents.
Wenceslao R. Lagumbay for the petitioner.
Ambrosio Padilla for the respondents.
BENGZON, C.J.:
This petition prays for revision of an order of the Commission on Elections declining to reject the returns of certain precincts of some municipalities in Mindanao. The Constitution provides for review by this Court of the rulings of the said Commission.
The matter being urgent, and having reached the conclusion that the returns of certain questioned precincts were "obviously manufactured" within the meaning of pertinent jurisprudence, particularly Mitchell v. Stevens,1 we issued on December 24, 1965, a short resolution upholding the Commission's power and duty to reject the returns of about fifty precincts.
It appearing therein that — contrary to all statistical probabilities — in the first set, in each precinct the number of registered voters equalled the number of ballots and the number of votes reportedly cast and tallied for each and every candidate of the Liberal Party, the party in power; whereas, all the candidates of the Nacionalista Party got exactly zero; and in the second set, — again contrary to all statistical probabilities — all the reported votes were for candidates of the Liberal Party, all of whom were credited with exactly the same number of votes in each precinct, ranging from 240 in one precinct to 650 in another precinct; whereas, all the candidates of the Nacionalista Party were given exactly zero in all said precincts.
We opined that the election result to said precincts as reported, was utterly improbable and clearly incredible. For it is not likely, in the ordinary course of things, that all the electors of one precinct would, as one man, vote for all the eight candidates of the Liberal Party, without giving a single vote to one of the eight candidates of the Nacionalista Party. Such extraordinary coincidence was quite impossible to believe, knowing that the Nacionalista Party had and has a nationwide organization, with branches in every province, and was, in previous years, the party in power in these islands.
We also know from our experience in examining ballots in the three Electoral Tribunals (Presidential, Senate, and House) that a large portion of the electors do not fill all the blanks for senators in their ballots. Indeed, this observation is confirmed by the big differences in the votes received by the eight winning senators in this as well as in previous national elections;2 almost a million votes between the first place and the eight. Furthermore, in 1965, the total number of electors who cast their votes was 6,833,369 (more or less). If every voter had written eight names on his ballot, the total number of votes cast for all the candidates would be that number multiplied by 8, namely 54,666,952. But the total number of the votes tallied for the candidates for senator amounted to 49,374,942 only. The difference between the two sums represents the number of ballots that did not contain eight names for senators. In other words, some 5 million ballots did not carry eight names. Of course, this is a rough estimate, because some ballots may have omitted more names, in which case, the number of incomplete ballots would be less. But the general idea and the statistical premise is there.
The same statistical result is deducible from the 1963 election data: total number of electors who voted, 7,712,019; if each of them named eight senators, the total votes tallied should have been 61,696,152; and yet the total number tallied for all the senatorial candidates was 45,812,470 only. A greater number of incomplete ballots.
It must be noted that this is not an instance wherein one return gives to one candidate all the votes in the precinct, even as it gives exactly zero to the other. This is not a case where some senatorial candidates obtain zero exactly, while some others receive a few scattered votes. Here, all the eight candidates of one party garnered all the votes, each of them receiving exactly the same number, whereas all the eight candidates of the other party got precisely nothing.
The main point to remember is that there is no block-voting nowadays.
What happened to the vote of the Nacionalista inspector? There was one in every precinct. Evidently, either he became a traitor to his party, or was made to sign a false return by force or other illegal means. If he signed voluntarily, but in breach of faith, the Nacionalista inspector betrayed his party; and, any voting or counting of ballots therein, was a sham and a mockery of the national suffrage.
Hence, denying prima facie recognition to such returns on the ground that they are manifestly fabricated or falsified, would constitute a practical approach to the Commission's mission to insure free and honest elections.
In Mitchell vs. Stevens, supra, the returns showed a noticeable excess of votes over the number of registered voters, and the court rejected the returns as obviously "manufactured". Why? The excess could have been due to the fact that, disregarding all pertinent data, the election officers wrote the number of votes their fancy dictated; and so the return was literally a "manufactured", "fabricated" return. Or maybe because persons other than voters, were permitted to take part and vote; or because registered voters cast more than one ballot each, or because those in charge of the tally sheet falsified their counts. Hence, as the Mitchell decision concluded, the returns were "not true returns . . . but simply manufactured evidences of an attempt to defeat the popular will." All these possibilities and/or probabilities were plain fraudulent practices, resulting in misrepresentation of the election outcome. "Manufactured" was the word used. "Fabricated" or "false" could as well have been employed.
The same ratio decidendi applies to the situation in the precincts herein mentioned. These returns were obviously false or fabricated — prima facie. Let us take for example, precinct No. 3 of Andong, Lanao del Sur. There were 648 registered voters. According to such return all the eight candidates of the Liberal Party got 648 each,3 and the eight Nacionalista candidates got exactly zero. We hold such return to be evidently fraudulent or false because of the inherent improbability of such a result — against statistical probabilities — specially because at least one vote should have been received by the Nacionalista candidates, i.e., the vote of the Nacionalista inspector. It is, of course, "possible" that such inspector did not like his party's senatorial line-up; but it is not probable that he disliked all of such candidates, and it is not likely that he favored all the eight candidates of the Liberal Party. Therefore, most probably, he was made to sign an obviously false return, or else he betrayed his party, in which case, the election therein — if any — was no more than a barefaced fraud and a brazen contempt of the popular polls.
Of course we agree that frauds in the holding of the election should be handled — and finally settled — by the corresponding courts or electoral tribunals. That is the general rule, where testimonial or documentary evidence, is necessary; but where the fraud is so palpable from the return itself (res ipsa loquitur — the thing speaks for itself), there is no reason to accept it and give it prima facie value.
At any rate, fraud or no fraud, the verdict in these fifty precincts may ultimately be ascertained before the Senate Electoral Tribunal.4 All we hold now, is that the returns show "prima facie" that they do not reflect true and valid reports of regular voting. The contrary may be shown by candidate Climaco — in the corresponding election protest.
The well-known delay in the adjudication of election protests often gave the successful contestant a mere pyrrhic victory, i.e., a vindication when the term of office is about to expire, or has expired. And so the notion has spread among candidates for public office that the "important thing" is the proclamation; and to win it, they or their partisans have tolerated or abetted the tampering or the "manufacture" of election returns just to get the proclamation, and then let the victimized candidate to file the protest, and spend his money to work for an empty triumph.
It is generally admitted that the practice has prevailed in all previous elections. Never was the point pressed upon us in a more clear-cut manner. And without, in any way, modifying our stand as outlined in the Nacionalista Party vs. Commission decision, we feel the mores of the day require application — even extension — of the principle in the Mitchell decision, which is realistic and common sensical even as it strikes a blow at such pernicious "grab - the - proclamation - prolong - the - protest" slogan of some candidates or parties.
It is strongly urged that the results reported in these returns are quite "possible", bearing in mind the religious or political control of some leaders in the localities affected. We say, possible, not probable. It is possible to win the sweepstakes ten times; but not probable. Anyway, judges are not disposed to believe that such "control" has proved so powerful as to convert the electors into mere sheep or robots voting as ordered. Their reason and conscience refuse to believe that 100% of the voters in such precincts abjectly yet lawfully surrendered their precious freedom to choose the senators of this Republic.
Indeed, social scientists might wonder whether courts could, consistently with morality and public policy,5 render judgment acknowledging such "control" or validating such "controlled votes" as candidate Climaco chose to call them.
In view of the foregoing, and overlooking some intemperate language which detracts from the force of the arguments, we hereby deny the motion to reconsider our resolution of December 24, 1965, as well as the petition for a re-hearing.
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. Dizon and Makalintal, concur.
Separate Opinions
BARRERA, J., concurring:
I vote with the majority, for, as the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Jose P. Bengzon points out, the line must be drawn somewhere and because I believe the Chief Justice has traced it at the point where it can at all be reasonably placed, where logic and experience both direct it to be. I take it that Justice Bengzon does not question the logic of the prevailing doctrine that the board of canvassers can legally discard "obviously manufactured" returns, as he accepts the exercise of that power where the returns report a number of votes cast in excess of the number of registered voters. He merely objects to the extension of that power to the situation obtaining in the present case wherein more than 50 precincts in the same provinces where our experience proves election has never been without extensive frauds, the returns disclose uniformly 100% voting, 100% in favor of 100% of the candidates of one party and 100% zero for 100% of the candidates of the other party. And the basis of his objection is that this result is not physically or theoretically impossible and could possibly reflect the actual voting, fraudulently as it may be, the solution of which he states, lies with the Electoral Tribunal. My answer is, if physical or theoretical impossibility is to be the criterion, then returns evincing greater number of votes cast than registered voters should not also be discarded as it is theoretically possible that with our experience regarding flying voters, ballots could possibly be cast in excess of the registered voters, which constitutes likewise, a fraud that could be corrected in an electoral contest. Then where shall we draw the line? Or shall we draw no line at all as insinuated by Justice Regala in his own dissenting opinion, and leave all questions relating to returns, to the corresponding electoral tribunal?
Both dissents express fear as to the consequences of the majority opinion, suggesting that the board of canvassers could become the tyrannical arbiters of the result of elections. In my opinion, if the line is not drawn as it has been done in the majority opinion, there would be the greater evil of the tyranny of the board of inspectors who prepare the returns in the hundreds of thousands of electoral precincts, who, because of their number and their widespread distribution all over the country, are more prone to political influence and more difficult to subject to scrutiny and supervision of those entrusted by law to preserve clean, honest and free elections. As between the two tyrannies, possible if we adopt a too sanctimonious regard for the election returns, that of the board of canvassers, less numerous in number and composed of sworn public officials, seems to be the less pervasive and pernicious as the perpetuators are likely to be more amenable to reason, supervision and control.
BENGZON, J.P., J., dissenting:
As once observed by a renowned jurist: "In law, as in life, lines have to be drawn. But the fact that a line has to be drawn somewhere does not justify its being drawn anywhere. The line must follow some direction of policy, whether rooted in logic or experience."1 For me, the majority view in the case at bar, by adopting the criterion of "statistical probabilities" in drawing the line between returns "obviously manufactured" and returns not of that kind, has drawn a shifting, movable and uncertain line, liable to run without direction of policy, without regard to logic and contrary to experience.
Furthermore, in my view, the majority would, against the provision of our Constitution, share the Senate Electoral Tribunal's exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. For it has in effect exercised, and authorized boards of canvassers likewise to exercise, the power to annul votes on the ground of fraud or irregularity in the voting — a power that I consider alien to the functions of a canvassing body and proper only to a tribunal acting in an electoral protest. For these reasons, I am impelled to respectfully express the following dissenting opinion, in accordance with the reservation made at the time the resolution of this Court was adopted.
The present suit is clearly a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not an appeal by certiorari under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. For its ground it alleges "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction".2 Such a ground is proper only in a petition for certiorari as a special civil action and not as an appeal. For that matter the petition does not cavil the fact that it seeks an extraordinary writ. It states that "Petitioners have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law"3 and does not even bother to indicate that a notice of appeal has been filed with the Commission on Elections, as required by section 2 of the Rule 43 in cases of appeals. It is captioned "For Certiorari and Prohibition".4 Needless to say, prohibition cannot be joined with appeal, for such a remedy can be resorted to only where appeal does not lie. The Supreme Court, under the Constitution, has no general powers of supervision over the Commission on Elections except those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to review the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission which may be brought up properly before the Supreme Court (Nacionalista Party vs. De Vera, 85 Phil. 126, 129). In this instance, no appeal from the decision of the Commission has properly been taken to this Court.
As raised by the pleadings, therefore, the point at issue is this: Did the Commission on Elections gravely abuse its discretion in finding the election returns in question to be genuine?
As a board of canvassers with respect to the election of Senators, pursuant to Section 166 of the Revised Election Code, the Commission on Elections is a ministerial body, duty-bound to accept the returns transmitted to it in due form, and to ascertain and declare the result only as it appears therefrom (Nacionalista Party vs. Commission on Elections, 85 Phil. 149). A prerequisite to the performance of said ministerial functions, however, is the power to determine the genuineness of the returns. For this reason, as a step sine qua non to the fulfillment of its proper task, it can also exercise the quasi-judicial power of deciding whether a particular return is genuine. Nonetheless, in so deciding, it cannot go behind the returns. In short, the genuineness of the returns — as far as canvassing is concerned — is to be determined solely from the face of said returns. The rulings to this effect are clear:
It is settled beyond controversy that canvassers cannot go behind the returns. The returns provided for by law are the sole and exclusive evidence from which a canvassing board or official can ascertain and declare the result. The canvassers are not authorized to examine or consider papers or documents which are transmitted to them with the returns, or as returns, but which under the statutes do not constitute part of the returns. (Dizon vs. Provincial Board of Canvassers, 52 Phil. 47. See also 29 C.J.S. 659; McCrary on Elections, pp. 198-199.)
So it is that all the instances petitioner cites of a board of canvassers being held justified in refusing to count a return, involve returns that can be pronounced non-genuine simply on the basis of what appears therefrom. For purposes of this case, the noteworthy example is that mentioned in Nacionalista Party vs. Commission on Elections, supra: "where the returns are obviously manufactured, as where they show a great excess of votes over what could legally have been cast".1äwphď1.ńët
For me, there is no doubt that in such a case the returns betray their falsity by their very contents. They set forth as the result of the voting in a precinct something which can be seen to be false without having to examine anything but the returns themselves. And the reason is simple. It is impossible for the votes to have in fact been as the returns assert them.
Petitioner would however extend the same treatment to returns where 100 percent voting is shown and the candidates of one party are credited with all such votes. In my opinion the situation is radically different. For this time it is possible for such a voting to have in fact taken place. Consequently, it is possible for the returns to be in fact genuine.
The discussion by the majority opinion of "statistical probabilities" does not establish that the votes inside the ballot boxes are not or cannot be as the returns say they are. Resort to the ballot boxes themselves would be needed to prove that the returns are false, that is, that in fact the votes are not as the returns state them to be.
A conclusion, then, that the aforesaid returns are obviously manufactured, does not necessarily follow from the 100 per cent voting that they set forth. Appreciation of probabilities, statistical or otherwise, can at most only classify such voting as highly improbable.
Stated otherwise, when the point at issue is whether it is possible or impossible, the Commission on Elections or the Supreme Court is empowered to find that a return is obviously manufactured, in that it states what is impossible. Not so where the question is whether it is probable or improbable, no matter the degree of improbability, in which case the subject matter pertains to the Electoral Tribunal. In the former, one deals with a certainty, namely, the impossibility. In the latter, one is faced with something debatable, namely, probability or improbability, which necessarily entails an element of doubt, and to resolve said doubt perforce one has to open the ballot boxes. As long as the voting stated in them is a possibility, returns in due form must be accepted by the board of canvassers.
It is true that chances are that in cases of 100 per cent voting, fraud, intimidation or other violations of the Election Law obtained. But said irregularities could have been in the conduct of the elections itself. From the face of the returns alone the irregularity cannot be fixed on said returns. So the board of canvassers soundly exercised its discretion in accepting said returns and leaving the deeper inquiry into the presence of fraud or other irregularities, not shown on the face of the returns, to the proper forum, namely, the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Said tribunal is under the Constitution "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of Senators (Arts. VI, Sec. II, Constitution of the Philippines).
Stated differently, it does not strike me as contrary to all "statistical probabilities" for the votes in some precincts to be what the returns in question state them. For other factors, such as fraud or irregularity in the voting — factors which "statistical probabilities" ought likewise to reckon with — could have been present and responsible for the straight voting therein. In such event, the fraudulent and irregular voting notwithstanding, the returns showing the straight voting are genuine, not manufactured, since they but faithfully reflect the count of votes inside the ballot boxes. For the annulment of those votes, no matter how detestable the fraud or irregularity vitiating them, the remedy is not to reject the returns for being obviously manufactured, which they are not, resulting in this case in the disenfranchisement of the affected voters in the three provinces without due process of law. The remedy is to file a protest with the proper Electoral Tribunal and there raise the issue of fraud in the voting, where it is exclusively cognizable.
The set-up in our system of determining the results of elections of Senators, places the acceptance and counting of the returns on the Commission on Elections, subject to correction by the Supreme Court in case of grave abuse of discretion or error of law, and the decision of electoral protests on the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
Speaking again of drawing lines, I hold the view that the jurisdictional line between the Senate Electoral Tribunal and other bodies, such as the Supreme Court or the Commission on Elections, should not be plotted along "statistical probabilities". For that is not where the Constitution draws the line. It constitutes the Senate Electoral Tribunal the SOLE judge of ALL contests relating to the ELECTION, RETURNS, and qualifications of Senators, without regard to whether the voting subject matter of said contests is or is not contrary to all "statistical probabilities". "SOLE JUDGE", "ALL CONTESTS" and "RELATING TO . . . RETURNS" are the meaningful KEY PHRASES in the Constitution.
Following "statistical probabilities" as the norm for judging the genuineness of election returns is, as aforesaid, drawing a line without direction of a policy rooted in logic or experience. Not in logic, because the consideration that fraud or irregularity attended an election which results in straight voting, only strengthens the view that their corresponding returns accurately stated such voting and are therefore genuine. Not in experience, for straight and one-hundred per cent voting has in fact occurred before, in other places. It occurred among others in at least 4 precincts of 3 municipalities in Cavite during the last elections.5 It may indeed be irregular, but it is not impossible. This is not to give a stamp of approval on any of the so-called controlled voting. In my view such voting is derogatory of the freedom that underlies our democracy. The point, however, is that in regard to such evils the forum of solution lies elsewhere.
Assuming that the instant suit is but an appeal from a decision of the Commission on Elections, the result would be the same. Although the issue would be not grave abuse of discretion but mere error of law, I do not think the Commission on Elections erred on a point of law in finding genuine the returns with the aforesaid 100 per cent voting. There is no provision of law repugnant to such a finding. And this Court, in passing on appeal upon the decision of the board of canvassers, cannot depart from the rule that the genuineness of election returns, for purposes of inclusion in the canvass, is to be judged solely from what appears on their face. Applying such a rule, the returns in question cannot be struck out as false or obviously manufactured. At least, respondent Commission on Elections cannot be said to have erred in not so striking them out.
Nonetheless, even as I disagree as to procedure and choice of means, I fully agree with the desire of the majority to purify the elections. Such a noble intention and such alone, I do not hesitate to say, is behind the decision of this Court. In a deliberative body like this Court the right to dissent is indeed essential, but I feel it is also the privilege and, at times like this, the duty of a dissenting member to stress the fact that the difference of opinions, does not detract from an ideal firmly, and with devotion, held in common..
As one, therefore, who shares their ideals and realizes that theirs is the purest of motives, I disagree with the majority in the pursuit of these ends. The intensity of the zeal shown by the majority to achieve a laudable purpose has taken them beyond the limits set by our Constitution. And sublime though the objective is, I cannot go that far to attain it.
I therefore sustain the view that the decision of the Commission on Elections accepting and counting the returns in question should not be disturbed herein and that the remedy is electoral protest. Between the lines, I could see against the good intention of the majority opinion. Subscribe to the aim of the majority view to strengthen our democracy we should, and I do, as long as we remain within the bounds laid down by law. For "we cannot transcend the law to foster the reign of law".6 The realization of an eminent purpose, such as preserving democracy, must still be done through proper channels ordained by law. The fact that an electoral protest is often decided so late that the people's choice could not even serve them is a problem which, I agree with the majority, needs to be solved; but it is not for the Supreme Court to solve, because the Supreme Court is not a policy-making body in our government. It is indeed one of the three pillars of our Republic, but each of said pillars has its own sphere of action. In the name of purifying elections, this Court cannot go against the policy laid down by statutes and the Constitution.
Finally, this Court has frowned upon what came to be popularly known as "short cut" in the discharge of powers or duties authorized or required by law.7 The decision of the majority from which I dissent, notwithstanding its praiseworthy intention, tends to sanction a short cut of the nature hitherto frowned upon.
I therefore dissent from the decision of the majority.
Bautista Angelo and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
REGALA, J., dissenting:
I concur in the dissenting opinion of Justice Bengzon but I wish to add a few words..
In the first place, I cannot subscribe to the majority opinion that "obviously manufactured" returns may be annulled by this Court. With respect to the contested returns, it is my view that the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and only that body, has the right and the jurisdiction to exercise that power. Our Constitution has been most careful to provide that the said Tribunal shall be "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of Senators (Article VI, sec. II). The assumption by this Court of the power that it did in this case, in effect amends the aforementioned provision to provide that the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be "the judge of some contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of Senators. The result is that the word "all" has been reduced to just "some" by this Court as it excludes therefrom such returns as are, in the language of the decision, "obviously manufactured."
Of course, the majority opinion attempts to deny the above by rationalizing that "the verdict in these fifty precincts may ultimately be ascertained before the Senate Electoral Tribunal. All we hold now, is that the returns show 'prima facie' that they do not reflect true and valid reports of regular voting. The contrary may be shown by candidate Climaco in the corresponding election protest."
In the second place, the majority opinion has rejected fifty (50) election returns covering fifty (50) different precincts spread over three provinces in favor of Climaco on the ground that they are "obviously manufactured," contrary to the finding made by the Commission on Elections that the said election returns are "regular and genuine returns," a finding which the Commission on Elections made after examination and verification of the returns in the presence of parties concerned and their counsel.
The majority opinion has failed to lay down any standard as to what returns are to be considered as statistically "probable" or "improbable." The judgment in that regard, it would seem, has been left solely to the boards of canvassers. I am profoundly alarmed that this void in the majority opinion and this failure to set the minimum element for what may be deemed, as "statistically improbable," leaving the matter completely at the hands of partisan or politically influenced boards of canvassers, will only allow for the commission of far more brazen and far more barefaced frustration of the popular will than has ever been experienced by this country.
What right has this Court to determine for the Senate Electoral Tribunal the "prima facie" value of the returns which it must go over? Why must this Court impose upon the said Tribunal its own judgment as to what is prima facie "statistically probable or improbable"?
Electoral protests may, indeed, take the whole term of the office concerned to decide. The victory of the winning candidate may after all be an empty one. But that is no reason for this Court to take a step not allowed by the Constitution. This Court, we have need to remind ourselves I think, is not the repository of remedies for all our ills. And not even the best of intention and the noblest of motives will justify it from assuming power it is not given under the Charter.
For these, as well as the reasons given in the dissenting opinion of Justice Bengzon, I would vote for granting of the motion for reconsideration filed by the attorney for Climaco.
Bautista Angelo, J., concurs.
Footnotes
123 Kans. 456, 33 Am. Rep. cited in 18 Am. Rep. and Nacionalista Party vs. Commission on Elections.
2The eight received 3,629,834; 3,472,689; 3,463,159; 3,234,966; 3,191,000; 3,037,666; 3,014,618; 2,972,525, respectively.
3One hundred per cent voted. Yet statistics show that all over the Islands, the percentage of voting was 79.5% only; and in Tarlac and Bulacan where facilities of communication are abundant, the percentage was 85.98 and 85.81 only.
4This answers the erroneous claim that our decision usurps functions of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
5Block-voting has been abolished.
BARRERA, J., concurring:
1Justice Felix Frankfurter, dissenting, in Pearce vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 315 U.S. 543, 558.
2Petition, p. 6.
3Petition, p. 10.
4Petition, p. 1.
51965 Elections: Bailen, Cavite — Precinct No. 10, all Liberals got 255 votes, all others, got zero, Precinct No. 12, all Liberals got 228 votes, all others got zero. Silang, Cavite—Precinct No. 34, all Liberals got 287 votes, all others zero. Ternate, Cavite—Precinct No. 7, all Liberals got 90 votes, all others zero. Also, in 1961 Elections: Saramain, Lanao del Sur—Precinct No. 1, NP Senatorial Candidates—all got 383 votes each; LPs all got zero.
6Nacionalista Party vs. Commission on Elections, supra, at 154.
7E.g., Gonzales vs. Hechanova, et al., L-21897, October 22, 1963.
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