Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19778 February 26, 1965
CROMWELL COMMERCIAL EMPLOYEES AND LABORERS UNION (PTUC), petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and CROMWELL COMMERCIAL CO., INC., respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
REGALA, J.:
The facts of this case are stated in the decision of this Court which was promulgated on September 30, 1964.
Briefly, our decision rules that as far as reinstatement is concerned, both employees who are discriminatorily dismissed as well as those who strike because of the employer's unfair labor practice are entitled to reinstatement. Excepted from the rule are those who, on account of violence or other misconduct during the strike, or who, because of subsequent employment elsewhere, must be deemed to have forfeited the right to reinstatement, having in view the policies of the Industrial Peace Act. With respect to backwages, however, We hold that only discriminatorily dismissed employees are entitled to backpay. Those who voluntarily strike, even if it be in protest against unfair labor practice, are not entitled to backwages unless, after giving up the strike and presenting themselves to the employer, the latter should refuse to reinstate them or should reinstate them subject to new conditions that are also discriminatory.
On the basis of the foregoing, we affirmed the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations.
The union has filed a motion for reconsideration. First of all, it contends that in the absence of good faith or similar circumstances on the part of the employer, the Court of Industrial Relations has no discretion to award half backwages only to reinstated employees. Full backpay should have been given instead and this Court should have ordered this in its decision, so it is averred.
To begin with, we note that this point is being raised for the first time only now. Section 7 of Rule 51 states that "no error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors and properly argued in the brief, save as the court, at its option, may notice plain errors not specified, and also clerical errors." Now, the fact that full backpay was not given certainly cannot be stigmatized as "plain error," much less a clerical one. As noted in the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations, the salesmen were not exactly justified in refusing to turn over their collections to the company. Nor is this the first case that one half instead of full, backwages are awarded.
It is also contended that those who struck in protest against the company's unfair labor practice should be given backwages because the company refused to take them back except under the conditions contained in its March 1 order. On this point, the decision states:
In contrast, the rest of the employees struck as a voluntary act of protest against what they considered unfair labor practice of the company. The stoppage of their work was not the direct consequence of the company's unfair labor practice. Hence, their economic loss should not be shifted to the employer. (See Dinglasan v. National Labor Union, G.R. No. L-14183, Nov. 29, 1959). As explained by the National Labor Relations Board in the case of American Manufacturing Co., 5 NLRB 443: "When employees voluntarily go on strike, even if in protest against unfair labor practices, it has been our policy not to award them backpay during the strike. However, when the strikers abandon the strike and apply for reinstatement despite the unfair labor practice and the employer either refuses to reinstate them or imposes upon their reinstatement new conditions that constitute unfair labor practice, We are of the opinion that the considerations impelling our refusal to award backpay are no longer controlling. Accordingly, we hold that where, as in this case, an employer refuses to reinstate strikers except upon their acceptance of new conditions that discriminate against them because of their union membership or activities, the strikers who refuse to accept the conditions and are consequently refused reinstatement are entitled to be made whole for any losses of pay they may have suffered by reason of the respondent's discriminatory acts." (Quoted in Teller, 2 Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Sec. 371, pp. 997-998)
Now, it is clear from the statement of the rule that those who strike voluntarily — even if in protest against unfair labor practice — are entitled to backpay only —
when the strikers abandon the strike and apply for reinstatement despite the unfair labor practice and the employer either refuses to reinstate them or imposes upon their reinstatement new conditions that constitute unfair labor practice.
In insisting therefore on the company's observance of the collective bargaining agreement as condition for returning to work, the strikers did not in fact abandon their strike, because the company's non-observance of their agreement was precisely the reason for their strike. This is the reason why we said that to be entitled to backpay, the strikers must have offered to return to work under the same conditions just before their strike so as to place on the company the blame for the strikers' economic loss.
By underscoring certain portions of the decision in the American Manufacturing case, the dissenting opinion seems to imply that on the contrary, the voluntary strikers in the former case were awarded backwages, it is because despite their unconditional offer to return to work, their employer refused to take them back except under "new conditions that discriminate against them." These new conditions were that these employees should sign a new contract as new employees and undergo medical examination. In contrast, no such conditions were imposed by the company in this case.
If the American Manufacturing case is being cited, it is for the general principle it lays, namely, that "When employees voluntarily go on strike, even if in protest against unfair labor practices, it has been our policy not to award them backpay during the strike."
Now, even in the English system, with its strict adherence to precedent, 1 to distinguish one case from another held to be the rule is not to deny its force as a precedent. As Professor Hart puts it —
... whatever authoritative status a rule extracted from precedent may have, it is compatible with the exercise by courts that are bound by it of the following two types of creative or legislative activity. On the one hand courts deciding a later case may reach an opposite decision to that in a precedent by narrowing the rule extracted from the precedent, and admitting some exception to it not before considered, or, if considered, left open. This process of "distinguishing" the earlier case involves finding some legally relevant difference between it and the present case, and the class of such differences can never be exhaustively determined. ... (The Concept of Law, 131)
Anent the claim that the notice given by the company to the employees was not a mere "tactical" threat calculated to make them go back to work, suffice it to say that if the strikers had anyway the right to reinstatement, no amount of notice of dismissal could negate that right. Any notice to that effect, therefore, could not be anything but a "tactical" threat.
Still on this point, the dissenting opinion states that without a grievance committee (for the failure to constitute which the company was found at fault by the Court of Industrial Relations) it is improbable, not to say inconceivable, that the laborers would "forego the right to strike without any alternative method to have their grievances redressed. The opinion goes on that "the bargaining contract is indivisible, and the employer, who was the first to breach it by blocking the organization of the grievances committee, has no right whatsoever to claim enforcement of the no-strike clause."
The remedy for violation of a provision of an agreement is not another infraction of that agreement. We still have courts open for the redress of grievances.
Finally, it is contended that Andrada and Dario should have been ordered reinstated, because the Court of Industrial Relations itself recognized that minor misdemeanor is an insufficient ground for denying reinstatement.
To be sure, what this Court said is that the Court of Industrial Relations cannot order the reinstatement of those who are guilty of violence on the company's property and that whether a misconduct is serious or not is for the Court of Industrial Relations to determine and only in cases of abuse of discretion will this Court step in. In other words, this Court did not agree with the Court of Industrial Relations' observation that occasional infractions of rules brought about by the rising temper may not justify denial of reinstatement. And this Court also said that the question of whether or not those already employed elsewhere should be reinstated is the task of the Court of Industrial Relations and where there is no abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere. Now the union says it is hard to show abuse of discretion. We think it rather plain that is no excuse for not proving abuse of discretion. To reinstate all employees irrespective of whether they have found employment elsewhere would be to negate the injunction that the question is one of discretion to be determined if the order would effectuate the policies of the law.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the motion for reconsideration is denied.1äwphï1.ñët
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Paredes, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Barrera and Dizon, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:
My vote is for the reconsideration of the decision for the reasons expressed in my original dissent. While there was a no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement, operation of that clause was manifestly dependent on the constitution of the grievances committee also provided therein, for it is highly improbable, not to say inconceivable, that the laborers would forego the right to strike without any alternative method to have their grievances redressed. The bargaining contract is indivisible, and the employer, who was the first to breach it by blocking the organization of the grievances committee, has no right whatsoever to claim enforcement of the no-strike clause. The employer cannot disregard what is unfavorable to him and seek the benefit of those stipulations that are in his favor.
By the same token, I do not believe the rule of the American Manufacturing case (5 NLRB 443) on employees who voluntarily go on strike applies in the present case. In the proceedings before us the employees were practically provoked into a strike because the employer blocked any other reasonable way to ventilate their complaints against management. In fact, the decision cited really favors the granting of backpay to laborers in the present case, who offered to return to work and abandon the strike, but whom the employer refused to readmit, imposing the condition that its March 1st order be accepted. Said the NLRB in the case cited (at p. 467).
When employees voluntarily go on strike, even if in protest against unfair labor practices, it has been our policy not to award them backpay during the strike. However, when the strikers abandon the strike and apply for reinstatement despite the unfair labor practices, and the employer either refuses to reinstate them or imposes upon their reinstatement new conditions that constitute unfair labor practices, we are of the opinion that the considerations impelling our refusal to award back pay are no longer controlling. Accordingly, we hold that where, as in this case, an employer refuses to reinstate strikers except upon their acceptance of new conditions that discriminate against them because of their union membership or activities, the strikers who refuse to accept the conditions and are consequently refused reinstatement are entitled to be made whole for any losses of pay they may have suffered by reason of the respondent's discriminatory acts. Here the strikers who were refused reinstatement except on the conditions set forth by the respondent are entitled to reinstatement with back pay from July 27, 1937, to the dates on which the respondent offers them reinstatement, less any amounts earned by them in the with back pay from July 27, 1937, to the dates on which the respondent offers them reinstatement, less any amounts earned by them in the meantime. (Emphasis supplied)
There is, therefore, no question in my mind that these laborers are entitled to backpay, at the very least from and after March 14, 1957.
Concepcion, J., concurs.
Footnotes
1Close emphasis on material facts is what distinguishes the English attitude to decided case from that of continental jurists who in general regard a judgment as a theoretical answer to rather abstact question of law. (See Paton, A Textbook of Jurisprudence 160 [ 2d ed.].)
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