Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21280             April 30, 1965
PROCOPIO R. MORALES, JR., petitioner,
vs.
TORIANO PATRIARCA and THE HON. JUAN R. LIWAG, respondents.
Suanes, Barbosa and Associates and Paredes, Poblador and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
On November 6, 1961, Procopio Morales, Jr. was extended an ad interim appointment as Justice of the Peace of San Andres, Quezon. On December 27, 1961, the appointment was released. Procopio Morales, Jr. took his oath, and assumed office, on December 28, 1961.
Secretary of Justice Diokno, on January 27, 1962, telegraphed the Executive Judge of Lucena City, stating: "Under Administrative Order Two President Macapagal And Supreme Court Decision Aytona Case, Morales Appointment Declared Without Effect Stop Please Advise Him Vacate Office Immediately.
Procopio Morales, Jr., on February 26, 1962, wrote the Secretary of Justice for reconsideration of said "advice." On April 3, 1962, the Secretary of Justice denied the request for reconsideration of the order to vacate.
On April 27, 1962, the Commission on Appointments confirmed Procopio Morales, Jr.'s appointment.1äwphï1.ñët
On October 19, 1962, Toriano Patriarca was extended an ad interim appointment as Justice of the Peace of San Andres, Quezon. The new appointee took his oath, and assumed office, on October 26, 1962.
On May 13, 1963, Procopio Morales, Jr. filed in this Court the instant petition for "Quo Warranto, Prohibition, Injunction, Etc.," against Toriano Patriarca and the Secretary of Justice.
Petitioner contends, first, that his appointment is not among the so called midnight appointments withdrawn and declared without effect by Administrative Order No. 2, and in the light of this Court's ruling in Aytona vs. Castillo, L-19313, January 19, 1962; secondly, that his present suit is filed on time.
From the decisions of this Court in the wake of the Aytona ruling, it is clear that petitioner's appointment was not a midnight appointment. The same was extended on November 6, 1961, even before election day, indicating deliberate and careful action (Merrera vs. Liwag, L-20079, September 30, 1963). Petitioner took his oath on December 28, 1961, before the "scramble" in Malacañang that started in the evening of December 29, 1961 (Gillera vs. Fernandez, L-20741, January 31, 1964). No haste and irregularity, therefore, attended petitioner's appointment, and he took his oath days before the promulgation, on December 31, 1961, of Administrative Order No. 2 (Soreño vs. Secretary of Justice, L-20272, December 27, 1963).
Petitioner, however, cannot be reinstated, since the present action for reinstatement was filed more than one year from his removal. As a public official in the service, he should have begun his court action for reinstatement, be it by quo warranto or mandamus, within one year from his removal or separation, otherwise his action is barred (Sec. 16, Rule 66, Rules of Court; Unabia vs. City Mayor, 53 O.G. 132; Velasquez vs. Gil, 53 O.G. 5615; Jose vs. Lacson, L-10477, May 17, 1957; Cuyo vs. City Mayor of Baguio, L-9912, May 23, 1957; Abella vs. Rodriguez, 54 O.G. 2879; Erauda vs. Cramen, 54 O.G. 6253; Alipio vs. Rodriguez, L-17336, December 26, 1963).
Petitioner's removal was, at the latest, on April 3, 1962, when the Secretary of Justice denied his motion for reconsideration of the order to vacate. Since the one-year period runs even during the pendency of a motion for reconsideration in the administrative level (Torres vs. Quintos, L-3304, April 5, 1951), said removal should even be deemed prior to April 3, 1962. The present suit was filed, as stated, on May 13, 1963, that is, at least 1 year, 1 month and 10 days from petitioner's removal.
It is petitioner's contention, however, that the one-year period should be counted from October 26, 1962, the date his successor assumed office. We cannot accept such a view. The rationale of the one-year period is that title to public office should not be subjected to uncertainties but should be determined as speedily as possible (Tumulak vs. Egay, 46 O.G. 3693). Consequently, the period runs even when there is no person as yet appointed to succeed in the position (Bautista vs. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Agcaoili vs. Baguitan, 48 Phil. 676; Lim vs. Yulo, 62 Phil. 161).
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed, with costs against petitioner. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., took no part.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation