Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18899 February 29, 1964
IN RE: SEARCH WARRANT SEIZURE OF SLOT MACHINES WITH OTHER PARAPHERNALIA IN PASAY CITY.
OWNERS OF 51 OF THE JACKPOT SLOT MACHINES, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, oppositor-appellant.
Paterno R. Canlas for petitioners-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellant.
CONCEPCION, J.:
The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation — hereinafter referred to as the Director — seeks the review of an order of the Court of First Instances of Rizal directing the return of fifty-one (51) slot machines, and the paraphernalia thereof, to the owners thereof. The appeal is before us only questions of law being raised therein.
It appears that sometime before September 1, 1959, said slot machines and paraphernalia were being operated by the owners thereof in Pasay City pursuant to licenses issued by said City in conformity with its Ordinance No. 106. On the date adverted to above, the aforementioned machines and paraphernalia, together with other slot machines operated without said license, were seized under and by virtue of search warrants issued by a judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Said unlicensed slot machines were the subject matter of criminal cases Nos. 9571-I and 9569-I of the Municipal Court of Pasay City. However, the special prosecutor in charge of said cases opined that no criminal case should be filed against the owners of the fifty-one (51) slot machines involved in the case at bar, and accordingly, recommended that said machines and its paraphernalia be released and returned to the owners thereof. As a consequence, on September 2, 1959, the Secretary of Justice ordered the Director to release said slot machines to their respective owners. However, this order was subsequently suspended, the Director having invited attention to the fact that the court which issued the search warrants adverted to above might punish him for contempt if he released the machines without judicial authority therefore. This led to the filing of a motion by the owners of said machines praying that the same be ordered released and returned to them.
The Director objected to the motion upon the ground that the machines in question are intended to be used for the commission of in offense (gambling), and are a public nuisance, as well as illegal per se. After due hearing, the lower court overruled this opposition and granted said motion. Hence this appeal.1äwphï1.ñët
The main issue therein is whether or not the aforementioned slot machines constitute a nuisance per se or will be devoted, if released, to some unlawful use. Appellant maintains that the answer should be in the affirmative, relying mainly upon the decision of this Court in Philips vs. Municipal Mayor (G.R. No. L-9183, promulgated May 30, 1959), in which we held that an ordinance of the Municipality of Caloocan authorizing the operation of slot machines was illegal it being violative of section of 2242 (j) the Revised Administrative Code imposing upon municipal councils the duty "to prohibit and penalize gambling."
The doctrine laid down in the Philips case is not in point, for Republic Act No. 183, which is the Charter of Pasay City (Section 16[n]), expressly authorizes its municipal board "to regulate and fix the amount of license fee for" inter alia, "slot machines", a power not granted to the municipal council of Caloocan. It being conceded that the municipal board of Pasay City has passed Municipal Ordinance No. 106 (approved on June 26, 1957), fixing the amount of the license fees for the operation of slot machines, and that the owners of the slot machines in question have paid said fees and secured the corresponding licenses, it follows that the operation of said machines is neither illegal nor constitutes a nuisance. Needless to say:
The mere possession of a slot machine or even its operation for amusement and not for profit does not constitute a crime. (38 CJS 159, footnote 99[1].
A slot machine is not a "gambling devise" per se, because it can be operated legally as well as illegally. (Gen. Code No. 13066; Nader v. State, Ohio Supp. 287.)
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., took no part.
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