Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17281 March 30, 1963
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and FREE VISAYAN WORKERS (NEGROS BRANCH), respondents.
Hilado & Hilado for petitioner.
Porfirio C. Casa for respondent Free Visayan Workers.
Mariano B. Tuason for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.
PAREDES, J.:
The facts of the case, which are not disputed by the parties are as follows:
Herein petitioner is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines; operates a sugar central processing mill at Victorias, Negros Occidental, and is the owner of sugar cane plantations, known as Haciendas "Bacayan, Pacita, Florencia and VICMICO Nursery", all located at Victorias, and "Begonia and Natividad", located at Mabalang, same province. Respondent Free Visayan Workers (Union for short), is a legitimate labor organization, some members of which are employed by petitioner in the above-named haciendas and the VICMICO Nursery. On May 9, 1958, the Free Visayan Workers sent to herein petitioner a set of proposals for a collective bargaining contract in behalf of the laborers working in the sugar cane haciendas of the Victorias Milling Company. In reply to the said communication, herein petitioner, on July 29, 1958, informed the Union that it could not possibly enter into a collective bargaining contract or negotiate for the same, alleging that the provisions of the Industrial Peace Act (No. 875) are not applicable to agricultural workers. A charge of Unfair Labor Practice under Sec. 4(a), subpar. 6, in relation to Secs. 13 and 17 of said Act, was presented by the Union with the respondent CIR. After an investigation, the prosecutor of the respondent CIR filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice with said Court, against the milling company, docketed as Case No. 50-ULP-Iloilo. A motion to dismiss was interposed by herein petitioner, putting in issue the applicability of the provisions of Act No. 875 to herein petitioner, on its refusal to bargain collectively with respondent Union. On February 11, 1959, over the opposition of the Union, respondent CIR denied the motion to dismiss and ordered herein petitioner to answer the complaint. After the motion for reconsideration presented by Victorias Milling Co., Inc., was denied, the present action for prohibition was instituted and given due course.
The only issue We are called upon to determine in the instant proceedings is "whether or not the Industrial Peace Act applies to agricultural workers", since there is no dispute that the members of respondent Union are merely laborers in the different sugarcane plantations of the petitioner.
In the case of "Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Julian Araos", G.R. No. L-10091, Jan. 28, 1958, We stated —
.... For instance, there can be no question that under our Industrial Peace Act, the Republic or any political division or subdivision, like a province or municipality, must and should also be excluded from the definition of employer. Similarly, under the term "employee" of our law, agricultural laborers or individuals employed in the domestic service, like private or domestic drivers, housemaids, kitchen help, etc., should be exempted.
It is claimed, however, that the above is an obiter dictum.
In a case, involving workers in a sugar central, We made a distinction between those performing exclusively agricultural chores from those who are not. Thus, We said —.
Where petitioner is a highly mechanized industrial concern with the work of planting and harvesting clearly and distinguished from that of transporting the cane from the fields, first to a switch and later to the mill, all its workers are to be considered industrial workers, except those devoted to purely agricultural work." (Pampanga Sugar Mills v. PASUMIL Workers Union, G.R. No. L-7668, Feb. 29, 1956)
It is, therefore, the nature of the work which classifies a worker as one falling under the exemption as "agricultural laborers." The members of respondent Union are merely agricultural laborers in petitioner's haciendas, the principal work of which is planting and harvesting sugar canes and other chores incidental to ordinary farming operations. They are agricultural laborers. Being agricultural workers, and in the supposition that the milling company had committed unfair labor practice upon them, the Court of Agrarian Relations has jurisdiction over the case.
The landholder shall not discourage, directly or indirectly the formation, maintenance or growth of a union or organization of tenants in his landholding, but he shall not initiate, dominate, assist or interfere in the formation or administration of any such union or organization. (Section 27, par. 5, of RA 1199, as amended by RA 2263, Approved June 19, 1959)
We are inclined to uphold the negative view not only because an agricultural laborer does not come within the purview of the word employee defined in Section 2(d) of Republic Act No. 875, but also because any matter that may pertain to the relation of tenant and landlord comes under the Agricultural Tenancy Act (Republic Act No. 1199, as amended by Rep. Act No. 2263), and any controversy that may arise between them as an incident of their relationship comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations created by Republic Act No. 1267.
x x x x x x x x x
With regard to our conclusion, that the present controversy comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations, suffice it to state that the latter court was created for the "enforcement of all laws and regulations governing the relation of capital and labor on all agricultural lands under any system of cultivation" (Section 1, Republic Act 1267, as amended by Republic Act 1409) and was given exclusive jurisdiction over the entire Philippines "to consider, investigate, decide, and settle all questions, matters, controversies, or disputes involving all those relationships established by law which determine the varying rights of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land where one of the parties works the land" (Section 7, Ibid.) Complainants, therefore, should have lodged their complaint with the agrarian court for the redress of their grievance considering this broad power given to it by law even if nothing is said therein relative to unfair labor practice. The subsequent enactment of Republic Act No. 2263 which grants to agricultural workers the right to file an action of this nature merely serves to confirm this jurisdiction of the agrarian court. The conclusion is, therefore, inescapable that the industrial court has improperly assumed jurisdiction over the present case for it comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the agrarian court." (Santos v. CIR, et al., G.R. No. L-17196, Dec. 28, 1961)
An unfair labor practice cases involving agricultural laborers engaged in agricultural pursuits are within the jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian, Relations. (Hacienda Esperanza, et al., v. CIR, et al., G.R. No. L-18708, Nov. 28, 1962.)
CONFORMABLY WITH THE FOREGOING, the writ is granted, the order denying the motion to dismiss is set aside and respondent Court is hereby ordered to desist from taking any action in Case No. 50 ULP-Iloilo. Costs taxed against respondent Visayan Free Workers, which is hereby reserved the right to file their complaint in the proper court.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
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