Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17683 September 26, 1962
WILLIAM C. PFLIEDER, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
C.N. HODGES, defendant-appellee.
Felix G. Gaudiel and Felix M. Lagrito for plaintiff-appellant.
Leon P. Gellada for defendant-appellee.
LABRADOR, J.:
This concerns a motion requesting the Court to decide a motion to dismiss the appeal in the above-entitled case on the ground that the order denying a petition for relief is not appealable. This question was passed upon sub-silencio in the decision when in the dispositive part thereof we said: ". . . the order of the court denying the motion for relief, are (is) hereby set aside." Our reasons not having been given in the decision and as defendant-appellee insists on his motion to dismiss, we have adopted this resolution.
The defendant-appellee claims that the order denying a motion for relief is not appealable because the period for appeal, which has to be counted from the date of the notice of the original decision has already expired.
The general rule is that all judgments or orders that are final are appealable. Thus in Monteverde, et al. vs. Jaranilla, et. al., 60 Phil. 297, we laid down the following ruling:
An order denying a motion for the annulment of a judgment by default in accordance with the provisions of section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is final and appealable (Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial, 47, Phil. 810; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Manila Railroad Co. vs. Arzadon, 20 Phil. 452; Mejia vs. Alimorong, 4 Phil. 572.) 1awphîl.nèt(Syllabus)
In the case of Rios vs. Ros, 79 Phil. 243, we again held:
Certiorari does not lie against an order denying a motion for relief based on the ground of excusable neglect under Rule 38, because said order is final in character in that it put an end to the ordinary proceeding of the case in court, and therefore appealable (section 2, Rule 41; Monteverde vs. Jaranilla, 60 Phil. 297), and there is no showing that petitioner's failure to avail himself of the remedy of appeal which he might have pursued was not due to his fault or negligence. (Syllabus)
It is true that the judgment rendered by the court upon default had already become final because the 30-day period for the appeal had already expired. But this notwithstanding, Rule 38 allows the filling of a motion for relief, and the denial of such motion is appealable because is a final order. (Rule 41, Sec. 2) As the order denying the motion for relief has been set aside, the judgment becomes open to review. This is what happened in this case. As stated hereinabove nobody questions the fact that under the rules the original judgment had become unappealable by the expiration of the 30-day period; nevertheless the final judgment was subject to the motion for relief, and if granted, necessarily the judgment has to be set aside. In the case the judgment has been set aside and the case remanded for further proceedings.
The motion to dismiss the appeal in question was, therefore, correctly denied.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
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