Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18270 November 28, 1962
SAN PABLO OIL FACTORY, INC. and WERNER P. SCHETELIG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, KAPATIRANG MANGGAGAWA ASSOCIATION (NLU), respondents.
Chuidian Law Office and Romeo A. Real for petitioners.
Mariano B. Tuason for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.
Eulogio R. Lerum for respondent Kapatirang Manggagawa Association.
DIZON, J.:
Appeal by certiorari taken by San Pablo Oil Factory, Inc. and Werner P. Schetelig from the resolution of Court of Industrial Relations in Case No. 1350-ULP titled "Kapatirang Manggagawa Association (NLU) vs. San Pablo Oil Factory, Inc., and Werner P. Schetelig" of the following tenor:
Wherefore, the motion addressed to the Court en banc, dated July 6, 1959 should be, as it is hereby, granted; and the resolution of the Court en banc, dated October 29, 1958 was hereby modified to the effect that the workers involved are hereby awarded backwages corresponding to the period of their unemployment as a result of the discriminatory lockout committed by the respondents.
Respondent Kapatirang Manggagawa Association herein after referred to as the Union — is a legitimate labor organization affiliated with the National Labor Union. Most of its members work for the San Pablo Oil Factory, Inc. — referred to hereinafter as the company — a duly organized domestic corporation, whose president and General Manager is Werner P. Schetelig.
On February 25, 1957, the Union, thru its president, presented to the Company a petition for the renewal of the collective bargaining agreement entered into by and between them on July 6, 1955. The petition contained twelve new demands.
Inspite of a series of negotiations and conferences in the course of which proposals and counter-proposals were submitted and discussed, the parties were unable to reach any agreement. Consequently, the Union filed a notice of strike with the Department of Labor on April 22, 1957, effective May 22, 1957. Three days later, the Company, thru its president, likewise filed a notice of lockout with the Department of Labor to be effective on May 27, 1957. These notices notwithstanding negotiations between the parties went on until the afternoon of May 27, 1957 when upon closing of working hours, the Company declared a lockout against the members of the Union, of which the latter was notified.
After the lockout, the negotiations continued, and in the course of one of the conferences between the parties, the workers offered to return to work but without signing a new contract — unless their additional demands were granted. The Company insisted, however, as a condition precedent to their returning to work, that they sign a new contract embracing no more than the provisions of the old contract.
On July 26, 1957, the Union filed a complaint with the Court of Industrial Relations (Case No. 1350-ULP) charging the Company with unfair labor practice under section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 and praying that its members be allowed to return to work and be paid their wages from the time they were locked out to the time they will be allowed to resume their jobs.
The Company's answer alleged that the lockout was legal having been declared in accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Peace Act, and that it was members of the Union who refused to work under term of employment offered to them.
On September 8, 1957, the parties having agreed upon mutually acceptable terms of employment, signed a collective bargaining agreement. This notwithstanding case for Unfair Labor Practice (Case No. 1350-ULP) continued, but after due trial thereof, the Court of Industrial Relations, on March 21, 1958, issued an order missing the case. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the abovementioned order, and on October 1958, the Court en banc issued a resolution the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, let the order of the Trial Court, dated March 21, 1958, be, as it is hereby, reversed and respondent should be, as they are hereby held, guilty of unfair labor practice as charged in the complaint.
An appeal was taken by the Company from the above-mentioned resolution, but we dismissed it for lack of merit.
More than eight months afterwards, that is, on July 6, 1959, the Union filed a motion with the Court of Industrial Relations praying that, in view of its resolution finding the Company guilty of unfair labor practice, back wages be awarded to the workers during the period of the lockout.
After a hearing on the motion, on March 15, 1961, Court of Industrial Relations issued the resolution subject matter of the present appeal.
The question decisive of this appeal is whether or not under the provisions of Section 17, Commonwealth Act 103, as amended, in conjunction with Section 15, Republic Act 875, the respondent court had authority to issue the resolution of March 15, 1961, awarding back wages to the employees of the Union corresponding to the period of the lockout, thus substantially modifying its resolution of October 29, 1958 finding the Company guilty of the charge of unfair labor practice but without making any award of back wages.
It may be admitted in this connection that under the provisions of Section 15, Republic Act 875, upon a finding of an illegal lockout, the employees or workers are entitled to back wages corresponding to the period of the lockout. The relief of award, however, can not be presumed but must be expressly made in the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations. This was not done in the present case.
It is, however, contended that under the provisions of Section 17, Commonwealth Act 103, the Court of Industrial Relations may, at any time during the effectiveness of an award, order or decision, and on application of an interested party, and after due hearing, alter, modify, in whole or in part, or set aside any such award, order or decision, or reopen any question involved therein. However broad and ample this grant of authority may seem, we do not believe that it grants the Court of Industrial Relations authority to reopen issues already passed upon, and to subsequently alter its decision after the same has become final and executory. In this, case, upon notice of the resolution finding the Company guilty of unfair labor practice without making any award of back wages in favor of the workers, the latter or the respondent Union could have first moved for a reconsideration in that respect, and if said motion failed, they could have appealed. The record discloses that neither step was taken to correct the error, for error it was for the Court not to grant the back wages after finding the Company guilty of unfair labor practice.
In the case of Pepsi Cola, etc. vs. Philippine Labor Organization, G.R. No. L-3506, January 31, 1951, we held that under the provisions of Section 17 of Commonwealth Act 103, a proceeding may be reopened only upon grounds coming into existence after the order or decision was rendered by the Court of Industrial Relations, but not upon grounds which had already been directly or impliedly litigated and decided by said court, nor upon grounds available to the parties at the former proceedings and availed of by any of them, and that to hold otherwise may give way to vicious and vexatious proceedings.
The above ruling was reiterated in Nahag, et al. vs. Roldan et al., G.R. Nos. L-5983 and L-6265, November 1953, in the following language:
While Section 17 of C.A. 103, apparently authorizes Court of Industrial Relations to modify an award at any time during its effectiveness, it cannot be construed as broad enough to authorize modification after an order for execution of award has already become final with respect to the period elapsed at the time the order was issued.
To the same effect was the ruling laid down in Rattan Art etc. Inc. vs. Union, G.R. No. L-6466, May 21, 1954.
The decision in Luzon Brokerage, etc. vs. Luzon Union, G.R. No. L-2069, May 30, 1946, is not application to the present. In said case, the Court of Industrial Relations ordered the reinstatement of a suspended driver, with back pay from the date of suspension until actual reinstatement, but the decision was silent on the latter's wages and number of working days weekly before his suspension. After a hearing was held on a motion execution, during which evidence was presented, the Court issued a new order determining the daily wages of the driver concerned as well as the number of the hours weekly. It was held that the Court did not without or in excess of its jurisdiction in doing so, for the reason that the original decision had awarded back wages already. What was done subsequently was merely an implementation of said award, and this was within the power of the Court to do under Sections 17 and 18 Commonwealth Act 103.
In the present case, when the Court of Industrial Relations decided the case on the merits and found the company guilty of unfair labor practice, it made no award back wages. The workers or the Union such failure should have appealed, but instead they allowed said decision to become final and executory. Consequently, there was no award of back wages which could be implemented by subsequent order or resolution.
WHEREFORE, the resolution appealed from is reversed, without costs.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
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