Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17852 May 31, 1962
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. AMADOR E. GOMEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu and BABY GO,
represented by his natural guardian and father GREGORIO GO, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General and City Fiscal Jose S. Amadora for petitioner.
F. V. Borromeo and J. R. Gabuya for respondents.
PAREDES, J.:
On March 4, 1960, Gregorio Go, father and natural guardian of BABY GO, a minor of 9 years, filed a verified petition in behalf of said Baby Go, for the latter's change of name to ALBERTO GO. The petition was accomplished in due form, hearing was held, after which the Court on October 8, 1960, rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads —
The Court finds the petition to be well-founded and therefore grants the same; and pursuant thereto hereby authorizes the name of Baby Go, registered in the local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, to be changed to ALBERTO GO, and that henceforward this child shall bear the name Alberto Go.
On November 8, 1960, the Solicitor General, in representation of the Government, filed a Notice of Appeal from the above decision and on November 9, 1960, the requisite Record on Appeal. On November 12, 1960, Judge Amador E. Gomez promulgated an Order, denying the appeal interposed on the ground that the same is frivolous. Alleging that the respondent Judge, in denying the appeal and not giving due course thereto, and in refusing to approve the Record on Appeal, acted in grave abuse of discretion and unlawfully neglected the performance of an act specially enjoined upon him as a duty, where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the Government presented the petition at bar. Answering, respondents justified their actuation by citing the order denying the appeal, wherein it was stated that the Court saw no valid reason for the appeal; all requirements had been complied with; at the hearing, the City Fiscal appeared in behalf of the Solicitor General, who cross-examined the lone witness for the petitioner, and scrutinized both testimonial and documentary evidence offered; the Fiscal submitted the case with out argument; that during the hearing on the Record on Appeal, the City Fiscal could not point out wherein lies the error or mistake alleged to have been committed by the trial court, and upon which the appeal could be based, except to say that the City Fiscal's office received instructions from the Solicitor General to interpose an appeal.
There is no dispute regarding the fact that the appeal was filed within the reglementary period. We believe that it is not within the province of the lower court to declare, at that stage of the proceedings, whether an appeal is frivolous or not. Such duty devolves upon the appellate Courts. Where an appeal is presented on time, attended by the requirements of law, the same should be given due course (Sec. 3, Rule 41). An appeal, being an essential part of our judicial system and, in this case, proper, courts are enjoined to facilitate its taking due course. It is true that the City Fiscal could not point out wherein lies the error in the order granting the petition for change of name. We think, however, that it was sufficient for the City Fiscal to inform the Court that he was instructed by the Solicitor General to interpose an appeal, indicating that, as to him, the decision was against the law and the evidence. It cannot be said that the Solicitor General just wanted to interpose an appeal by mere caprice. It would be for the benefit of all concerned that the appeal of the State be given due course.
WHEREFORE, the Writ is granted; the Order of November 12, 1960, reversed, and another entered, ordering the respondent Judge to give due course to the appeal interposed by the Government. No costs.1äwphï1.ñët
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.
Bengzon C.J., is on leave.
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