Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14189 October 25, 1960
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUTIQUIO YAMSON and PRIMO ROMERO, defendants-appellants.
Ricardo D. Galano for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor C.D. Quianson for appellee.
PER CURIAM:
For killing a co-inmate in the Bilibid Prisons at Muntinglupa, Rizal, Eutiquio Yamson and Primo Romero were charged before the Court of First Instance of Rizal with the crime of Murder in an information which reads as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of February, 1958, in the municipality of Muntinlupa, province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who are convicts confined in the New Bilibid Prisons, by virtue of final judgments rendered against them, at night time, circumstance deliberately sought to insure success in the commission of the crime, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another, with evident premeditation and treachery, armed with deadly weapons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kill Maximo Reyes, also a convict confined in the same institution, by stabbing him with improvised weapons, pointed and/or sharpened, thereby inflicting upon him multiple stab wounds which directly caused his death;
That the aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism is present in the commission of the crime in that the crime was committed after the accused have been convicted by final judgments and while they were serving the said judgments in the New Bilibid Prisons.
Contrary to law with the following aggravating circumstances:
1. That the crime was committed with insult to public authorities;
2. That the crime was committed by armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity;
3. Use of superior strength or means was employed to weaken the defense;
4. Cruelty;
5. That the crime committed where public authorities were engaged in the discharge of their duties.
At their arraignment on March 15, 1958, Atty. Jose Atienza, counsel de oficio of the appellants, moved to withdraw his appearance and the appellants manifested their desire to secure the assistance of their own counsel. The trial court reset the arraignment to April 16, 1958 in the morning, but enjoined Atty. Atienza to continue to appear for them until the appearance of the new counsel. The arraignment for April 16, 1958, was transferred to April 21, 1958, on which date both accused, with the assistance of Atty. Atienza, entered a plea of guilty.
On May 31, 1958, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged in the information, which also alleges that the aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism is present together with five other aggravating circumstances. There is only one mitigating circumstance present, that is the plea of guilty, but since this is not enough to offset the above aggravating circumstances, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer the maximum penalty provided by law which is death and to indemnify the heirs of the offended party in the sum of P3,000.00 and to pay his corresponding share of the costs.
In view of the penalty imposed the case was automatically elevated to this Court, for review. Counsel de oficio, Atty. Ricardo D. Gallano, raised eight (8) errors which pose only the propriety and correctness of taking into consideration the aggravating circumstances described in the information and the imposition of the death penalty. The arguments of counsel center on the assumption that the aggravating circumstances did not attend the commission of the offense and that no evidence was adduced to prove them. Counsel further discourses on the alleged improvidence of the plea of guilty on the part of the appellants, with veiled insinuation that said appellants were not fully informed of the consequences of this plea.
We are fully convinced that before the appellants entered their plea of guilty, they were apprised of the import and consequences thereof. They did not plead without the assistance of counsel. Counsel de oficio was all the time at hand. The presumption of regularity and faithfulness in the performance of official functions, on the part of counsel de oficio, has not been overcome. No evidence appears on record that he had failed in his duty to advise the appellants of what to do. It would be creating a dangerous precedent to say now that the advice to plead guilty by the appointed counsel de oficio was improvident. The period embraced from April 21, 1958, date of arraignment, and May 31, 1958, date of promulgation of the sentence, could have given the appellants or counsel, ample time to move, or complain if their plea of guilty was improvidently given.
The issues raised by counsel in his brief were already answered by us in a number of cases. In U.S. vs. Barba, 29 Phil., 206, and U.S. vs. Santiago, 35 Phil., 20, it was held that a plea of guilty is an admission of all the material facts alleged in the complaint or information. In the subsequent cases, we ruled that a plea of guilty when formally entered in arraignment is sufficient to sustain a conviction for any offense charged in information, without the necessity of requiring additional evidence, since by so pleading, the defendant himself has supplied the necessary proof (People vs. Valencia, 59 Phil., 42; People vs. Palupe, 69 Phil., 702.) It matters not even if the offense is capital for the admission (plea of guilty) covers both the crime as well its attendant circumstances (People vs. Acosta, 98 Phil., 642; 52 Off. Gaz. [4] 1930). The allegation that the defendants did not get any practical benefit in pleading guilty to the crime charged, is not a plausible argument to dub the plea of guilty, as improvidently made. As well observed by the Solicitor General, "The matter of pleading guilty to a charge is not a game. An accused pleads guilty because he believes that he is guilty. The advantages that he may get by so pleading are mere secondary considerations. Using the very argument of appellants that their plea of guilty did not improve their situation we ask, what advantage would appellant achieve by undergoing a trial?"
The excuse that they might not have understood the import of their plea of guilty, as the aggravating circumstances were described in the information in the technical language of the law, is untenable, to say the least. They were assisted by counsel and the presumption is that said counsel informed them of the possible aftermaths of their plea.
It is alleged that the trial court should have required additional evidence after the plea of guilty, to show the existence of the aggravating circumstances described in the information. In answer it would be well to reproduce hereunder, the pronouncements of this court, regarding the suggested practice of calling witnesses or presenting evidence, in support of the accused's plea of guilty.
. . . (1) The essence of the plea of guilty in a criminal trial is that the accused, on arraignment, admits his guilt freely, voluntarily, and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act, and with a clear understanding of the precise nature of the crime or crimes charged in the complaint or information.
(2) Such a plea of guilty, when formally entered on arraignment, is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offense charged in the information, even a capital offense, without the introduction of further evidence, the defendant having himself supplied the necessary proof.
(3) There is nothing in the law in this jurisdiction which forbids the introduction of evidence as to the guilt of the accused, and the circumstances attendant upon the commission of the crime, after the entry of a plea of "guilty."
(4) Having in mind the danger of the entry of improvident pleas of "guilty" in criminal cases, the prudent and advisable course, especially in cases where in grave crimes are charged, is to take additional evidence as to the guilt of the accused and the circumstances attendant upon the commission of the crime.
(5) The better practice would indicate that, when practicable, such additional evidence should be sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction independently of the plea of guilty, or at least to have no room for reasonable doubt in the mind of either the trial or the appellate court as to the possibility of a misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the precise nature of the charges to which he pleaded guilty.
(6) Notwithstanding what has been said it lies in the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge whether he will take evidence or not in any case wherein he is satisfied that a plea of "guilty" has been entered by the accused, with full knowledge of the meaning and consequence of his act.
(7) But in the event that no evidence is taken, this court, if, called upon to review the proceedings had in the court below, may reverse and send back for a new trial, if on the whole record, a reasonable doubt arises as to whether the accused did in fact enter the plea of "guilty" with full knowledge of the meaning and consequences of the act. . . . ( U.S. vs. Jamad, 37 Phil., 305-318.)
Undoubtedly, the better practice in serious cases like the one at bar, is already stated in the above quoted pronouncements, but the trial judge must have been fully satisfied that the appellants entered the plea of guilty with full knowledge of the meaning and consequences of their act, more so when, as in this case, the lives of the appellants were involved. The record does not reveal that appellants or counsel ever complained or protested at the time of arraignment that they did not understand the information and the effect of their plea of guilty.
Conceding for the purposes of argument that the aggravating circumstances of use of superior strength or means employed to weaken the defense is absorbed by or inherent in treachery, the situation would not alter, because there would still be five aggravating circumstances, offset by one mitigating circumstance of the plea of guilty.
Conformably with the foregoing, we find the judgment appealed from to be in accordance with the evidence and the law. The same should be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David and Paredes, JJ., concur.
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