Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13113 August 13, 1959
BLAS ELNAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MACARIO P. SANTOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental,and ROMAN VALENCIA, et al., respondents.
A. P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen for petitioner.
Geminiano Eleccion for respondents.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This case before this Court on a petition for certiorari filed by Blas praying for the review of thedecision rendered by the Court of Appeals on September 26, 1957, affirming the judgment of the lower court which holds that its decision on the merits has already become final and executory.
This petition stems from a case originally filed before the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental wherein Blas Elnar prayed to be declared the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 1182 of the Cadastral Survey of Dumaguete. Decision was rendered in favor of defendants declaring them the owners of the land and awarding in their favor attorney's fees in the amount of P1,000.00.Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which wasdenied, and when he tried to appeal from the decision,the trial court declared that the motion for reconsiderationhe had filed was merely pro forma and did not suspendthe running of the period to appeal. Accordingly, thetrial court held that its decision was already final and executory.
Plaintiff filed a petition for mandamus with the Courtof Appeals in an attempt to secure an order directingthe trial court to give due course to his appeal, but theCourt of Appeals in a decision rendered on September26, 1957, denied the petition. Hence the present petitionfor review.
It appears that the trial court rendered judgment inthe main case on February 18, 1957, dismissing plaintiff'scomplaint but ordering him to pay defendants the sum ofP1,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs of action. Notice of this decision was served on plaintiff's counsel onMarch 28, 1957. On April 25, 1957, plaintiff's counselfiled a motion for reconsideration or new trial. On May9, 1957, the trial court denied the motion holding that itwas merely pro forma and as such did not suspend theperiod to appeal. This ruling was affirmed by the Courtof Appeals.
The question to be determined is whether said motionfor reconsideration or new trial is merely pro forma anddid not suspend the period to appeal.
Because of its intimate bearing on our discussion wequote hereunder the motion under reconsideration:
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
and/or NEW TRIAL.
Comes now the plaintiff BLAS ELNAR thru his undersignedattorneys and to this Honorable Court respectfully moves forreconsideration and/or new trial on the following.
GROUNDS
1) THAT THE EVIDENCE ARE INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFYTHE DECISION IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANTS(Sub-sec. c, Sec. 1 Rule 37, RULES OF COURTS); and
2) THAT THE DECISION IS CONTRARY TO LAW (Sub-sec.6 Sec. 1, Rule 37, RULES OF COURT).
SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OF ERRORS.
It is respectfully submitted, as required by Sec. 2, RULE 37 ofthe RULES OF COURT, that the Trial Court made errors in itsDECISION dated February 18, 1957 as hereinafter specified:
(A) ON QUESTIONS OF FACTS, this Court has erred on thefollowing points:
I
IN MAKING THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSION: "THECOURT IS OF THE OPINION, AND SO HOLDS, THATINASMUCH AS ANDRES LAS PIŅAS DID NOT HAVE ANYVALID AND LEGAL TITLE ON ANY PORTION OF LOTNO. 1182, TAN KING SIONG, THE PURCHASE AT THEPUBLIC AUCTION SALE OF THE LANDS IN QUESTIONBY THE SHERIFF IN 1937, ACQUIRED NOTHING . . ., (p. 6, DECISION").
II
IN MAKING THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSION; IFTHERE ARE PERSONS WHO ARE WANTING INPOSSESSION OF THE DISPUTED LAND, THEY ARE ANDRESLAS PINAS, TAN KING SIONG, WHO DID NOT EVENKNOW THE EXACT LOCATION AND BOUNDARIES OFTHE LAND IN LITIGATION, AND PLAINTIFF, WHO HASAT NO TIME BEEN IN POSSESSION OF THE SAME. (p. 6-7, DECISION).
III
IN FAILING TO MAKE A CATEGORICAL CONCLUSIONTHAT THE PLAINTIFF IS A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES DULY QUALIFIED TO OWN LAND (p. 7, DECISION).
(B) ON QUESTIONS OF LAW, the Court has erred on thefollowing points:.
I
IN MAKING THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSION: THE DEFENDANTS CAN NOT BE SAID TO HAVE BEEN BARRED BY THE PRINCIPLE OF LACHES IN ENFORCING THEIRRIGHT TO LOT NO. 1182 (p. 7, DECISION).
II
IN MAKING AN AWARD IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANTS OF ATTORNEYS' FEES IN THE AMOUNT OFP1,000.00 (p. 8, DECISION).
III
IN NOT RENDERING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THEPLAINTIFF AND AWARDING HIM ATTORNEY'S FEESO F P1,000.00.
ARGUMENTS
The plaintiff Blas Elnar respectfully reserves his right to submiteither written or oral arguments to substantiate this motion forreconsideration and/or new trial within such period of time as thisHonorable Court may grant.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff Blas Elnar invoking the provisions ofRULE 37 of the RULES OF COURT, partially Secs. 1 and 3thereof, respectfully prays this Honorable Court to set aside itsDECISION dated February 18, 1957 and to render judgment infavor of plaintiff Blas Elnar in accordance with his COMPLAINT.
Cebu City (for Dumaguete City), April 24, 1957.
|
A.P. DEEN & EDDY A. DEEN
By: (Sgd.) A.P. DEEN
Attorneys for the plaintiff
Pond & Deen Bldg., Cebu City |
Under section 2, Rule 37, a motion for new trial shallbe made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefor,notice of which shall be served on the adverse party.When the motion is made upon the ground that "theevidence was insufficient to justify the decision, or it isagainst the law," the motion shall point out specificallythe findings or conclusion of the judgment which are notsupported by the evidence or which are contrary to law,making express reference to the testimonial or documentaryevidence or to the provisions of law alleged to becontrary to such findings or conclusions.
Former Chief Justice Moran, commenting on the abovementionedprovisions, says: "Where a motion for new trial is filed under the third paragraph of this section and fails`to point out specifically the findings or conclusions of thejudgment which are not supported by the evidence or whichare contrary to law, making express reference to thetestimonial or documentary evidence or to the provisions of lawalleged to be contrary to such findings or conclusions', itshall be treated as a motion pro forma intended merely todelay the proceedings and it shall not interrupt or suspendthe period of time for the perfection of an appeal.1 However,where the motion for reconsideration was based on a claim that the finding of the trial court as to the authenticityof the disputed signature was not justified by theevidence submitted, which is the testimony of the expertwitness denying such authenticity, the motion points outwhy the finding of the court is not justified by theevidence, and is clearly not a pro forma motion for new trialor reconsideration; such motion for reconsiderationsuspends the period for perfecting an appeal."2
Analyzing the averments made by petitioner in hismotion for reconsideration we find that he attributes to thetrial court two errors: One is on "questions of fact" andanother on "questions of law." As to the former, hepoints out the findings or conclusions of the trial courtwhich in his opinion are supported by the evidence,although he does not make any express reference to suchevidence, and as to the latter he also points out specificallythe findings or conclusions which in his opinion arecontrary to law. We likewise find that plaintiff expresslyreserved his right to submit written or oral argument tosubstantiate his motion within such period of time as theCourt may grant him, which request was however ignoredwhen the Court denied outright his motion for reconsideration.
We believe that the above averments when consideredin the light of the decision on the merits may be consideredsubstantial compliance with the rule and may come underthe exception pointed out by former Chief Justice Moran.Here is where we may properly apply the principle thatthe rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote the interest of justice.
Another reason why the petition for mandamus wasdismissed by the Court of Appeals is the allegation not deniedby respondent that as of June 14, 1957, long before saidpetition was filed, plaintiff has satisfied the judgment ofthe trial court from which he is now seeking to appeal.This point needs clarification. Plaintiff's main action is torecover the ownership and possession of a parcel of landwhich was dismissed by the trial court even it awardedto defendants attorney's fees in the a amount of P1,000.000.It is from this dismissal that plaintiff is now appealingalthough incidentally he is also disputing the award ofattorney's fees. What was executed over plaintiff's oppositionis the award of attorney's fees. Payment, therefore,of said fees cannot be deemed an abandonment of hisappeal from the dismissal of his main cause of action. Eventhen such payment cannot be taken as abandonment becauseit was forced upon him through a writ of execution.And considering that under our rule a judgment may beexecuted even pending appeal if the trial court, in theexercise of its discretion, finds good reason therefor(sec. 2, Rule 39), there is no plausible reason for holdingthat payment by plaintiff of said attorney's fees constitutesand abandonment of his appeal.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed.The trial court is hereby ordered to give due course tothe appeal of petitioner.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador,Concepcion, Endencia and Barrera, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Valdez vs. Jugo, 74 Phil., 49; Alvero vs. De la Rosa, 76 Phil., 428.
2 Ylanan vs. Mercado, 94 Phil., 769; 50 Off. Gaz., 1982.
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