Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5217             May 13, 1953
Intestate Estate of the deceased, CARLOS VELORIA. VICENTE VILORIA, petitioner-appelle,
vs.
ISIDRO VILORIA, oppositor-appellant.
Justino Z. Benito for appellee.
Del Prado & Fernandez for appellant.
PARAS, C.J.:
On May 10, 1948, the petitioner Vicente Viloria filed in the Court of First Instant of Pangasinan a petition for summary distribution of the properties left by the deceased Carlos Viloria among his only surviving children and heirs, namely, the petitioner and Isidoro Viloria. The latter filed an opposition, alleging that he (Isidoro Viloria)should have a total share of some 17,079 square meters, and Vicente Viloria should have a total share of some 15,262 square meters. After several postponement of the hearing, the parties, assisted by their respective attorneys, submitted a written stipulation whereby a one-fourth portion on the western side of lot No. 3436 and a one-fourth portion of the northeastern side of lot No. 3394 are ceded to the oppositor Isidoro Viloria and the remaining three-fourths of said lots are ceeded to the petitioner Vicente Viloria. In view of this stipulation, and after receiving evidence from the petitioner in the support of his jurisdictional averment in the complaint, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan rendered a decision on March 8,1951, that the dispositive parts of which reads as follows:
Wherefore, the Court hereby declares that Carlos Viloria died intestate without debts, obligation, or credits whatsoever and that the person entitled to succeed in the properties left by said deceased are his two children, Vicente Viloria, to whom said properties be summarily adjudicated in accordance with the stipulation agreement submitted but said heirs on February 26,1951 and which is hereby approved, subject, however, to the provision of section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
Let a copy of this decision be forwarded to the Branch of Internal Revenue at Dagupan City for the purpose ascertaining the inheritance taxes, if any.
Notice of this decision was served on the parties, thru their respective attorneys, on March 13, 1951. On August 1, 1951, the oppositor, Isidoro Viloria, thru another counsel filed a petition praying that said decision be set aside and a trial on the merits be ordered, on the ground that the oppositor, being illiterate, but not know the true contents of the stipulation on which of the decision was based, and that said decision came to his personal knowledge only on July 23, 1951. On August 9, 1951, the oppositor filed an amended petition, containing the new allegation that the petition filed to include in his petition for summary distribution lot No. 4972, of some 7,995 square meters, as part of the hereditary estate left by the deceased Carlos Viloria. The petitioner filed an opposition. On August 23, 1951, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan issued an order, denying oppositor's petition and amended petition to set aside the decision of March 8, 1951. From this order the oppositor has appealed.
In this argued for the appellant that his petition is one for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, founded on fraud or mistake consisting in the fact that he signed the stipulation in the question in the belief that it adjudicated to him one-half of the entire estate left by the deceased Carlos Viloria. We cannot accept the appellant's position. The stipulation bore not only his signature but also that of his attorney, and during the hearing held on March 5, 1951, he confirmed, upon being questioned by the trial Judge, his thumbmark appearing on the document containing the stipulation. His attorney was also present at the hearing, and it cannot be supposed, in the absence of any showing to the contrary, that the latter acted irregularly. Indeed, that the appellant did not asked for a change of attorney. The appellant cannot claim that he learned of the decision only on July 23, 1951, because he was represented by counsel who received notice on March 13, 1951, and this is notice to the appellant. Much less can the latter claim that he was not timely apprised of the tenor of the appealed decision, but he must have known that said decision was to conform to the stipulation in question.
The alleged fact that the petitioner-appellee omitted in his petition for summary distribution lot No. 4972, is of no moment, since the same may be subject of a proper action, if desired, between the oppositor-appellant and the petitioner-appellee.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is affirmed without costs. So ordered.
Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
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