Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-4869             May 26, 1952

ESTEBAN MANGAOANG, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF LA UNION, respondent-appellee.

Leon V. Gaetos for appellant.
Hermenegildo Gualberto and Juan Gualberto for appellee.

PARAS, C.J.:

In civil case No. 39 of the Justice of the peace court of San Juan, La Union, a writ of attachment was issued in virtue of which one generator and two parcels of land were levied upon by the provincial sheriff as belonging to the defendants in said case. After judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Esteban Mangaoang, was rendered by the court, a writ of execution was issued, in pursuance of which the provincial sheriff was directed to sell the attached properties. Three days before the date of the sale, a third party claim was filed with the sheriff by one Gabriela Villanueva over the two parcels of land about to be sold. The sheriff notified the judgment creditor, Esteban Mangaoang, of this third-party claim and demanded from him an indemnity bond if he wanted the sale to be proceeded with, in accordance with section 15, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court. Esteban Mangaoang refused to file any bond, and insisted that the sheriff carry out the sale, contending that the third-party claim was filed too late. As the sheriff desisted from selling the properties, Esteban Mangaoang instituted in the Court of First Instance of La Union a petition for mandamus to compel the provincial sheriff to proceed with the execution sale. From a decision of the court dismissing the petition, the petitioner appealed.

It is contended for the appellant that the third-party claimant should have filed her claim with the sheriff before the latter had made a return to the writ of attachment. This contention is clearly without merit. We have here an execution sale. Section 15 of Rule 39 provides in part as follows: "If property levied on be claimed by any other person than the defendant or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serve the same upon the officer making the levy, and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment creditor or his agent, on demand, indemnify the officer against such claim by a bond in a sum not greater than the value of the property levied on, and, in case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of execution." Under this provision, it is clear that any person other than judgment debtor or his agent may file with the sheriff making the levy a third-party claim at any time, as long as the sheriff has the possession of the property levied upon, or before the property shall have been sold under execution.

The appellant, however, insists that because the two lots in question had been levied upon under a previous writ of attachment, the applicable provision is section 14 of Rule 59 which provides in part as follows: "If property taken be claimed by any other person than the defendant or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the ground of such right or title, and serves the same upon the officer while he has possession of the property, and a copy thereof upon the plaintiff, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property under attachment, unless the plaintiff or his agent, on demand of said officer, indemnifies him against such claim by a bond in sum not greater than the value of the property attached, and in case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be decided by the court issuing the writ of attachment." Even under this provision, the provincial sheriff was plainly correct in requiring the appellant to file an indemnity bond, because the third-party claim was filed with the sheriff while he had possession of the properties levied upon, this being the only time limit fixed in said provision.

The purpose of the indemnity bond is obviously to protect the sheriff against damages that may accrue to the third-party claimant by reason of the attachment or execution sale, and the matter of requiring such bond lies within the judgment and discretion of the sheriff.

Wherefore, the appealed decision is affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, Bautista, Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.


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