Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3624 December 28, 1951
TAN SENG HOO Y OTROS, recurrentes-apelantes,
vs.
MANUEL DE LA FUENTE, alcalde de la ciudad de Manila, Y OTROS, recurridos-apelados.
D. Bienvenido L. Rillo en representacion de los apelantes.
El Fiscal de la Ciudad S. Eugenio Angeles el Fiscal Auxiliar Sr. Arsenio Nañawa en representacion de la apelados.
PABLO, J.:
Los recurrentes son ciudadanos chinos y ocupantes depuestos (market stalls) en los mercados publicos de laciudad de Manila, con licencia expedida de acuerdo con laLey de la Republica No. 37 y la orden del Departamento de Hacienda No. 32. Se les concedieron dichos puestos porque no habia solicitantes filipinos.
El 26 de Mayo de 1949, cada uno de ellos recibio una notificacion en virtud de la cual se les requeria que dejasensus puestos dentro del termino de 24 horas, con las advertenciade que la ciudad de valdria de la policia para lanzarles de alli si no de jaban dichos puestos de acuerdo conla orden. En el mismo dia los recurrentes presentaron unrecurso de "prohibition", causa civil No. 8180, en el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila, pidiendo que se prohibiese al Alcalde y a sus agentes a echarles de sus puestos. En30 de Mayo del mismo ano el Juzgado expidio, a mociondebidamente presentada, una orden de interdicto preliminar.
En 6 de Enero de 1950 y despues de la vista correspondiente, el Juzgado de Primera Instancia dicto una decisions obreseyendo la solicitud de interdicto prohibitorio, dela que fueron notificados el 23 de enero de 1950.
Al siguiente dia el Tesorero de la Ciudad, obrando deacuerdo con la orden del Alcalde, dirigio cartas a los recurrentes, ordenandoles que vacasen sus puestos dentro decinco dias.
En 24 de enero el abogado de los recurrentes evio unacarta al Alcalde de la Ciudad, pidiendo que se suspendiesela orden hasta que la decision, hubiese quedado firme.
En 26 de enero apelaron contra la decision. El 30 delmismo mes se trasmitio el expediente al Tribunal de Apelacion,y el mismo dia el abogado de los apelantes presentouna mocion en dicho tribunal pidiendo que el expediente fuese cursado al Tribunal Supremo porque solamente tratabade suscitar cuestiones de ley.
El 31 de enero se envio el expediente a este Tribunal.
La mocion de los recurrentes en el Juzgado de PrimeraInstancia, en que se pedia un interdicto preliminar mientrasestaba pendiente la apelacion, fue denegada.
El 31 de enero de 1950, alegando que el tribunal inferiorabuso de su discrecion, los recurrentes presentaron a este Tribunal una mocion urgente pidiendo una orden de interdicto preliminar, que fue denegada en 3 de febrero delmismo ano.
En 21 del mismo mes presentaron una mocion de reconsideracion que fue denegada en 24 de febrero.
El "Annex B" de la solicitud, con fecha 6 de enero de1949, es un documento en que consta que Tan Ko Lok, residenteen la calle de Legarda No. 502, Sampaloc, ha pagadoal Tesorero de la Ciudad la cantidad de P1 como impuestode licencia (license fee) para ocupar por un ano desde el1.o de enero hasta el 31 de diciembre de 1949, el puesto443 (Stall 443, 2nd class) del mercado de Sampaloc. Losdemas recurrentes ocupan y han obtenido sus respectivospuestos bajo las mismas condiciones en que Tan Ko Lokocupa el suyo.
Cuando se dicto por el Juzgado de Primera Instancia deManila su decision en 6 de enero de 1950, los recurrentesya habian perdido automaticamente su derecho a permaneceren sus puestos. Con todo, pidieron ante este Tribunalla expedicion de un interdicto prohibitorio, preliminar: esodemuestra que querian aun permanecer en sus puestos sabiendoque su licencia ya habia expirado.
Los recurrentes contienden que, bajo la licencia expedidaa su favor (parecida al Annex "B"), tienen derecho apermanecer en sus respectivos puestos como los filipinospueden continuar ocupando los suyos. Esta contencion esinsostenible. Despues de expirado el plazo de un ano, niel chino, ni el filipino pueden permanecer en su puesto amenos que se haya renevado su licencia. Si, por el simplehecho de haber obtenido su puesto, el ocupante puede permanecerpor todo el tiempo que quiera, entonces seriainnecesario poner en la licencia el plazo de un ano. Lafijacion del plazo seria una redundancia.
Los recurrentes contienden que, bajo la Ley No. 37, elciudadano filipino tiene preferencia al puesto si lo solicitanun filipino y un extranjero; pero si no hay ningun solicitantefilipino, el extranjero tiene derecho al puesto. La preferenciaque se da al extranjero es solamente un acto decondescendencia o gracia, y su tenencia es precaria. Esaocupacion no es de estricto derecho; puede ser canceladaen cualquier tiempo por las autoridades de la ciudad. Enel caso de que no haya solicitante filipino, puede provisionalmenteconcederse el puesto a un extranjero para que produzcala renta necesaria para la ciudad. El ocupar unpuesto en un mercado publico esta reservado para losnacionales, es un privilegio concedido al filipino por disposicionconstitucional. No es un derecho inalienable quetiene todo ser humano, como el derecho a la vida, la libertadde penar, etc.
El Estado de New Jersey prohibe, por medio de una ley,a los extranjeros utilizar red para la pesca. (2 C. S. NewJersey, p. 252, par. 92.).lawphil.net
El Estado de new Jersey prohibe por una ley a losextranjeros dedicarse a la casa sin licencia. (2 C. S. NewJersey, p. 2528, pars. 134, 138.).
Se prohibe en Filipinas conceder a los extranjeros lacontrata de obras publicas, (Ley No. 4239) y las leyes delCommonwealth Nos. 108 y 421 castigan la evasion de lasleyes de nacionalizacion de cierto derechos de franquiciasy privilegios.
Las leyes de los estados de Washington y Nebraska queprohiben a los extranjeros ejercer la profesion de abogadofueron declaradas legales en In re Yamashita (70 Pac.,482) y en Re Admission to BAr (84 N. W., 611).
En Filipinas no se permite al extranjero ejercer la profesionde abogado, y este Tribunal ha denegado varias solicitudespresentadas por ciudadanos americanos.
En Gizzarelli vs. Presbey (117 Atl. Rep., 359), el TribunalSupremo de Rhode Island declaro que la ordenanzaque prohibe a un extranjero operar un "bus" de carga ypasaje en las calles de la ciudad no es discriminatoria, noviola la Enmienda 14.a de la Constitucion.
En Morin contra Nunan (103 Atl. Rep., 378), se declaroconstitucional la ordenanza de la ciudad de Weehawken,New Jersey, que prohibe la operacion por extranjeros devehiculos de motor para pasaje.
Fue declarada constitucional — que no viola la enmienda14.a de la Constitucion Americana — la Ley del Estado deMassachussets, que restringe para los ciudadanos americanosla expedicion de licencia para la ocupacion de buhonero.(Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E., 149.).
La ley del Estado de Pennsylvania que prohibe a los extranjerosmatar pajaros o animales silvestres, excepto endefenda propia y de su propiedad, fue declarada constitucionalpor el Tribunal Supremo de los Estados Unidos enPatsone vs. Commonwealth (232 U. S., 138; 58 L. ed., 539).
Las leyes que no permiten la expedicion de licencia para la venta de licores por extranjeros fueron declaradas constitucionales por el Tribunal de Apelacion de Maryland en Trageser vs. Gray (20 Atl. Rep., 905); por el Tribunal Supremo de Ohio en Bloomfield vs. State (99 N. E., 309); ypor el Tribunal Supremo de Texas en De Grazier vs. Stephens (105 S. W., 99,).
En People vs. Lowndes (29 N. E., 751), la Corte de Apelacion de Nueva York declaro que el articulo 441 del Codigo Penal, que castiga con prision y multa la recoleccion o cultivo de ostras en las aguas del Estado de Nueva York por uno que no es residente del mismo, se ha dictado con el fin de proteger a los resisentes con exclusion de los no residentes; y es, segun el Tribunal Supremo de los Estados Unidos, en McCready vs. Virginia (94 U. S. 391), "un ejercicio legal de Poder Legislativo sobre la propiedad comun de los ciudadanos del estado."
Las leyes y decisiones citadas son medidas que fueron adoptadas para proteger al nacional. Las barreras arancelarias son otras medidas encanminadas a proteger los recursos nacionales, como la agricultura y la industria. No son armas de mala ley; son remedios que utilizan las naciones cuando son necesarios. No deben resentirse los extranjeros si con su adopcion en Filipinas quedan afectados.
Si el Gobierno, por necesidad, tuviera que ceder a un extranjero una contrata de obras publicas por no haber ningun filipino que quiera hacerse cargo de ella, eso no esrazon para que despues el extranjero reclamase, como de estricto derecho, la otbencion de otras contratas.
Si, a falta de abogado o persona competente, un Juzgado nombra a un abogado extranjero para encargarse de la defensa de una acusado, eso no es razon para que el abogado extranjero reclame despues, como de estricto derecho, el privilegio de ejercer la profesion ante los tribunales de Filipinas. Los recurrentes, que obtuvieron licencia para ocupar un puesto en un mercado publico a falta de solicitatnes filipinos, deben comprender que por cortesia se les concedio dicho puseto y, no porque tienen derecho a el; no deben reclamar si se les echa del puesto porque lo ocupan en contravencion de la prohibicion constitucional.
La nacionalizacion de los mercados publicos ha quedado definitivamente establecida al aprobarse la Constitucion.
En Co Chiong y otros contra Hon. Miguel Cuaderno, Sr., y otros (46 Off. Gaz., 4833; 83 Phil., 242), este Tribunal dijo:
Public markets are public services or utilities. . . . Under the Constitution, the operation of all public services are reversed to Filipino citizens and to corporations or associations sixty per centum of the capital of which belongs to Filipino citizens.
xxx xxx xxx
Foodstuffs sold in public markets demand, at least, as much official control and supervision as the commodities sold and distributed in other public utilities. They affect the life and health of the people, the safeguarding of which is one of the basic obligations of a constituted government. Official control and supervision can be exercised more effectively if public market stalls are occupied by citizens rather than by aliens.
En el asunto de Aranque Market Extension ChineseVendors Associations contra Hon. Manuel de la Fuente, etc.y otros (48 Off. Gaz., 94) *, este Tribunal dijo:
Petitioner alleged that the Aranque Market Extension is nota public market within the meaning of all laws, ordinances, ordersand regulations governing public market because said market standson private property and its building was erected with private funds.This contention is not well taken. A market is a "public market" when it is dedicated to the service of the general public and isoperated under government control and supervision as a public utility, whether it be owned by the government or any instrumentalitythereof or by any private individual. It is settled doctrinethat "public market may be the object of individual ownership orlease, subject to municipal supervision and control." (43 C. J.p. 394.) Thus, if a market has been permitted to operate undergovernment license for service to the general public, it is a "public market" whether the building that houses it or the land upon which it is built be of private or public ownership. This is not differentfrom public vehicles or vehicles of public utility which are so classifiedwhether they be owned by private individuals or by governmentinstrumentalities. The factors determining a "public market", therefore,are the purpose or use to which such a market is dedicatedand the authority under which it operates, and not the fact orstatuts of ownership.
Y es porque el articulo 8, Titulo XIII, dispone asi:
No se concedera franquicia alguna, certificado u otra forma deautorizacion para operar un servicio publico, excepto a ciudadanosfilipinos o a corporaciones u otras entidades organizadas segun lasleyes de Filipinas, el sesenta por ciento de cuyo capital sea de lapropiedad de ciudadanos filipinos; y tales franquicia, certificado oautorizacion no tendran caracter exclusivo ni seran para un periodomayor de cincuenta anos. No se concedera franquicia o derechoalguno a cualesquier individuo, razon social o corporacion exceptobajo la condicion de que tal franquicia o derecho estaran sujetosa enmienda, modificacion o derogacion por la Asamblea Nacionalcuando el interes publico asi lo requiera.
Se contiende que un "stall" o un puesto en un mercadopublico puede ser ocupado por un extranjero de la mismamanera como este puede ocupar un "taxicab". No existesimilitud en los dos casos. El que usa un "taxicab" es uncomprador del servicio de transportacion. El que ocupa un"stall" no es un comprador: explota el negocio de venderen un mercado publico, que es lo que se prohibe precisamente.El extranjero puede comprar efectos de un "stall"como puede ser pasajero de un "taxicab"; pero no puedeocupar el "stall" para dedicarse al negocio de vender, comono puede, directa ni indirectamente, explotar el negocio detransportar pasajeros por medio de un "taxicab". Un extranjeroque paga determinada cantidad al Yellow Taxicab Co., por ejemplo, para que bajo el nombre de esta y pormedio de un taxi de su propiedad explote el negocio detransportar pasajeros, indirectamente infringe la ley.
Si un "stall" puede ser ocupado por un extranjero, todoslos "stalls" podran serlo igualmente por extranjeros. Entoncesla nacionalizacion de los mercados publicos seria unaverdadera irrision. Es evidente que no se nacionalizo laadministracion de los mercados publicos porque ya esta acargo de los gobierno municipales; lo que se nacionalizoes el negocio al por menor que se realiza en los "stalls".
Ese negocio es rudimentario, es comercio en su estadoembrionario; apenas se emplearia un capital de veinte otrienta pesos; es migaja de pan comparado con los comerciosen que hay concurrencia libre de nacionales y extranjeros.Si se encomendo a los ciudadanos filipinos la explotacionde los "stalls" en los mercados publicos es porquese deseaba evitar que en las transacciones que se hacenprecipitadamente por exigencias del momento se sirvieraal publico gato por liebre. No hay mejores y mas celososguardianes de la salud del pueblo que los mismos nacionales.Asi razonaron los varios tribunales supremos de los EstadosUnidos al sostener la constitucionalidad de las varias leyesproteccionistas que fueron impugnadas de nulas.
Se confirma la decision apelada con costas contra losapelantes.
Bengzon y Jugo, MM., estan conformes.
Paras, Pres., Feria, Padilla y Bautista Angelo, MM.,conformes con el resultado.
Separate Opinions
TUASON, J., dissenting:
The main basis of this Court's decision is Annex B, a sample of the license issued to the petitioners. The decision holds that these licenses being for one year, ending December 31, 1949, the petitioners had already lost automatically their rights to their stalls when the trial was held. "Con todo — says the decision — pidieron ante este Tribunal la expedicion de un interdicto prohibitoro preliminar: eso demuestra que querian aun permanecer en sus puestos sabiendo que su licencia ya habia expirado."
This statement takes for granted several things none of which the court below or the City Fiscal himself has dared insinuate. Nor do the petitioners contend, that "bajo la licencia expedida a a su favor (parecida al Annex B), tienen derecho a permanecer en sus respectivos puestos como los filipinos pueden continuar ocupando los suyos." Neither the court below in its decision, nor the City Fiscal in his brief, nor the petitioners in their brief so much as mention Annex B.
But inasmuch as this Court has dwelt on Annex B, I am going to explain what I think this annex is.
To begin, the petitioners' asserted right to keep their respective stalls is not founded on Annex B; it is the lease, with which the decision of this Court seem to confound the license, that is the petitioners' cause of action. The licenses of which Annex B is one, are provided for in Ordinance No. 2995, as amended by Ordinance No. 3051, and are nothing more than a sort of tax on business. Sections 3 and 4 of Ordinance No. 2995 as amended read:
Section 1. License. — No stallholder shall engage or conduct his business in the City public markets without first having obtained a license therefor from the City Treasures.
Section 3. Fees. — There shall be paid in advance to the City Treasurer for every license granted under the provision of this ordinance an annual fee as enumerated below.
Such licenses or license fees are classified by Section 8, pending on the markets and the kinds of merchandise sold. They vary in amount from as low as P0.10 to P1.50 a year.
It is hardly necessary to remind ourselves that these license fees are not different, except perhaps as to amount, from licenses fees imposed on all similar businesses outside the markets. They are paid yearly into monthly, quarterly, or semi-annual installments. We also know that the period to which a license fee corresponds is not the measure of the time the license may run a business. The business continues license fee. In a special sense, the license follows the business and not vice versa.
What are closely related to the points at issue, though also undecisive thereof, are the rentals on market stalls. The rentals are fixed in section 25 of the Market Code. Ordinance No. 2898, as amended, and there is another schedule of payments different form that of license fees both as to amount and interval. Thus Section 4 of Ordinance No. 2995, as amended by Ordinance No. 3051, stipulates that "in addition to the license fee provided in the preceding section, cash licenses or stallholder shall pay the rental fees provided in section 35 (337) of Ordinance No. 2398, known as the Market Code as amended." These rentals are payable daily, and graduated at rates which range from P0.10 in the Pandacan market to P0.50 in the Divisoria market.
The collection of rentals daily, like the collection of license fees annually, was devised as a matter of expediency. The stallholder might abandon his stall; he might die without leaving any heir, or be expelled for cause before the end of the year, quarter or month. By no means is the daily collection of rentals intended to be the duration of the lease. Otherwise, and under the theory of this Court's decision, the stallholder would be subject to ejectment at the close of each day. It should be observed that the rentals may be paid in advance for a longer period at the stallholder's option. And so may the license pay the license fee in advance for more that a year if the system of accounting permits.
The duration or term of the lease of a market stall is treated in Section 25 of the Market Code and section 8 of Ordinance No. 2995. According to these sections the lease is "continous" and permanent, and by the first-mentioned section a regular lease of a market stall may be revoked by the City Mayor only "for any reasonable or just cause, or for any violation of the provisions of this or any other ordinance, or any rules and regulations relating to the administration of the public markets." The permanent character of the lease is more particularly emphasized by the fact that the leasehold is made hereditary; under Section 20 of the Market Code, upon the death of the lawful stallholder, or in case of his physical disability for work, the surviving spouse or the eldest legitimate son or daugther, as the case may be, is entitled to succeed that deceased or incapacitated stallholder to the lease.
These ordinances part take of the nature of a contract between the city and the stallholder, and it would take strong reasons of national policy, as declared by the legislature, and public welfare, for even the City Council to impair its (contract's) obligations. At any rate, the City Mayor can only execute the provisions of the above ordinances; he has no express or implied power to eject any stallholder except for any of the causes specified in those ordinances. This rule is elementary, to familiar to all students of constitutional and municipal governments to be elaborated upon.
The next question that naturally crops up is, have the appellants violated any of the provisions of the Market Code or of the rules and regulations governing the administration of public markets? Not in the least. It is alleged by the petitioners, and the allegation is expressly admitted by the respondent, that "the petitioners had always been pursuing peacefully and lawfully their business in said stalls, complying with all lawfull orders and regulations above mentioned plus their paying the required daily stall fees."
The leases under consideration were terminated for no other reason than the stallholders are aliens and markets are public utilities. Indeed it is suggested that this is only an ostensible reason, the true reason being politics. Our attention is drawn to the coincidence that the ousting was carried out, and in a pereptory and summary manner, few months before the 1949 elections.
But let us brush aside this little burst of cynicism and confine ¨the discussion with the territory of the respondents' and this Court's argument.
It is said that, as aliens are prohibited by the Constitution from operating public utilities and markets are public utilities, therefore aliens may not occupy market stalls. To begin with, I dissented from this Court's decision holding that markets are public utilities, and I still do adhere to this belief. Public utilities are enumerated in Section 13(a) of Commonwealth Act No. 146. Public markets are not included in the list. Turning to American definition of public utility I find no characteristic of publc markets that comes within the description.
But before the present purposes of this dissent. I may and do assume that public markets are public utilities; so what? I still remain maintain that the majority confuses public markets with stallholders. Stallholders are not public utilities simply because they do business in public markets-not only more than a person is a public utility who rides in a public bus or hires a vehicle from a public utility company for his exclusive and personal use. The largest department store on the Escolta is not a market, and that store would not be a market if it were moved into a market compound. A market in the sense in which the term
is used in Republic Act No. 37 and the Market Code means "the territorial area in which goods are brought and sold or the gathering in such area for the purpose of buying or selling goods. (26 Words and Phrases 530.)
Assuming, as I do for the sake of argument, that markets are public utilities, the governmental agency or instrumentality charged with regulating public utilities would deal with the owner or owners of the place, prescribe how and where the stalls should be arranged, how much should be charged for each stall each. It would not deal with in dividual stallholders or stallowners just as it does not deal with hirers of public buses for private use. On the contrary, the regulations would have an eye single to the convenience and protection of stallholders and the prevention of discrimination against applicants for stall. It is the interest of the merchants where with the Public Service Commission would be concerned. The prices of commodities, the fitness of merchandise for human consumption, and the like are matters for other agencies of the government to look into.
We have seen that Republic Act No. 37 excludes with some exceptions, aliens form the privilege of renting stalls in public markets. This exclusion is not obedience to any constitutional mandate but is predicated upon entirely different considerations. Proof of this is that the exclusion is not absolute but conditional on lack of Filipino bidders for stalls. Incidentally, this permission although conditional, for aliens to occupy market stalls is an illustration of the belief, at least, of Congress that individual merchants in or outside public market are not public utilities. At any rate, the Congress has spoken, and the Mayor whose position was created by Congress is duty bound to respect legislative enactments. This Court has not declared Act No. 37 unconstitutional and does not pretend to do so in this case.
The passage quoted from this Court's decisions and relied upon now by this Court, by the court below, and by the respondents, to the effect that governmental functions and privileges may be denied to aliens, is correct. There can be no doubt that those functions and privileges may be confined to Filipinos by the Legislature and most of them are as a matter of fact. But so may the Congress allow aliens to enjoy and exrcise any of them. And as already stated, the Congress does allow by incontrovertible implication if not by express provisions of Act No. 37 aliens to hold public market stalls. The control over the functions and privileges referred to is derived from the principle of sovereignty and not from the fact that they are public utilities, for no one would claim that they are.
From what has been said there stand out those unassailable facts, which in reality are the only factors that matter in this case: The Congress has authorized the lease to aliens of stalls which Filipinos don't want. The City Council by ordinance has followed suit. And the petitioners were awarded the stalls in question because these are in remote and dark corners of the market and no Filipinos were interested in them. The validity of Act No. 37, of the ordinace or of the lease is unchallenged.
How can we get around these facts? The Court has found a way out and here it is: "La preferencia que se da al extranjero es solamente un acto de condescendencia o gracia, y su tenecia es precaria. Esa ocupacion no es de estricto derecho; puede ser cancelada en cualquier tiempo por las autoridades de la cuidad. En el caso que no haya solicitante filipino, puede provisionalmente concederse el puesto a un extranjero para que produzca la renta necesaria para la ciudad. El ocupar un puesto en un mercado publico esta reservado para los nacionales, es un privilegio concedido al filipino por disposicion constitucional. No es un derecho inalienable que tiene todo ser humano, como el derecho a la vida, la libertad de pensar, etc."
But this theory runs headlong against express provision of the Market Code, that, subject to the exceptions specified in that by-law, the lease is not only for life but hereditary. Aside from these specific provisions, common sense positively abhors the idea that the Mayor, the City Council itself could bring the lease to an end at will. Moreover, no sensible merchants would think of bidding for a space or stall in a public market, investing capital and making other preparations to set up business, with the knowledge that the next day, next month, next year, or on the approach of the next election he might be ousted.
The decision meets this observation, which was made in the course of the deliberations, with this one: "Ese negocio es rudimientario, es comercio en su estado embrionario; apenas se emplearia un capital de veinte o treinta pesos; es migaja de pan comparado con los comercios en que hay concurrencia libre de nacionales y estranjeros."
One thing I am certain I understand in this remark is that only 20 or 30 pesos is needed for capital to operate a store in a market. My reply is that from common observation the figures given are an extreme understatement, to say the least, unless we are thinking of peddlers who bring to market on their head fruits, greens or vegetables from their yards.
This is not a brief for aliens or against nationalization of industries and the retail trade. That is the concern of Congress. Courts are constituted for another and distinct purpose: to interpret the law and administer justice according to law, humanity, and decent respect for the sanctity of contracts and commitments.
Wherefore, I dissent.
REYES, J., dissenting:
On October 1, 1946, Congress passed Republic Act No. 37 to take effect on January 1, 1947, giving citizens of the Philippines preference in the lease of public market stalls and empowering the Secretary of Finance to promulgate necessary rules to carry out its purpose. In the exercise of this power, the Secretary of Finance, on November 26, 1946, issued Department of Finance Order No. 32, declaring all stalls and booths in public markets vacated as of January 1, 1947, so that they may thereafter be leased to Filipino applicants, and providing that "only in the absence of a Filipino applicant" may the ward be made to an alien.
Because of the enforcement of the aforementioned Deparetment Order, the herein petitioners, who were Chinese citizens holding stalls in different markets of the city of Manila, were ousted from their stalls on or about January 12, 1948. But, as authorized in the same Department Order and the Republic Act above mentioned, they were later awarded other stalls not applied for by any Filipino.
Sometime in May, 1949, however, petitioners were officially notified that pursuant to a special orders of the Mayor, they were to vacate their stalls within 24 hours or face forcible ejectment by the police. Considering the order illegal, petitioners sought to restrain its enforcement by bringing the present action for prohibition in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Mayor, the Treasurer, and the market administrators of the city. The court dismissed the action, holding that it had no reason to interfere with city officials in the enforcement of Republlic Act No. 37. From this decision ¨petitioners have appealed to this Court.
It is admitted that petitioners have not violated any provision of the Market Code or any regulation governing the occupancy of market stalls to warrant revocation of their lease. And is not disputed that the stalls in question were awarded to the petitioners because there were no Filipino applicants for them. The sole issue is whether petitioners may be barred form the market stall for no other reason than they are aliens.
The Government has already established a national policy with respect to the leasing of stalls in public markets. As enunciated in Republic Act No. 37, the policy is to give Filipino citizens preference in the lease of those stalls but not to bar aliens therefrom. Consistently with that policy, the Department Order implementing the Act permits the award of a stall to an alien "in the absence of any Filipino applicant." The policy received judicial sanction in the case of Co Chiong et al. vs. Cuaderno, 46 Off. Gaz., 4833 *.
I understand it to be the first duty of every public officer to obey the law, and I cannot conceive how this Court could sanction a violation of that duty by giving validity to the challenged order of the city executive issued in defiance of the terms of a statute which for our purposes must be presumed valid because this Court has not declared it unconstitutional.
I, therefore, dissent from the opinion of the majority.
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