Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1471 May 20, 1949
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULIAN ORAZA, defendant-appellant.
Isidoro B. Ibay appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Isidro C. Borromeo for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
In the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, the appellant Julian Oraza was prosecuted physical injuries for inflicting upon the offended partyHilario Sison injuries which required medical attendance and took sixty days to heal, and which, during the afore-said period o f time, incapacitated said offended party for the work on which he was theretofore habitually engaged. When first arraigned, he pleaded not guilty, but later, with leave of the court, this plea was withdrawn and, upon rearraignment, he pleaded guilty. After said second plea, and with the permission of the court, he proceeded to prove surrendered to the authorities after the commission of the crime and that he was a little bit drunk at the time he committed it, his drunkenness not being habitual. The lower court, considering his plea of guilty as well as the other mitigating circumstances sentenced him to four months of arresto mayor and to pay the costs, at the same time reserving to the offended party the right to claim damages in a separate civil action. From this decision,the defendant appealed, alleging that the penalty is excessive, and that, furthermore, the lower court erred in making the reservation in favor of the offended party claim damages in a separate civil action, inasmuch asnowhere in the complaint is any claim for damages made, aside from the reserve the offended party was made after the defendant had pleadedguilty to the information.
As regards the penalty imposed the same is clearly not excessive. Counselfor the appellants in his brief, admits that the penalty of arresto mayor is within the range provided by law only that consideration the number of mitigating circumstance stances, namely three, and that the injuries inflictedupon the offended party healed in sixty days and not in ninety dayswhich is the maximum period mentioned in article 263, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposed should have been. only two months, which is the minimum of the penalty next lower to that prescribed law. This contention, we find to be unfounded. There is no warrant or reason for making any fine distinctions based on the period within which injuries inflicted upon an offended party may have actually
healed, — that is,whether the are within the minimum, medium or maximum period. or number of days mentioned in the article of the Revised Penal Code involved. In the present case it is sufficient that the same came under the provisionsof article 263. paragraph 4, of the code inasmuch as the period of incapacity and healing of the injuries was more than thirty days but not more than ninety days.
Once the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law is applied because of the presence of two or more mitigating circumstances, the period, — whether it be in the maximum, medium or minimum — should and must be left entirely to the discretion of the trial court, according to the very terms of article 64, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the Period that it man deem applicable, according to the number of such circumstances. (5 Viada, 5th ed, p. 577.)
As to the second point regarding the reservation in favor of the offended party of the right to claim damages in a separate civil action, there is no need to allege in the information that the offended party hadsuffered damages and intends to make a claim for them. Every person criminal liable for a felony is also civilly liable (Art 100, Revised Penal Code) So, when a complaint or information is filed even without any allegation of damages and the intention to prove and claim them, it is to be under that the offender is liable for them, and that, the offended party has the rightto prove and claim for them, unless a waiver of the reservation is made. (People vs. Celorico, G. R. No. 45738, 1 8 Lawyers' Journal, Phil., 403; United States vs. Heery, 25 Phil., 600.) As a matter of fact, the record in the present case shows that the reservation was made by the court in favor of the offended Party Previous to the plea of guilty by the appellant. (See page 2, t. s. n. Posadas.)
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Tuason and Reyes, JJ., concur.
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