Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1639 March 19, 1949
FLORENCIO REYES, petitioner,
vs.
SOTERO RODAS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, JOAQUIN GARCIA, as Sheriff of Manila, and JOSE V. RAMIREZ, respondents.
Ramon Diokno and Domingo Sandoval for petitioner.
Delgado, Dizon and Flores for respondents.
PERFECTO, J.:
Petitioner prays for the annulment of the writ of execution issued on July 25,1947, in civil case No. 70328 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Jose V. Ramirez vs. Florencio Reyes, ordering the latter, among other things to vacate and restore to plaintiff the premises known as 428-430 Azcarraga Street, Manila in virtue of a judgment rendered on September 14, 1945.
On September 9, 1947, this Court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction for the suspension of said writ of execution.
The case in which the writ of execution was issued in one of ejectment in which adverse decision of petitioner was rendered first in the municipal court of Manila and then in the Court of First Instance off Manila.The latter's decision was affirmed by the Supreme court in March, 1947.
The property belong to Basilisa Gonzales and Carmen Gorricho de Aguado. Plaintiff Ramirez was the administration having filed the complaint for the benefit of the two owners.
While the case was pending in the Supreme Court, defendant Reyes according to him happened to learn that Ramirez was relieved by the owners as administrator since October 4, 1946, and the Bank of the Philippines Islands had been appointed in his stead. Reyes agreed with the new administrator to buy the property and pending negotiations for the suspension of the decisionfor ejectment. Consequently, Reyes filed with the Supreme Court on April 10,1947, a petition said suspension. On April 18, 1947, this court denied the motion "without prejudice to filing the same in the lower court."
Following this suggestion, Reyes filed with the lower court a motion for suspension of execution April 23, 1947. On April 28, 1947, Ramirez filed an urgent motion for execution of the judgment.
Both motion were heard on May 24, 1947, after the property in question was sold by the Bank of the Philippines Islands as attorney-in-fact of the owners in deed of sale executed since May 9, 1947.
Reyes paid in cash P165,00. The sale being absolute and definitive included all the building and improvements "with all the right to inherent to the property including possession." Accordingly, On May 12, 1947, transfer certificate of Torrens title No. 7344 was issued in favor of Reyes by the Register of Deeds of Manila free from all encumbrances.
On July 11, 1947, however, the respondent judge ordered the issuance of writ of execution as prayed for in plaintiff Ramirez' motion.
On July 21, 1947, Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration. Before it had been acted upon a writ of execution was issued on July 25, 1947. The motion for reconsideration was denied on September 3, 1947.
Upon the above facts, petitioner Reyes contends that the issuance of the writ of execution had been made in excess of jurisdiction, it being an absurdity and injustice to oust him from the property when he has become the owner of the same including the right of possession thereof and forthe property to be delivered to responded Ramirez who with the revocation of his power as administrator had completely lost his interest in the property and in the case.
Without denying petitioner's allegation respondents answered that the petitioner has omitted important facts and accordingly proceeded to allege them. Substantially they are:
By reason of a dispute between Ramirez and Reyes, the first entered into a contract of lease for the same property with M. Hernandez for a period of two year starting from April, 1945., the contract to be effective upon the termination of the ejectment suit against Reyes, and Hernandez to shoulder all expenses of the litigation. Later it was agreed that the two-year lease would begin when the property is turned over to M. Hernandez.
M. Hernandez assigned during her life time the lease agreement to her daughter Elvira Montenegro. Basilisa Vda. de Gorricho, one of the owners, while willing to sell the property to Reyes wanted to be relieved of responsibility in connection with the contract of lease with Elvira Montenegro, and the latter to relinquish to said lease.
Upon failure to make Elvira Montenegro relinquish said right Ramirez was relieved was relieved of the his administration. Ramirez continued even after revocation, to carry on the litigation against Reyes not only on behalf of the owners but also on behalf of M. Hernandez and subsequently Elvira Montenegro. After final decision was rendered, on Ramirez' suggestion, the Bank of the Philippines, on Ramirez suggestion the Bank of the Philippines Island authorized his attorneys to eject Reyes and to give the possession of the property to Elvira Montenegro. On October 1, 1946, upon being informed of the negotiation taken by Reyes to purchase the property, the negotiation taken by Reyes to purchase the property, Elvira Montenegro wrote him a latter informing him of the lease contract entered into between her and Ramirez. The agreement for Elvira Montenegro to shoulder all the expenses of the ejectment suit was acquiesced in by the owners of the property.
In the deed of sale executed by the Bank of the Philippines Islands on May 9, 1947, in favor of Reyes the latter assumed the consequences of the contract of lease executed between Ramirez and M. Hernandez and assigned to ElviraMontenegro.
Upon the fact alleged by petitioner and supplemented by respondents, both set undisputed the conclusion is unavoidable that respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in n writ of execution and that the writ of execution issued on July 25, 1947, is null and void.
Jose V. Ramirez instituted the ejectment proceeding merely in a representative capacity as administrator of the property appointed by the owner thereof. At the time he move for the issuance of the writ of execution, he was no longer the administrator of the property having been relieved of said position by the owner who in his stead appointed the Bank of the Philippines Island. Consequently he lost his legal personality to take any part in the ejectment proceeding. Without that annectent personality he has absolutely no standing in the case. The legal category of a third person who had never intervened in the litigation. The fact that his name continued to appear in the title of the case and there is no showing that either the Bank of the Philippines Islands or the owners themselves had appeared in the case to substitute him is immaterial and would not in any way, restore the legal personality of which he was divested as a result of the cessation as administrator.
After Florentino Reyes had purchased the property including the right of possession thereof he stepped into the shoes of the owners. The purchase had the effect of merging the owners. The purchase had the effect of merging the two legal personalities which had been litigation in the ejectment proceeding on one side the owners represented by administratorJose V. Ramirez and on the other Florencio Reyes. The merger had the effect of blotting out the owner and Ramirez form the whole scene leaving the whole legal field to Reyes alone.
The writ of execution would have the effect of ousting Reyes from the property the same to be delivered to Ramirez as agent or representative of the owner after purchasing the property he would be the one entitled to take and have possession of the property. Ramirez cannot claim said possession not only because he had been relieved of and substituted in his duties as administrator but because even if he had not been relieved he cannot claim a better right than his principal the owners who had transferred the possession of the property to Reyes. Any right that an agent may claim is always subservient to that of his principal.
After Reyes became by purchase the owner of the property and entitled to its possession the acquisition carried the right of the party plaintiff in the ejectment proceeding in the same way as if he had actually taken the place of said party-plaintiff in the proceeding by appearing as substitute thereof. What then be the purpose of writ of execution that would oust Florencio Reyes from the property the property to be delivered to the same Florencio Reyes?
Under the circumstances of the case the legal result is not different from that which would obtain if both parties had actually agreed by written stipulation to quash the execution of the judgment. The step taken by Reyes had actually the effect of quashing said execution. Although without the superfluous ceremonial formality of a corresponding written stipulation. The lower court had no more business to order the execution. In ordering it, it stepped beyond the bounds of its jurisdiction.
The existence of the alleged lease contract between Ramirez and M. Hernandez, the latter substituted by Elvira Montenegro, cannot absolutely affect the result because according to respondent allegation no copy of the contract having been shown said contract was contingent upon the result of the ejectment suit and ouster of Reyes from the property and M. Hernandez and Elvira Montenegro had anticipatively abided by the outcome of the ejectment proceeding.
According to respondent answer the contract of lease with M. Hernandez was for a period of two years from the month of the April, 1945. When the writ of execution was issued on July 25, 1947, the two-year period agreed upon had already expired. As a matter of fact it had already expired when respondent judge issued on July 11, 1947, the issuance of the writ of execution.
It is true that according to Exhibit 1 of respondent Ramirez and Hernandez agreed to make the starting point of the two year period from the time possession of the property is turned over to M. Hernandez or Elvira Montenegro but said possession had not been and cannot be turned over to Elvira Montenegro and the latter has no claim to press.
Respondents' allegation that Ramirez might be liable for damages to Elvira Montenegro for not executive the judgment in the ejectment proceeding and ousting Reyes has no ground in fact or in law. The two-year period originally set to begin in April 1945, had expired and the two-year period with a contingent beginning has not basis to exist because the contingency of the ouster of Reyes turned against Elvira Montenegro expectations.
The order of respondent judge dated July 11, 1947 and the writ execution issued pursuant thereto on July 25,1947, are set aside and the writ of preliminary injunction herefore issued by this Court is declared permanent.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason and Montemayor, JJ., concur.
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