Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2009 April 30, 1949
SUNRIPE COCONUT PRODUCTS CO., INC petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and SUNSHINE COCONUT WORKERS' UNION (CLO), respondents.
Paredes Diaz & Poblador for petitioner.
Juan R. Maralit for respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Industrial Relation holding that the parers and "shellers" of the petitioner Sunshine Coconut Products Co., Inc., are its laborers entitled to twelve days sick leave (one day for each month of service), notwithstanding the fact that they are piece-workers under the pakiao system. The contention of the petitioner is that said "parer" and "shellers" are independent contractors and do not fall within the category of employees or laborers.
The Court of Industrial Relation has relied upon the rule laid down in the case of Philadelphia Record Company, 69 N.L.R.B., 1232 (1946), to the effect that when a worker possesses some attributes of an employee and others off an independent contractor which make him fall within an intermediate area he may be classified under the category off an employee when the economic factsof the relation make it more nearly one of employment than one of independent business enterprise with to the ends sought to be accomplished. Counsel for the petitioner does not dispute the correctness or applicability of the rule but it is vigorously contended that in the case at bar the economic facts characteristic of the independent contractor far outweigh the economic facts indicative of an employee. We are not called upon to rule on the accuracyof petitioner's contention since the conclusion of the Court of Industrial relation on the matter is binding this Court. In other word the ruling that the "parers" and "shellers" have the status of employee or laborers carries the factual verdict that economic facts showing such status outweigh those indicative of an independent contractor. Some facts expressly invoked by the Court of Industrial Relations are: That the "parers" and "shellers" work under some degree of control or supervision of the company if not under its absolute direction; that said " parers" and "shellers" form stable groups composed of matured men and women who regularly work at shelling and paring nuts that for the most part they depend on their work in the Sunripe Coconut Products Co., Inc. For their livelihood; that they are admittedly working in the factory of said company alongside person who are indisputably employed by said company. As already stated whether these specific facts are outweighed as contended by the petitioner by facts demonstrative of the status of an independent contractor is a question decided adversely to the petitioner when the Court of Industrial Relations held that the "parers" and "shellers" are laborers or employees.
It is also pretended for the petitioner for the petitioner that the Court of Industrial Relations departed from the definition of the word "employee" or "laborer" found in the Workmen's Compensation Law namely: " 'Laborer' is used as a synonym off employee,' and it means every person who has entered the employment of or works under a service or apprenticeship contract for an employer. . . ." (Section 39 [b], Workmen's Compensation Law as amended.) The Court of Industrial relation of course adverted to the following definition; "An employee is any person in the service of another under a contract for hire express or implied oral or written. " (Section 7, Labor Union by Dangle and Scriber, p. 7, citing McDermott's Case, 283 Mass. 74; Werner vs. Industrial Comm., 212 Wis., 76) In essence however the ruling of the Court of Industrial Relation does not run counter to the definition given in the Workmen's Compensation Law.
Counsel for the petitioner have stressed the argument that the principal test in determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor is the employer's right of control over the work and not merely the right to control the result it being intimated that the "parers" and shellers" are controlled by the petitioner only to the extent "that the nut are pared whole or that there is not much meat wasted." Even under the criterion adopted by the petitioner it would not be amiss to state thatthe requirement imposed on the "parers" and "shellers" to the effect that the nuts are pared whole or that there is not much meat wasted," in effect limits or that there is not much meat wasted," in effect limits or controls the means or details by which said workers are to accomplish their services.It is inconceivable that the "parers " and "shellers" in order to meet the requirement of the petitioners would not follow a uniform standard in the performance of their work.
Petitioner also insists that the "parers" and "shellers" are piece-workers under the "pakiao" system. In answer, suffice it to observe that Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended expressly provides that "A minimum wage or share shall be determined and fixed for laborers working by the hour day or month or by piece-work and for tenants sharing in the crop or paid by measurement unit. . . ." (Section 5.) The organic law of the Court of Industrial Relation therefore even orders that laborers may be paid by piece-work; and the facts that the "parers" and shellers" are paid a fixed amount for a fixed number of nuts pared or shelled does not certainly take them out of the purview of Commonwealth Act No. 103.
It is unnecessary to discuss at length the other facts pointed out by the petitioner in support of the proposition that said "parers" and shellers" are independent contractors, because a ruling on the matter would necessarily involve a factual inquiry which we are not authorized to makeEven so we would undertake to advance the general remark that inn cases of this kind wherein laborers are usually compelled to work under condition and term dictated by the employer a reasonably wide latitude of action and judgment should be given to the Court of Industrial Relations with a view to settling industrial disputes conformably to the intents and purposes of its organic law. Without in the least intimating that the relation between the "parers" and "shellers" on the one hand and the petitioner on the other as planned out by the latter was conceived knowingly to deprive said workersof the benefits accruing to workers who are admittedly employees or laborersunder Commonwealth Act No. 103 or the Workmen's Compensation law it is not difficult to surmise that a contrary decision is likely to set a precedent that may tend to encourage the adoption of a similar scheme by many other or even all employers.
The appealed decision of the Court of Industrial Relations is therefore affirmed with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Tuason, J., concur in the result.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
We concur in the decision as penned by Mr. Justice Paras.
We believe that judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the so-called "pakyaw" system mentioned in this case as generally practiced in our country is in fact a labor contract between employers and employees between capitalists and laborers. Under this system the workers continue in the economic category of contract laborers. They do not acquire the character of owners or managers of an independent enterprise. The system is practiced only in labor contracts.
The "parers" and "shellers" in this case according to the record are subjectto same degree of control or supervision by the company for which they are working and that very fact characterized them as employees or laborers, entering into the service of the company under a contract of hire or lease of services.
BRIONES, M., conforme:
Esroy conforme con la ponencia. Aunque los obreros intersados en este asunto trabajan bajo la forma de contrato llamada "pakyaw," esto es se les paga la compensasion de trabajo no mediantee jornal sino a razon de la cuantia de la labor realizada esto sin embargo es merament los demass efectos y fines loss obreros de que se trata forman parte de la organizacion de trabajadores afectos a la industria de la compania recurrente. Si se tratase de obreros contratados bajo "pakyaw" de cuaando en cuando, casualmente segun lo requieran la emergencia y las necesidades incidentales de la compania probablemente se podria sostener que no son obreros enel seentido legal de la palabra y por tando sin derecho a reclamar los titulos y privilegios anejos a la condicion de obrero. Pero el presente caso es diferente. Aqui los obreros tienen una colocacion mas o menos permanente y forman parte como digo de la orrganizacion de la compania al igual que los asalariados.
FERIA, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
Under section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 and Rule 44 of the Rule of Courtby appeal by certiorari from the decrees order or decision of the Court of Industrial Relation to the Supreme Court lies only in cases in which question of law are involved in the appeal and consequently this Court can not review said decrees, orders or decisions on question of facts.
In all judicial cases the justiciable question is always either one of factand law or of law only if the facts on which it is predicated are admittedor not issue. It can never be a question of fact only because the administration of justice consists in the application of law to facts of each case submitted to the Court for decision. The facts are the minor premise of the syllogism the law applicable to the major premise and the conclusion drawn from the syllogism is the conclusion or finding of law necessary of the decision of cases or lawsuit by the courts.
If the facts are admitted and only the law applicable to the case and the conclusion of law to be drawn from such application is in issue in an appeal the question involved is purely of law and he Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review and pass upon the conclusion of law or finding of the Court of Industrial Relation. However, if not only the law applicable and consequently, the inference or conclusion to be drawn from the application thereof but the facts of the case as shown by the evidence are in issue the question involved in an appeal is not of law but of fact, because no question may arise before the facts to which the law may bee applied have been finally determined or found.
In the present appeal there is no question of law involved because the question whether the "parers" or "shellers" have the status of employees or laborers in view of the facts of the case or the work they were bound to do or the control the principal may or may not have over their work is a question of fact, or which "would necessarily involve a factual inquiry which we are not authorized to do," according to the very decision of the majority.
This Supreme Court has, therefore no jurisdiction to review the decision of the Court of Industrial Relation because the appeal does not involve a question of law but of facts and this Court has no power to review the findings of facts in the decision of the said Court of Industrial Relation. A decision of the said Court on question of fact is final and not appealable.
We should have dismissed the petition for certiorari by way of appeal filed in this case from the start and the fact that we have given it due course in order to determine whether or not appeal lies after hearing the adverse party, does not necessarily empower us to pass upon the merits of the appeal and affirm or reverse the decision appealed from. To affirm or reverse a judgment of the Court of Industrial Relation presupposes a review by us of the finding of fact on which it is based which we have power to do in the present case.
Petition for certiorari by way of appeal is therefore dismissed. We can not review and affirm or reverse the decision of the court of Industrial Relation in this case. So ordered.
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