Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1234 April 30, 1949
VICTORINO FLORO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
SANTIAGO H. GRANADA, defendant-appellee.
Francisco Ventura and Eulalio Legaspi for appellant.
No appearance for appellee.
FERIA, J.:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila which dismissed, upon motion of the defendant, the action of the plaintiff to compel the former to deliver to the latter the owner's duplicate certificates of title of five parcels of land sold with pacto de retro by the defendant to the plaintiff "in order that the latter may surrender them for the registration and notation of the aforesaid contract of pacto de retro executed in his favor by the defendant herein."
The ground upon which the order of dismissal is based is that the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the action, but what the plaintiff should do is to present the deed in the office of the register of deeds of Occidental Negros and if the defendant refuse to surrender his title after due notice, the plaintiff should asks the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros to require the defendant to produce said titles.
The lower court did not commit any error in dismissing the plaintiff the plaintiff's complaint on said ground.
According to the allegations in the complaint, the predecessors in interest of the defendant could not deliver their duplicate certificates of title of the land sold by them to the defendant on April 4, 1944, time of the sale, because they had lost them during the last war. The same parcels of land acquired by the defendant were same date sold with pacto de retro by him to the herein plaintiff. After liberation the defendant and appellee filed a petition with the court for the reconstitution of the original of theabove-mentioned certificates of title, in order that the deed of sale in his favor could be registered. In compliance with an order of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros the plaintiff and appellant, on January 5, 1946, submitted to the court the deed of sale under pacto de retro with lease, executed by the defendant in favor of the plaintiff and prayed that the said deed be registered and annotated on the certificates of title that would be issued in the name of the defendant Santiago Granada. The courtissued an order for the reconstitution of the titles of the aforesaid parcelsof land, and on May 15, 1946, the Register of Deeds of Occidental Negros issued the transfer certificates of the title covering said parcels of the land in the name of the defendant Granada, who received them on May 17 of the same years, but refused to surrender said certificate to the Register of Deeds or deliver them to the plaintiff, and hence the filing of the plaintiff action.
Attorneys for appellant contend that the plaintiff's action is to compel the defendant to deliver to the former the duplicate certificate of the title issued in the latter's name in order that the plaintiff-vendee may register his interest in the land on those certificates issued in the name of the defendant-vendor. Because a contract of pacto de retro sale is a voluntary deed of transfer which does not divest the land in fee simple from the owner. Hence, the interest of the vendee a retro in the land is less than anestate in fee simple. That being the case, according to section 52 of the Land Registration Law, no new certificate is entered or issued to the transferee, but his interest in the land is registered by filing with the Register of Deeds the instrument creating such interest and by memorandum thereof made by said Register of Deeds upon the certificate of title. "[Of the registered owner.]"
This is obviously untenable. A sale with pacto de retro transfer the legal title to the vendee (Alderete vs. Amandoron, 46 Phil., 488), and the vendee is subrogated to all the right and actions of the vendors (art. 1511, Civil Code), and therefore the vendee is the owner of the estate in fee simplesubject to the vendor's right off redemption. And he may mortgage the property or impose upon it any other charge, but if the vendor redeems it he (the vendor) is entitled to "receive it free of any charge or mortgages imposed by the vendee, but he shall be obliged to respect any lease made by the latter in good faith and in accordance with the customs of the place where it is situated" (art. 1520, Civil Code). This contention of the attorney for appellant signing the brief runs counter to the opinion expressed by the same attorney in his book on Land Registration and Mortgages, page 90, to the effect that "the to legal title is transferred to him (vendee), that is, he has the fee simple which is the registrable title in the initial registration, while the right to redeem the property retained by the vendor a retro should only be noted in the decree and certificate of title issued in the name of the vendee under section 52 and 57 of the Land Registration Act No. 4996. This opinion is correct, for the right to repurchase is a real right or interest therein which may be registered as an interest less than an estate in fee simple under section 52 of the same Act No. 496 and as such goes with the land and may be claimed against any person deriving title from the vendee (Pan Daguilaa vs. Gaza, 12 Phil., 663; Mortera vs. Martinez, 14 Phil., 541; Lucido vs. Calupitan, 27 Phil., 148).
Section 57 of Act No. 496 provides that "an owner desiring to convey in fee simple his registered land or any portion thereof shall execute a deed of conveyance, with the grantor or grantee may present to the register of deeds in the province where the land lies. The grantor's certificates shall be produced and presented at the same time the register of deeds shall thereupon . . . make out in the registration a new certificate of title to the grantee, and shall prepare and deliver to him an owner's duplicate certificate." And according to section 111 of the same Act, if the outstanding owner's duplicate certificate is not presented, the Court may, upon petition of the vendee and after hearing, "order the registered owner or any person with holding the duplicate to surrender the same, and direct the entry of a new certificate upon such surrender." Said section 111, reads as follows; "In every case where the clerk or any register of deeds is requested to enter a new certificate in pursuance of an instrument purporting to be executed by the registered owner, or by reason of any instrument or proceedings which divest the title of the registered owner against his consent, if the outstanding owner's duplicate certificate is not presented for cancellation when such request is made, the clerk or register of deeds shall not enter a new certificate, but the person claiming to be entitled thereto may be apply by petition to the court. The court, after hearing, may order the registered owner of any person withholding the duplicate to surrender the same, and direct the entry of anew certificate upon such surrender."
The petition shall be filed with the Court of First Instance and entitled in the original case in which the decree of registration was entered, according to the last paragraph of section 112 of section 112 of Act No. 496, which provides that "any petition filed under this section, and all petitions and motions filed under the provisions of this Act after original case in which the decree of registration was entered." (Emphasis Ours.)
Therefore, the order appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Tuason and Montemayor, JJ., concur.
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