Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2363 September 23, 1948
GREGORIO ARANETA, INC., FRANCISCO JAVIER DE PITARQUE Y ELIO, ISABEL MARIA DE YNCHAUSTI DE PITARQUE Y DE YNCHAUSTI, petitioners,
vs.
SOTERO RODAS, Judge of First Instance of Manila, COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS and CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE TARLAC, respondents.
Araneta and Araneta and Jesus G. Barrera for petitioners.
FERIA, J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of this Court dismissing the special civil action of certiorari and mandamus filed by the petitioners against the respondents, which asked that order of the respondent judge denying the petitioner's motion to compel the other respondents to answer certain interrogatories submitted by the former to the latter be set aside, and that the respondent be ordered to issue an order compelling the respondent corporation to answer said interrogatories.
According to section 1, Rule 67, certiorari lies when the respondent court or judge has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. There is no doubt or question that the respondent judge or court had and did not exceed the court's jurisdiction, but it is alleged that said judge has acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition of the petitioners.
It is obvious that discretion is the power exercised by courts to determine questions arising in the trial of a cause to which no rule of law is applicable, but which from their nature and circumstances of the case, are controlled by the personal judgment of the court, or the judgment of the court uncontrolled by fixed rules of law (See Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third Division, Vol. I, p. 884). When the law does not provide a rule or norm for the court to follow in deciding a question submitted to it, but leaves it to the court to determine it in one way or another at his discretion, the judge is not absolutely free to act at his pleasure or will or arbitrarily. He must decide the question, not in accordance with law for there is none, but in conformity with justice, reason and equity, in view of the circumstances of the case. Otherwise the court or judge would abuse his discretion. (See Hodges vs. Barrios and Redfern, L-1904, 1 promulgated April 16, 1948, 45 Off. Gaz. [Supp. to No. 9], 372, concurred in by the dissenter from the resolution sought to be reconsidered in the present case.).
Therefore, the question to be determined in the present case is whether or not there is a rule of law which controls or guides the respondent judge in deciding whether an interrogatory should be allowed or not.
It is well settled, and admitted in paragraphs 11 and 14 of the petition for the certiorari, that the scope of discovery by means of written interrogatories under Rule 20 literally copied from Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, like the scope of discovery by the deposition, is governed by section 2, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which was taken from Rule 26, of said Federal Rules of which was taken from Rule 26 of said Federal Rules of Civil Procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States. Under the provisions of said section 2, Rule 18 "the deponent may be examined regarding any matter involved in the pending action, whether relating to the claim or defense of the examining party, or to the claim or defense of the examining party, or to the claim or defense of any other party". (Dixon vs. Philfer, D. C. S.C. 1939, 30 F. Supp., 627; Coca Cola Co. vs. Dixi Cola Laboratories, D. C. Mass. 1939, 29 F. Supp. 423; Lanova Corporation vs. National Supply Co., D. C. Pac., 1939, 29 F. Supp., 119; Aner vs. Hershey Cremexy Co., D. C. Pac., 1939, 29 F. Supp., 119; Aner vs. Hershey Cremexy Co. D. C. Va. 1940, 1 F. R. D., 286.).
Since the scope of depositions and written interrogatories is limited to matters which are not privileged and relevant to the subject matter involved in a pending action, and the determination of whether or not an interrogatory is privileged or material is not left to the discretion of the court or judge, for there is a law applicable which serves as norm or guide for the court or judge to follow, the respondent judge could not commit a grave abuse of discretion which it did not have in deciding whether or not the interrogatories in question are immaterial to the subject matter involved in the pending action, and therefore they can not be allowed. If the respondent judge has acted contrary to law in deciding that the written interrogatories propounded by the petitioners to the other respondents are immaterial, he would have committed an error of law which this court can not correct in the present case; but not a grave abuse of discretion.
In our resolution of July 27, 1948, we dismissed the partition for certiorari and mandamus on the ground that appeal at the proper time is the proper remedy; and relying on the dissenting opinion of one member of this Court, that "appeal cannot be the proper remedy for petitioners' complaint," all the arguments in the petitioners' motion for reconsideration tend to show that appeal is not the speedy and adequate remedy, because it would entail unnecessary delay and waste of time.
The resolution, in sitting that appeal at the proper time is the proper remedy, did not mean to say that certiorari may lie, that is, that respondent judge has acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, but there is appeal or appeal is the proper remedy. The order complained of is interlocutory and hence not forthwith appealable; it may only be assigned as erroneous if appeal is taken from the final judgment. The scope of the subjects which a person interrogated is called to testify orally in actual trial (Landry vs. O'hara Vessels, supra); and in the same way that neither appeal nor certiorari lies against a ruling of the court which reject an immaterial question during the trial, so no such remedies may be resorted to against a court's order that does not allow a written interrogatory which is not material.
What the resolution means to say, and we now expressly so hold is that certiorari does not lie at all for the reasons above stated, and the proper remedy is to rise the question of admissibility of such interrogatories on appeal from the final judgment of the respondent court or judge. It is obvious that the question whether certiorari or appeal is the proper and adequate remedy may only come up when the court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and the act complained of is appealable.
In view of all the foregoing, motion for reconsideration is denied. So ordered.
Moran, C. J., Paras, Pablo, Briones, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
On July 27, 1948, we voted to give due course to the petition, stating as follows:
Contrary to the contention in the majority resolution, appeal cannot be the proper remedy for petitioner's complaint. The proceeding of interrogatories provided by Rule 20 has to be undertaken before the final trial of a case. The rule has been drafted as one of the means to avoid the possibility of cases being fought through a strategy of surprises their interrogatories answered under Rule 20, it is unjust and contrary to law to compel them to proceed with the final trial of the case without said interrogatories being answered first. If the lower court erred and violated the rule in refusing to have petitioner's interrogatories answered, appeal will be inadequate to remedy the situation, as the case will be decided by the lower court without the petitioner's being given the opportunity of making use of the answers that the other party may give. Reversal on appeal of the denial with entail retrial in the lower court and the unnecessary delay which the law abhors.
There is no reason why we should reverse the stand thus taken. The majority resolution, denying the motion for reconsideration, is a belated answer to our above opinion. The answer is unconvincing.
We vote to grant the motion for reconsideration and to give due course to the petition.
Bengzon, J., concur.
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