Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-48977 February 23, 1944
CONCEPCION SUDARIO, et al., represented by FELISA SUDARIO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ACRO TAXICAB CO., INC., and LAMBERTO YUSON, defendants-appellees.
Julio Siayngco for the appellants.
Vera and Gregorio for the appellees.
BOCOBO, J.:
In this case we are called upon to decide the legal question of how far the definite dismissal of an information for homicide through reckless negligence, on motion of the fiscal, after arraignment, and without the consent of the accused precludes a subsequent civil action. More specifically, does such a dismissal bar a later civil action for culpa aquiliana?
Concepcion, Fe and Sinforiano Sudario, minor children of the late Agapito Sudario, through their guardian Felisa Sudario, bring an action for damages against the Acro Taxi Cab Co. Inc., and Lamberto Yuson for the gross negligence of Yuson (a taxi driver employed by defendant corporation) who on April 5, 1939, caused the taxi to hit Agapito Sudario hurling him against an acacia tree, as a result of which Sudario died. Plaintiffs pray that defendants be ordered to pay P1,000 solidarily as damages.
It appears that as a result of the tragic death of Agapito Sudario, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal on May 26, 1939 filed an information against Lamberto Yuson for homicide through reckless negligence. No reservation of a separate civil action was made. Upon arraignment on June 16,1939, the accused pleaded "not guilty". But on October 2, 1939, the Fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case, stating: "Without the testimonies of the eye-witnesses above-mentioned, the undersigned does not have any other evidence to support the information and consequently cannot procure the conviction of the accused."
The Court of First Instance of Rizal made the following order:
Sometida la mocion de sobreseimiento en la causa arriba titulada presentada por el Fiscal, y encontrandola bien fundada, el Juzgado, sobresee esta causa y declara cancelada la fianza prestada por el acusado para su libertad provisional, con las costas de oficio.
Later, however, that is, on January 27, 1940, plaintiffs herein filed the present civil action in the Court of First Instance of Leyte. A motion by defendant Acro Taxi Cab Co., Inc., to dismiss was denied by the Hon. F. Borromeo Veloso on September 10, 1940. Trial of this civil case was held in December 1940 and January 1941, when both parties submitted their respective proofs, consisting of oral testimonies, depositions and exhibits. Defendant Lamberto Yuson was adjudged to be in default on December 16, 1940. On May 12, 1941, the Court of First Instance of Leyte, presided over by the Hon. Fernando Hernandez, rendered judgment, dismissing the complaint on a question of law, without going into the merits of the evidence. The trial court declared:
En la causa que nos ocupa, si bien es verdad que no hubo una sentencia absolutoria pero la accion judicial termino con una mocion del fiscal provincial por el fundamento de que no existian pruebas que demostraron la imprudencia del acusado, habiendose presentado esta mocion despues de haber sido leida la querella contra el acusado. El auto dictado por el Tribunal competente viene a ser una sentencia absolutoria y constituye un obstaculo para un proceso ulterior contra el acusado para una accion civil proveniente del delito.
Por las razones arriba expuestas, nos vemos constreñidos a declarar que el sobreseimiento de la causa criminal contra el aqui demandado Lamberto Yuson, ha dado por efecto exonerar a este del alegado delito y, en su consecuencia, la accion civil proveniente del mismo es improcedente.
En vista de la conclusion a que hemos llegado sobre este particular, creemos innecesario analizar las pruebas de los demandantes sobre los meritos de la causa en su fondo. (p. 20, Record on Appeal.)
Plaintiffs appealed from the foregoing judgment.
After a careful consideration, we hold that while the court a quo was right in declaring that the dismissal of the criminal case against Lamberto Yuson put an end thereto and precluded a civil action based upon the crime of homicide through reckless negligence, the trial court was, however, in error barred. It is admitted by the attorney for defendant Acro Taxi Cab Co., Inc., that "plaintiffs brought this action under the provisions of articles 1902and 1903 of the Civil Code". A reading of the complaint herein shows that its theory is culpa aquiliana. For example, solidary (not subsidiary) liability is demanded from the employer, Acro Taxi Cab Co. Inc. The court a quo should therefore have examined the evidence presented at the trial of the civil case, with a view to determining the liability of defendants for culpa aquiliana under articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. For this reason, the case should be remanded to the trial court for decision upon the evidence thus adduced by both parties.
The principles governing the relation between a criminal prosecution and a civil action have been examined by us in Barredo vs. Garcia et al., (G. R. No. 49006, promulgated July 6, 1942; 73 Phil., 607). But inasmuch as there is a seemingly significant difference between that case and the present, because the taxi driver therein had been convicted in a criminal proceeding, while here the criminal case was definitely dismissed after arraignment, we shall make a further study with a view to clarifying some of these principles.
The pith of the instant case lies in the distinction between culpa aquiliana (or quasi-delito or culpa extracontractual) on the one hand and civil liability resulting from a crime on the other. Because of such line of cleavage between those two legal institutions, it is clear that the defendants, in spite of the dismissal of the criminal case — which is equivalent to an acquittal — may still be responsible for damages on culpa aquiliana under articles 1902 and 1903, Civil Code, which provide thus:
Art. 1902. El que por accion u omision causa daño a otro, interviniendo culpa o negligencia, esta obligado a reparar al dano causado.
Art. 1903. La obligacion que impone el articulo anterior es exigible, no solopor los actos u omisiones propios, sino por los de aquellas personas de quienes se debe responder.
El padre, y, por muerte o incapacidad de este, la madre, son responsables de los perjuicios causados por los hijos menores de edad que viven en su compañia.
Los tutores lo son de los perjuicios causados por los menores incapacitados que estan bajo su autoridad y habitan en su compañia.
Lo son igualmente los dueños o directores de un establecimiento o empresa, respecto de los perjuicios causados por sus dependientes en el servicio de los ramos en que los tuvieran empleados o con ocasion de sus funciones.
El estado es responsable en este concepto cuando obra por mediacion de agente especial; pero no cuando el dano hubiese sido causado por el funcionario a quien propiamente corresponda la gestion practicada, en cuyo caso sera aplicable lo dispuesto en el articulo anterior.
Son, por ultimo, responsables los maestros o directores de artes y oficios respecto a los perjuicios causados por sus alumnos o aprendices, mientras permanezcan bajo su custodia.
La responsabilidad de que trata este articulo cesara cuando las personas en el mencionadas prueban que emplearon toda la diligencia de un buen padre de familia para prevenir el daño.
In other words, although acquittal in a criminal case or its definite dismissal as a general rule1 impedes the civil liability arising from the alleged crime, nevertheless, the civil action for damages on account of culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito according to said two articles of the Civil Code still subsists.
The Spanish Civil Code and the Spanish jurists are positive and unequivocal in distinguishing culpa aquiliana governed by the Civil Code from civil responsibility regulated by the Penal Code. Under the Spanish Civil Code, there are five sources of obligations, namely: (1) law; (2) contracts; (3) quasi-contracts; (4) delicte or criminal acts; and (5) quasi delicto. Thisclassification may be perceived in articles 1089, 1092, and 1093, which read:
Art. 1089. Las obligaciones nacen de la ley, de los contratos y quasi-contratos, y de los actos y omisiones ilicitos o en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia.
Art. 1092. Las obligaciones civiles que nazcan de los delitos o faltas se regiran por las disposiciones del Codigo Penal.
Art. 1093. Los que se derivan de actos u omisiones en que intervenga culpa o negligencia no penadas por la ley, quedaran sometidas a las disposiciones del Capitulo II del titulo XVI de este libro.
De Diego gives the history of the sources of obligations thus: (De Diego, Curso Elemental de Derecho Espanol, Cocun y Foral, Vol. 5, pp. 218-219, 221.)
LOS ACTOS JURIDICOS, expresion de la voluntad, en consideracion a la cual producen obligaciones, con o BILATERALES (CONTRATOS) fuente normal de las obligaciones, o UNILATERALES, para los contados casos en que, segun algunas legislaciones, producen tambien obligacion.
Los otros hechos origen de obligaciones, con independencia y aun contra la voluntad de los interesados, son de varia naturaleza, y los de mayor relieve son los HECHOS ILICITOS, verdaderas agresiones a la esfera juridica de otro, y los HECHOS LICITOS y permitidos o produccion de especiales estados, para cuya regulacion o desaparicion existe una necesidad y se impone una obligacion (a esta pertenecen los antiguos cuasicontratos).
DOCTRINA DEL DERECHO ROMANO Y DE LOS INTERPRETES. — Esta teoria no es mas que una nueva expresion, con arreos mas cientificos de los "antiguos de interpretes romanos y modernos.
Sayo, en su "Aureos", habia dicho que las obligaciones nacen de los contratos, de los delitos y de otras varias causas que no se atrevio a calificar. (Obligationes mascuntur est ex contractu aut ex maleficio out propio quedam jure ex variis causarum figuris.').
Esas otras causas, la jurisprudencia posterior advirtio que tenian pronunciadas analogias o con los contratos o con los delitos, y de aqui que en las "Instituciones" de Justiniano apareciesen ya desenvueltas y asimiladas esas varias causas al contrato ("quasi ex contractu") o al delito ("quasi ex delicto"), de donde surgieron las cuatro fuentes de las obligaciones; contrato, quasi-contrato, delito y quasi-delito, convirtiendo aquellas meras semejanzas o agrupaciones en entidades independientes (quasi contrato y quasi delito).
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DOCTRINA DE LOS CODIGOS MODERNOS, ESPECIALMENTE DEL ESPANOL. — LOS Codigos modernos se encontraron con la clasificacion tradicional de las fuentes, y la aceptaron en general; pero agregando una nueva fuente la ley, para todas aquellas obligaciones que no podian relacionarse o explicarse por consecuencia de aquellos hechos definidos de contrato, cuasicontrato, delito y cuasidelito. Esta es la formula del Codigo civil italiano, y esta, en otros terminos, es la doctrina del espanol....
Manresa traces the development of culpa aquiliana as follows: (Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espanol, Vol. 12, p. 598.).
En el derecho romano la ley Aquilia sento ya al principio de que estaba obligado a indemnizar todo aquel que cometiere un dano por culpa o imprudencia, especificando el grado de esta responsabilidad en multitud de casos y de circunstancias. La doctrina propia de la teoria romana fue trasladada mas o menos integramente a las leyes del titulo 15 de la Partida 7. a las cuales constituian nuestro derecho civil positivo hasta la publicacion del Codigo que comentamos, pues si bien el penal en sus articulos 18, 19, 20, y 21 habian consignado la responsabilidad civil como consecuencia de la penal, extendiendola en determinados casos a personas distintas de las que ejecutaron los hechos de que trajera su origen, es lo cierto que esa responsabilidad civil se refiere a hechos o actos distintos de los que producen las obligaciones objeto de este capitulo, pues aquella se contrae por hechos u omisiones punibles con arreglo a la ley y estas provienen de actos u omisiones que sin estar penadas por ella son, sin embargo, culpables civilmente.
El Codigo civil reproduce el sentido general del antigo derecho, si bien, concordando sus preceptos con las teorias modernas, impone las obligaciones derivadas de la culpa o negligencia, no solo al causante del dano, sino a veces a una tercera persona que debe responder por el, por estar ligada a este por vinculos tales que lo hagan responsables de sus actos; y aun establece otros casos de responsabilidad que son, o una reproduccion de la accion moral o la extension de esta a otros danos de circunstancias analogas.
The nature of the civil responsibility for an illicit act, apart from any crime, may be judge by reading these passages in Sanchez Roman's work:
(Sanchez Roman, Derecho Civil, Vol. 4, pp. 136-137.).
4. De modo mas sintetico y expresivo, y con verdad, pero sin que por esto lograra mayor concrecion la especialidad de la tesis relativa a las fuentes de las obligaciones, se ha dicho que estas proceden de dos cuasas, a saber: la ley y los hechos.
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Con arreglo a esta doctrina, y aceptando su generalidad, en el concepto de obligacion y en sus causas, procederia despues clasificar esos hechos en cuatro grupos:
1.º Hechos licitos creados mediante la voluntad concordada de varias personas: su especie, el contrato.
2.º Hechos licitos voluntarios o involuntarios, pero aquellos sin voluntades concordodas; y estos ultimos, imputables tambien a cierto sujeto, para la responsabilidad de prestaciones, que ellos en justicia originen, por ministerio de la ley: su especie, el llamado quasi-contrato.
3.º Hechos ilicitos de caracter civil, que no lleguen, por tanto, a la categoria de penables y sean voluntarios o involuntarios, pero en este caso imputables sus especies, las prestaciones y responsabilidades originadas en el dolo que no constituya delito, en la mora, en la culpa, en el caso fortuito, cuando no sirva de hipotesis quasi-contrato.
4.º Hechos ilicitos voluntarios y penables; sus especies, el delito y la falta, segun la tecnologia legal.
It will be seen that according to Sanchez Roman, liability for unlawful acts of a civil character is quite broad. Therefore, how can it be maintained that the mere acquittal in a criminal case of homicide through reckless negligence, or a dismissal thereof, puts an end to any and all rights of action for civil damages under the Civil Code?
The distinction between civil liability arising from a crime and civil responsibility under the Civil Code is clearly seen in the following extracts from Manresa's work: (Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espanol, Vol. 12,pp. 596, 600-601)..
Si bien en ocasiones es dificil precisar si tiene caracter meramente civil o penal el mal producido por lo accion o la omision, en la generalidad de los casos, merced a la perfecta y clara determinacion que en la actualidad se observa en la ciencia juridica respecto de dichas ordenes, facil es dar forma legal al concepto juridico de las obligaciones consiguientes de la culpa y negligencia como caso distinto de las responsabilidades civiles propias de todo delito o falta. (Emphasis supplied.).
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En efecto; examinando detenidamente la teoria general de la culpa y de la negligencia, se observa que, tanto en una como en otra de dichas causas, hay tres generos o tres especies distintas, a saber:
1.ª La que representa una accion u omision voluntaria por la que resulte incumplida una obligacion anteriormente constituida. .
2.ª La que sin existencia de una obligacion anterior produce un dano o perjuicio que, teniendo su origen en un hecho ilicito, no reviste los caracteres de delito o falta; y
3.ª La que teniendo por origen un hecho que constituye delito o falta produce una responsabilidad civil como accesoria de la responsiblidad criminal.
La primera de estas tres especies de culpa o negligencia es siempre accesoria de una obligacion principal, cuyo incumplimiento da origen a la teoria especial de la culpa en materia de contratos y el estudio de esta debe hacerse al examinar cada contrato, en efectos de dicha culpa en cada uno de ellos.
La tercera de las especies citadas es accesoria tambien, pues no puede concebirse su existencia sin la de un delito o falta que la produczca. Es decir, que solo el lado de la responsabilidad criminal puede subsistir esa responsabilidad civil y la obligacion proveniente de la culpa, indicada como una consecuencia de la responsabilidad criminal, y por consiguiente, su examen y regulacion pertenecen al derecho penal.
Como consecuencia de ello, resulta que la unica especie de culpay omision o negligencia que pueda ser y es materia del presente capitulo, es la segunda, o sea la que sin la existencia de una obligacion anterior, y sin ningun antecedente contractual, produce undano o perjuicio que tiene su origen en una accion u omision culpable solo civilmente; es decir, que siendo ilicita no revista, sin embargo, los caracteres de una delito o falta por no estar penada por la ley.
The distinction between civil liability under the Penal Code and culpa aquiliana under Arts. 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code has been recognized by this Court in Bernal and Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric and Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, and Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co., 55 Phil., 73. These two cases were cited in the recent case of Barredo vs. Garcia et al., supra.
It is thus, that the responsibility for culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito as an independent juridical institution, seperate from civil liability arising from a crime, is of ancient lineage and has come down through the centuries to the present Civil Code of Spain. It can not therefore be ignored by confusing it — as the trial court did — with civil responsibility which results from the commission of a penal offense.
In consequence of the unquestionable distinction between civil liability arising from a crime and responsibility for culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, we hold that although by reason of the previous dismissal of the criminal case, no civil action could be brought by the heirs of Agapito Sudario on the Penal Code theory of civil liability resulting from homicide through reckless negligence, nevertheless a civil action could still be brought against the defendants on the Civil Code theory of culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito.
The Supreme Tribunal of Spain and the Spanish jurists, among them the eminent Maura, have declared this doctrine by recognizing such a distinction. We shall first see some decisions of the highest court of Spain, then examine Maura's views, and then study some cases in Philippine jurisprudence which are claimed to be contrary to the rule herein formulated.
Among the applicable decisions of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain are those of February 19, 1902, October 19, 1904; and October 21, 1910.
In the case decided on February 19, 1902, the action was for culpa aquiliana for the death of plaintiff's mother who had been run over by a street car. The Supreme Court of Spain laid down this doctrine. (Jurisprudencia Civil. Vol. 93, p. 268.).
Considerando que los mismos preceptos legales revelan con igual claridad que lo dispuesto en el articulo 1092 del Codigo es para el casode que los Tribunales de lo Criminal hagan declaraciones dentro de los limites de su competencia que tengan que servir de base a los de lo civil; pero cuando esto no ocurre, por fundarse el sobreseimiento meramente en no haberse justificado en la causa los hechos determinantes de la responsabilidad penal, se impone la aplicacion del precepto del articulo 1093 para juzgar de la culpa o negligencia en su aspecto civil sin que en este sentido haya cometido, por lo tanto, la Audiencia de Madrid ninguna de las infracciones alegadas en los tres primeros motivos del recurso.
The decision of October 19, 1909 referred to an action for charges in the amount of 25,000 pesetas because of the death of plaintiff's son who had been attacked by a bull belonging to defendant. A criminal case was instituted, which was dismissed by the Audiencia provincial; that order of dismissal was declared final by the Sala de lo Criminal of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain. The defendant in the civil case was ordered to pay 3,000 pesetas by way of damages. On appeal by defendant, the cassation was denied, the Supreme Court of Spain holding:
Considerando que el articulo 1905 del Codigo Civil no consiente otra interpretacion que la que clara y evidentemente se deriva de sus terminos literales, bastando, segun el mismo, que un animal cause perjuicio para que nazca la responsabilidad del dueno aunno imputandose a este ninguna clase de culpas o negligencia habida, sin duda, cuenta por el legislador de que tal concepto de dueno es suficiente para que arrastre las consecuencias favorables o adversas de esta clase de propiedad, salvo la excepcion en el mismo contenido, y esto y sean perjuicios inferidos en las cosas, ya con mas razon en las personas, por su mayor trascendencia, sin que a ello obste el resultado de la causa original referida, por ser en uno y en otro caso distinto el aspecto de la responsabilidad, siendo, consiguientemente, de desestimar los motivos primero y segundo del recurso, en el sentido que queda expuesto... (Emphasis supplied.)
The sentence of October 21, 1910, of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain was already cited by us in Barredo vs. Garcia et al., supra. In that Spanish case, Ramon Lafuente had been run over and killed by a street car pertaining to the Compañia Electrica Madrileña de Traccion. The conductor was prosecuted in a criminal proceeding but he was acquitted. A civil motion for damages was then instituted by the widow; the lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, but an appeal was taken by the defendant alleging violation of Articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code because by final judgment the lack of fault or negligence had been declared. However, the Supreme Court of Spain upheld the judgment appealed from, and made the following pronouncements which are applicable to the present case:
Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado supuesto de que el Tribunal a quo, al condemar a la Compana electric Madrilena al pago del dano causado con la muerte de Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y efectos juridicos de la sentencia absolutoria dectada en la causa criminal que se siguio por e mismo hecho, cuando es lo cierto que de estehan conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes aspectos, y como la de lo criminal declaro dentro de los limites de su competencia que el hecho de que se trata no era constitutivo de delito por no haber mediado descuido o negligencia graves, lo que no excluye, siendo este el unico fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el concurso de la culpa o negligencia no calificadas fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo civil, y que alcanzan, segun el 1903 entre otras personas, a los Directores de Establecimientos o Empresas por los danos causados por sus dependientes en determinadas condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo civil, al conocer del mismo hecho bajo este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la Compania recurrente a la indeminizacion del dano causado por uno de susempleados, lejos de infringir los mencionados textos, en relacion con el articulo 116 de la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal, se ha atenido estrictamente a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones, ajenas a su jurisdiccion propia, ni contravriar en lo mas minimo el fallo recaido en la causa. (Emphasis supplied.)
The above decisions, and others that could be cited, clearly demonstrate the principle that acquittal in a criminal case for reckless negligence or its definite dismissal does not preclude a civil action on culpa aquiliana under Articles 1902 and 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code.
We come now to the authoritative voice of the distinguished jurist, Maura, whose opinions, published under the title of "Dictamenes" have added to the wealth of the legal literature of Spain. In Vol. 6 (pp. 483-628) of that publication there is a "Dictamen" dated September 24, 1919, which precisely covers the question at issue herein and whose powerful reasoning should commend itself to all who have always entertained the belief that acquittal in a criminal case or its dismissal completely wipes out all civil liability for damages. The facts which gave rise to the "consulta" were as follows: On the morning of October 29, 1917, there was a collision between a train of the Ferrocarril del Norte and another of the Ferrocarril Cantabrico, many persons having been killed or injured, and material damage was caused to both railroad companies. Constantino Pareja, an employee as a flagman, of the Ferrocarril del Norte, was prosecuted for simple negligence in a criminal action for having given the right of way to the Cantabrico train before the scheduled time. The Ferrocarril del Norte was made a party because of its subsidiary civil liability. The Ferrocarril Cantabrico reserved its civil action. Both the employee and the employer were absolved. The Ferrocarril de Norte contended that this judgment of acquittal cancelled all responsibility and barred any civil action. The question asked in the "consulta" was whether the Ferrocarril Cantabrico, in spite of such acquittal, could still bring a civil action against the Ferrocarril del Norte for damages Maura in his "Dictamen" answered in the affirmative. The following extracts from his opinion will throw a flood of light upon the instant case: (A. Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 802-806, 505-508, and 512-518.)
Pero acontencio que el Jurado dio veredicto de inculpabilidad, el cual trae aparejada, sin disyuntiva posible, el fallo de libre absolucion. Puesto que resultaba no haberse perpetrado delito, el Tribunal del proceso, tan solo tenia jurisdiccion para absolver; quedaba negado, suprimido readiclmente, el asiento de su competencia. Sin duda de ningun linaje, la inexistencia del delito, y la consiguiente inexistencia de responsabilidad, tanto penales como civiles, que fueron nacidas del delito mismo, quedo estatuida para siempre, de modo irrevocable.
Esta causa juzgada obsta para cualquiera demanda que no se pueda sostener sin imputarle al encargado, de la ocasion, Constantino Pareja, el delito de que se le acuso y salio absuelto. Si el caso hubiera sido diferente y la acusacion versada sobre otra indolede delito, podria facilmente convenir la dicha incompatibilidad; pero es obvio que la Compania del Norte puede estar obligada a indemnizarde los quebrantos y menoscabos irrogados en el choque de los dos trenes consabidos, sin que para existir la tal obligacion, se necesite que Constantino Pareja incurriese en aquel delito. Cabemuy bien que esta obligacion civil del la Compania exista sin que dimane de culpa de Pareja; mas tambien puede resultar incurso el mismo Pareja en culpa o negligencia, cuantas de aquellas notas agravatorias que definen el delito y que les habrian hecho punibles. Lo unico que paso en authoridad de causa jurada, es que no. Se cometio delito, ni es exigible responsabilidad nacida del delito. Fuera de esto, acerca de lo que no estuvo sub judice, no existe ni puede existir cosa juzgada.
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El solo caso en que la sentencia firme del proceso puede obstar al separado y ulterior ejercicio de la accion civil, es haber aquella declarado que no existio el hecho de que lo civil hubiera podido nacer (articulo 116, Enjuiciamiento criminal). Por ejemplo: si el fallo del Tribunal en la causa, declara que no sufrio lesiones el supuesto herido, que esta viva la supuesta victima del homicidio, o que ha permanecido el dueno en posesion de la cosa que se suponia hurtada o robada, la Ley veda que en juicio civil, en son de exigir las consiguientes indemnizaciones, se pretenda la declaracion de las lesiones, de la muerte, del hurto o del robo. Mas seconoce a priori, y lo confirmara un examen analitico: que no puede tener aplicacion el presente caso al veto excepcional del Art. 116, por ser a todas luces absurda la contingencia de haberse declarado que no existio el choque de los trenes, en la manana del 20 de Octubre de 1917.
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Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos, todavia menos parece sostenible que exista cosa juzgada acerca de la obligacion civil de indemnizar los quebrantosy menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los trenes. El titulo en que se funda la accion para demandar el resarcimiento, no puede confundirse con las responsabilidades civiles nacidas del delito, siquiera exista en este, el cual sea, una culpa rodeada de notas agravatorias que motivan sanciones penadas mas o menos severas. La lesion causada por delito o falta en los derechos civiles, requiere restituciones, reparaciones o indemnizaciones, que cual la pena misma atanen al orden publico; por tal motivo vienen encomendadas, de ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es que si por esta via se enmiendan los quebrantos y menoscabos, el agraviado excusa procurar el ya conseguido desagravio; pero esta eventual coincidencia de los efectos, no borra la diversidad originaria de las acciones civiles para pedir indemnizacion.
Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no vendrian a cuento y que tienen otro regimen), dimanan, segun al Art. 1902 del codigo Civil, de toda accion u omision, causante de danos o perjuicios, en que intervengan culpa o negligencia. Es trivial que acciones semejantes son ejercitadas ante los Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente, sin que la Justicia punitiva tenga que mezclarse en los asuntos. Los arts. 18 al 21 y 121 al 128 del Codigo penal, atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales y politicos del mismo, desenvuelven y ordenan la materia de responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, en terminos separadaos del regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se denomina aquiliana, por alusion a procedentes legilativos del Corpus juris. Seria intempestivo un paralelo entre aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de indemnizar a titulode culpa civil; pero viene el caso y es necesaria una de las diferenciaciones que en el tal paralelo se notarian.
Los arts. 20 y 21 del Codigo penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las responsabilidades civiles, entre los que sean por diversos conceptos culpables del delito o falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos al servicio de los cuales estanlos delincuentes; pero concaracter subsidiario, o sea, segun el texto literal, en defecto de las que sean responsables criminalmente. No coincide en ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo Art. 1903 dice: `La obligacion queimpone el articulo anterior es exigible, no solo por los actos y omisiones propios, sino por las de aquellas personas de quiens se debe responder'; personas en la enumeracion de las cuales figuran los dependientes y empleados de los establecimeintos o empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea con ocasion de sus funciones. Por esto acontece, y se observa en la jurisprudencia, que las empresas, despues de intervenir en las causas criminales con el caracter subsidiario de su responsabilidad civil por razon del delito, son demandadas y condenadas directa y aisladamente, cuando se trata de la obligacion ante los Tribunales Civiles..
Siendo, como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando verdadero postulado de nuestro regimen judicial la separacion entre justicia punitiva y tribunales de lo civil, de suerte que tienen unos y otros normas de fondo en distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de proceder, habiendose, por anadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la Compania del ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se reservo ajercitarsus acciones, parece innegable que la de inemnizacion por los danos y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub judice ante el Tribunal del Jurado, no fue sentenciado, sino que permanecio intacta al pronunciarse el fallo de 21 de marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no hubiera sido de inculpabidad, mostrose mas arriba que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada para despues del proceso; pero al declararse que no existio delito, ni responsabilidad dimanada de delito, materia unica sobre que tenian jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se redobla el motivo para la obligacion civil ex lege, y se patentiza mas y mas que la accion para pedir su cumplimiento permanece incolume, extrana a la cosa juzgada. (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing opinion of Maura is applicable to the case under consideration because in both cases there was an acquittal in the criminal prosecution. It is to be specially noted that in the Spanish case on which Maura gave his "dictamen", the criminal prosecution was for simple negligence only, so that the acquittal established that there had not been even simple negligence under the penal code. In the instant case, where the criminal action was for reckless negligence, there is greater reason to hold that the dismissal in this case does not bar a civil action for culpa-aquiliana.
It should also be specially noted that in the case treated of in the foregoing "dictamen" of Maura, the employer, Ferrocarril del Norte, had been made a party in the criminal action because of its subsidiary civil liability, and that said railroad company had been absolved in the criminal proceeding, together with its employee. In the present case, the Acro Taxi Cab Co. Inc. was not made a party in the criminal action and was not exonerated; so with greater reason it could be made liable in an action based on culpa aquiliana.
Attention is likewise invited to Maura's interpretation of Art. 116 of the Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure, as to when a subsequent civil action is barred. He says in effect the meaning of said provision is that no civil action can be brought later if the court's decision in the criminal case declared that the event complained of did not take place at all, as when the supposed wounded man suffered no wounds whatsoever, or when the alleged victim of homicide is alive, or when the supposed stolen article was always in the possession of the owner. It seems that the purpose of Art. 116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is reproduce in sec. 1, par. (d) of Rule 107 of the Rules of Court is to avoid a conflict between such declaration in the criminal case and a judgment for plaintiff in a subsequent civil case. On the other hand, there can be no conflict where there is no such declaration. Thus, in the instant case, the definite dismissal of the information on action of the fiscal, after arraignment, for insufficiency of evidence — there being no declaration of the Court that Agapito Sudario had not been run over at all — does not perforce signify that in a later action on culpa aquiliana, a finding of negligence based on Arts. 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code, after both parties have presented all their respective proofs, would be incompatible with the aforesaid dismissal of the criminal prosecution. For the sake of clarity, the two provisions under examination will now be quoted:
Art 116, Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure:
La extincion de la accion penal no lleva consigo la de lo civil, a no ser que la extincion proceda de haberse declarado por sentenciafirme que no existio el hecho de que la civil hubiese podido nacer.
En los demas casos, la persona a quien corresponda la accion civil podra ejercitarlo, ante la jurisdiccion y por la via civil que procede, contra quien estuviere obligado a la restitucion del a cosa, reparacion del dano o indeminzacion del perjuicio sufrido. (Emphasis supplied.)
Rules 107, sec. 1 (d) of the Rules of Court reads:
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In the other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damages suffered;
It should be observed that the latter part of these two provisions is broad enough to include and warrant a subsequent civil action on culpa aquiliana.
We shall now examine the case relied upon by the trial court.
The case of Wise and Co. vs. Larion, 45 Phil. 514, refers to an acquittal in a criminal case for estafa, which, being a malicious act, can not, after acquittal, come under Article 1902 of the Civil Code.
Almeida vs. Abarca, 8 Phil. 178 was different because the civil liability therein claimed was predicted on the crime of arson, and not on culpa aquiliana. In the following passage this court impliedly recognized that if the civil action had been based on the theory of quasi-delito, the complaint might have been meritorious:
It has not been alleged or shown by the plaintiffs, as a cause of action instituted civilly against the defendant, that the aforesaid fire was caused through any fault or negligence on the part of the defendant, nor is there shown any motive or cause distinct from that act, the object of the case already terminated, in accordance with the provisions of articles 1893, 1902, and 1903 of the Civil Code; . . . .
And when the case was appealed to the Federal Supreme Court, that tribunal said:
First, by the positive legislation of the Philippine Codes, civil and criminal, a distinction is drawn between a civil liability which results from the mere negligence of the defendant and a liability for the civil consequence of a crime by which another has sustained loss or injury.
The case of Francisco vs. Onrubia, (46 Phil. 327), is also founded on the civil liability under the Penal Code. Hence it is likewise different from the case under review.
The case of Gonzales vs. Judge of First Instance of Bulacan et al., G.R. No. 48233 concerned the right of the offended party to exact civil responsibility as the result of a penal offense. There was no question of culpa aquiliana.
Finally, we must reiterate our belief expressed in Barredo vs. Garcia et al., (73 Phil., 607), that the remedy for culpa aquiliana should be given its due importance in the Philippines for the better protection of private rights. The legal profession in this country has by habit relied mostly on the civil liability resulting from a crime and has almost entirely forgotten the remedy for culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. In consequence, many civil wrongs have been entirely without indemnity or have been inadequately redressed, for it is harder to secure conviction in a criminal case for reckless negligence because the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, whereas culpa aquiliana can be shown by a mere preponderance of evidence in a civil case under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. It is also known that there has grown up a practice of the trial courts of uniformity awarding only P1,000.00 (at present P2,000.00) for the death of a person brought about by the negligence of the defendant in a criminal case. For failure of the party concerned to appeal from this often inadequate amount of damages, the appellate courts have had an opportunity to review this question. If the remedy for culpa aquiliana were availed of more frequently, justice would be more likely to be achieved by the victims or their heirs.
The serious inadequacy of the remedy of civil liability derived from a crime springs from the inherent absurdity and injustice of the plan of the Penal Code, which makes civil indemnity depend upon the result of the criminal action. In the realm of principles, the idea is wrong, for there are fundamental differences between the criminal prosecution and the civil action arising from a crime. Among these differences are: (1) the former is for public vindication because of the disturbance of the social order, while the latter is for the defense of a private right or interest; (2) the plaintiff in the former is the State while in the latter an individual person: (3) in the former, the plaintiff is at a disadvantage because, among other reason, the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, penal laws are strictly construed, and the accused enjoys certain special rights, while in the latter, plaintiff and defendant stand on equal footing. So the civil liability resulting from a criminal offense is but a mirage and can not quench the plaintiff's thirst for justice and relief. But the wonder of it al is why the legal profession has cherished the futility of such remedy and ignored the effectiveness of an action on culpa aquiliana, which has its own important place in the scheme of our legal system. The trouble does not lie in our laws but in the failure of our lawyers and judges to apply them properly.
The mission of the courts is not merely passive, by limiting themselves to the precise issues of law presented to them. They must see to it that the legal system of the country is understood as a unified, integral whole, with the relations of the various parts clearly envisaged by the legal profession. It is thus a significant function and duty of the courts to enhance the sound development of jurisprudence. One of the means for the purpose is to restore into full efficacy those juridical institutions whose force has been overlooked. Therefore, we must voice our opinion that would make for a stronger safeguard of private rights if remedies for private wrongs were sought in a civil action, absolutely without any connection with any criminal proceedings. The civil liability arising from a crime depends upon the result of the criminal case, which is under the control of the public prosecutor whose main concern is the penalty prescribed for the offense, the civil indemnity being incidental so far as he is concerned. In fact, certain practices in criminal cases have developed which reduce the civil aspect to a mere routine. On the other hand, if damages caused by culpa or negligence are sought under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code, the civil action is separate and independent; the plaintiff alone controls the pleadings and the presentation of proofs; there will be more opportunity to show the real amount of damages; and judgment may be secured by a simple preponderance of evidence.
Consequently, we contemplate with grave concern the relegation of the remedy for culpa aquiliana, a weapon which in the Philippines has for generations been rusting in the armory of the law, while the many victims of personal injuries and the heirs of numerous persons who have died as a result of other's negligence had to suffer from the almost complete uselessness of another weapon: the civil liability arising from a crime. It is thus that in countless cases of extra contractual negligence, there has been a failure, through the oversight of the legal profession, to render every one his due — cum quious tribuere — which is the very marrow of justice. In the interest of right and for the wholesome growth of the Philippine legal system, it is hoped that the members of the bench and bar will turn their attention more and more to the remedy for culpa aquiliana.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from should be and is hereby reversed, and the case shall be remanded to the trial court which shall determine from the evidence whether or not defendants are liable for culpa aquiliana under Arts. 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code, and render judgment accordingly.
With costs against defendant-appellees. So ordered.
Moran, Horrilleno, and Paras, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
OZAETA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I dissent from the statement in the majority opinion that the trial court "was right in declaring that the dismissal of the criminal case against Lamberto Yuson ... precluded a civil action based upon the crime of homicide through reckless negligence." I hold that the trial court erred in so declaring because section 1 (d) of Rule 107 expressly provides the contrary in the following language:
(d) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In the other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damages suffered;
Under this rule the civil liability of the defendants arising from the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence was not extinguished by the dismissal of the criminal case without trial on the merits, although such dismissal, having been made after the arraignment of the accused, extinguished the penal action.
The pertinent allegations of plaintiffs' complaint in this case are as follows:
3 — Que a eso de las 6:30 de la manana del 5 de abril, 1939, un automovil Taxi No. 941 de la propiedad de la corporacion demandada y entonces manejado por el demandado Lamberto Yuson, uno de los chauffeurs de la misma, por la notoria negligencia de dicho chofer, atropello, apabullo a Agapito Sudario, padre de los mencionados menores demandantes, que entonces pasaba por la Calle Dominga, municipio de San Juan, Provincia de Rizal, Islas Filipinas, estrellandolo contra un tronco de acacia, de cuyas resultas dicho Agapito Sudario fallecio casi instantaneamente;
x x x x x x x x x
5 — Que como resultado de la muerte del mencionado Agapito Sudario, causada por la grave imprudencia y negligencia de parte del demandado Lamberto Yuson, chofer de la Corporacion demandada, dichos menores demandantes han quedado desamparados y privados de su unico sosten en la vida, causandoles danos y perjuicios por la cantidad de DIEZ MIL PESOS (P10,000).
These allegations comprehend an obligation ex delicto; and although the liability therefor of the Acro Taxi Cab Co., Inc., is subsidiary, the joining of the said corporation in this same action against the principal obligor is permissible.
I concur in the reversal of the judgment appealed from and in the remand of the case to the Court of origin for decision on the merits.
Yulo, C.J., concurs.
Footnotes
1 There might be some exceptions. See essay on "La Cosa Juzgada y la Accion Civil" by Atisto Mortare, in the "Revista General de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia", Vol. 87, pp. 384-426.
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