G.R. No. L-48346




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-48346 June 29, 1943 DESTILERIA AYALA y CIA., INC., petitioner, vs. LIGA NACIONAL OBRERA DE FILIPINAS, and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents. Sabido and Laurel, Jr., for petitioner. Paguia and Lerum for respondents. BOCOBO, J.: The petition for a writ of certiorari in this case, dated June 3, 1941, seeks the reversal of the order of the Court of Industrial Relations, of March 13, 1941, denying the Destileria Ayala y Cia, Inc. (petitioner herein) authority to dismiss Francisco Serrano as cashier of said company, directing petitioner herein to reinstate Serrano to his former position and to pay him his salary during his suspension. It appears that an industrial dispute between petitioner herein and its laborers affiliated with the "Liga Nacional Obrera de Filipinas," one of the respondents herein, was certified to the Court of Industrial Relations on November 20, 1940 by the Under-Secretary of Labor. Among the demands involved was the restoration of the old scale of salaries. One of the employees concerned was Francisco Serrano, whose old monthly compensation of P120 was alleged to have been reduced to P77. Serrano was once of the signers of the motion of the "Liga Nacional Obrera de Filipinas" dated December 4, 1940, supplementing its demand for the return to the former scale of salaries. A few days later, that is, on December 11, 1940, petitioner herein asked the Court of Industrial Relations for authority to dismiss Francisco Serrano as cashier on the ground of negligence. On December 24, 1940, this motion was supplemented by a petition to said Court of Industrial Relations for authority to suspend Serrano, with the assurance by the Destileria Ayala y Cia., Inc., petitioner herein, that if Serrano's reinstatemant was ordered by the Court, of Industrial Relations, petitioner herein would pay him his salary during the period of suspension. This petition for suspension was granted on the same date, with the understanding just mentioned. Before the Court of Industrial Relations. Serrano was charged with negligence for having failed to demand from Antonio Valdez, a collector of petitioner herein. Bill No. 2049 on August 12, 1940. Antonio Valdez later confessed to having misappropriated P37.50 corresponding to Bill No. 2049, and another amount, P52.50, which was a part of his collecting on November 22, 1940. After hearing the Court of Industrial Relations on March 13, 1941, held that Serrano had committed no negligence; that there was no valid and sufficient reasons for his discharge; and that the real motive of petitioner herein for desiring to dismiss Serrano was the latter's affiliation with a labor union and his act of joining his co-workers in their efforts to improve their lot. The aforesaid Court held: In view of the facts and circumstances shown above the Court concludes that Serrano had not committed any negligence in the performance of his duties as charged and that there is no valid and sufficient reason for his discharge. From all what appears, the Court is inclined to believes that the alleged negligence reason Serrano was not the real or motivating reason behind respondent's action in seeking his dismissal. The evidence and the record are barren of any other controlling reasons which may impel the respondent to seek the dismissal of an employee who was rendered long years of faithful and efficient service in a position of trust and confidence like Serrano except his actuation of joining the movement for the improvement of his and that of his co-workers. He was one of those who demanded the restoration of the force scale of salaries, an objective palpably against the wishes and pecuniary interest of his employer made more painful because it is the last thing expected from him who ranks high among his co-workers both in position and in the degree of trust enjoyed. Such an act cannot be viewed by the employer other than pure disloyalty from one whom it had retained in its payrolls for years and years. It is, therefore, not surprising if respondent considers his continuance in the service as undesirable. The view that Serrano union affiliation and activities was the real motive which impelled respondent's desire to dismiss him becomes more evident when it is taken into account that if there are employees who could be considered negligent in the performance of their duties in connection was the anomalies committed by Valdez, these persons are no other than Fidel Policarpio and Vicente Luckichih, — the former, by not notifying his superiors of the delay in the payment of Bill No. 2049, and the latter, for having allowed the use of original receipt No. 13195 (Exhibit D) from the stub of receipts under his custody and possession. Apparently, no action was taken by respondent against these two employees who are not affiliated with the union and who did not affix their signatures in the petition relative to salary restoration. The Court, therefore, is fully convinced that respondent had all the reasons to discriminate and retaliate against Serrano and to realize such objective, it had resorted to hide the real motive behind the veil and guise of the present charges. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that Serrano is absolutely free from blame and is innocent of the charges imputed against him and respondent's petition seeking authority to dismiss him is hereby denied. The respondent is directed to reinstate Serrano to his former position, and, in conformity with its assurance given before the hearing, to pay him the salary he ought to have earned from the date of his suspension to that of his reinstatement. The Authority of the Court of Industrial Relations in rendering the above judgment was based on section 19 of Commonwealth Act. Nop. 103, in connection with section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 213, which read as follows: ACT No. 103 Sec, 19. Implied condition is every contract of employment. — In every contract of employment or tenancy, whether verbal or written, it is an implied condition that when any dispute between the employer or landlord and the employee, tenant or laborer has been submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for settlement or arbitration, pursuant to the provisions of his Act, and pending award or decision by it, the employee, tenant or laborer shall not strike or walk out of his employment when so enjoined by the Court after hearing and when public interest so requires and if he has already done so, that be shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the Court, which shall be issued only after hearing when public interest so requires or when the dispute cannot, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled; and if the employees, tenants or laborers fail to return to work, the Court may authorize the employer or landlord to accept other employees, tenants or laborers. A condition shall further be implied that while such dispute is pending in the Court, the employer or landlord shall refrain from accepting other employees, tenants or laborers, unless with the express authority of the Court, and shall permit the continuation in the service of his employees, tenants or laborers under the last terms and conditions existing before the dispute arose; Provided, That within fifteen days after the declaration of the strike, employers will not be allowed to engage the services of strike breakers. A violation by the employer or landlord or by the employee, tenant or laborer of such an order or the implied contractual condition set forth in this section shall constitute contempt of the Court, and shall be punishable as in all other of contempt of a Court of First Instance. ACT No. 213 Sec. 5. Any person or persons, landlord, or landlords, corporation or corporations or their agents partnership or partnerships or their agents, who intimidate or coerce any employee or laborer or tenant under his or their employ, with the intent of preventing such employee or laborer or tenant joining any registered legitimate labor organization of his own choosing or, who dismiss or threaten to dismiss such employee or laborer or tenant from his employment for hearing joined or for being a member of, any registered legitimate labor organization, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment of not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos, or both, at the discretion of the court. Inasmuch as the findings of fact by the Court of Industrial Relations cannot be inquired into by us, and that Court having found that Francisco Serrano was absolutely free from blame, said Court committed no error in denying petitioner herein authority to dismiss him, and ordering the payment of his salary during suspension. At the time the order appealed from was issued, section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 and section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 213 were in full force and effect. We find that the order of the Court of Industrial Relations was fully warranted by the legal provision aforementioned. However, these statutory provisions are not only inconsistent with the present circumstances but the Court of Industrial Relations has been abolished. Executed Order No. 1 by the Chairman of the Executive Commission, dated January 30, 1942, which organized the Central Administrative Organs and Judicial Courts, did not reconstitute the Court of Industrial Relations, and no government agency has been created to carry out the functions formerly exercised by that Court. Consequently, the order of that Court which is questioned in this proceeding is effective only until January 30, 1942 when the Court of Industrial Relations ceased to exist. Therefore, the order of the Court for Industrial Relations is hereby modified in the sense that the petitioner herein, in pursuance of its own undertaking, must pay the salary of Francisco Serrano during the period of his suspension up to and including January 30, 1942, but that the petitioner herein was not, and is not now, under any obligation to reinstate him after that date. Thus modified, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, without any findings as to costs. Yulo, C.J., Moran, Ozaeta and Paras. JJ., concur. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation