G.R. No. L-48754




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-48754 November 26, 1941 EMILIO V. REYES, protestant-appellant, vs. APOLONIO R. DIAZ, protestee-appellee. MORAN, J.: This case is certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals upon the ground that the jurisdiction of the trial court is in issue. The supposed questions of jurisdiction are, first, whether or not there is sufficient to show that the protestant has duly filed his certificate of candidacy, and second, whether the trial court has or has no authority to pass upon the validity of the ballots adjudicated to the protestant which have not been challenged by the protestee in his counter-protest. Article VIII, section 2, No. 3, of the Constitution confers upon the Supreme Court jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any trial court is in issue." Section 138, No. 3, of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259, provides that the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue." It has been held that the word "jurisdiction" as used in the constitutions and in the statutes "means jurisdiction as to the subject-matter only, unless an exception arises by reason of its employment in a broader sense." (15 C. J. 735; Johnson vs. Wells, 91 Fed. 1; U. S. vs. Lee, 84 Fed. 626; Vinal vs. Continental Constr., etc. Co., 34 Fed. 228; Starnes vs. Mutual Loan etc., Co., 102 Ga. 597; 29 SE 452.) There is in our Constitution or in the law aforecited nothing which may lend the word "jurisdiction" therein used a broader meaning than jurisdiction over the subject matter. On the contrary, having due regard to the manifest purpose of the law, which is to confine the appellate jurisdiction of this court to cases of vital importance involving questions of fundamental character, such, for instance, as the question of validity of statute, treaty or ordinance, or the legality of any tax, import or assessment which may effect the very existence of the government, or criminal cases wherein life imprisonment or death penalty is imposed, we are of the opinion and so hold, that the issue of jurisdiction which confers appellate powers upon this Court in a given case is not such question as is dependent exclusively upon minor matters of fact or upon a mere construction of the pleadings, but that which has reference to the more important question of jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter as determined by law. Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong (C. J. S., p. 36) and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines its powers (Banco Español Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921; Perkins vs. Dizon, 40 Off. Gaz. No. 7, 3d Sup. p. 216; Ng Si Chok vs. Vera, G.R. No. 45674). The question, therefore, of whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject-matter, calls for interpretation and application of the law of jurisdiction which distributes the judicial power among the different courts in the Philippines, and since the ruling on the matter is of far-reaching consequences, affecting, as it may, the very life and structure of our judicial system, the law has deemed it wise to place the power and authority to act thereon in the highest court of the land. In the instant, case, there is no such question of jurisdiction as above described. Both parties agree that if the due filing of the protestant's certificate of candidacy is proven, the trial court has no jurisdiction except to dismiss the case. There is, therefore, no question between the parties as to what the jurisdiction of the trial court is according to law in either case. The real question between them is one of fact — whether or not the protestant's certificate of candidacy has been duly filed. And not the until this fact is proved can the question of jurisdiction be determined. Neither is the second question one of jurisdiction within the purview of the legal provisions above quoted. Whether certain ballots are or are not pertinent to the issue raised in the pleadings, is merely a question of relevancy of evidence. It may be true that the court by an erroneous ruling on such question my encroach upon issues completely foreign to those defined in the pleadings, but in such case the question of jurisdiction that may arise would not be one of jurisdiction over the subject-matter but of jurisdiction over the issue. In order that a court may validly try and decide a case, it must have jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. (Banco Español Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921; Perkins vs. Dizon, 40 Off. Gaz. No. 7, 3d Sup. p. 216.) But in some instances it is said that the court should also have jurisdiction over the issue (15 C. J. 734; Hutts vs. Martin, 134 Ind. 587, 33 N. E. 676), meaning thereby that the issue being tried and decided by the court be within the issues raised in the pleadings. But this kind of jurisdiction should be distinguished from jurisdiction over the subject-matter the latter being conferred by law and the former by the pleadings. Jurisdiction over the issue, unlike jurisdiction over the subject-matter, may be conferred by consent either express or implied of the parties. (Rule 17, sec. 4, Rules of Court.) Although an issue is not duly pleaded it may validly be tried and decided if no timely objection is made thereto by the parties. This cannot be done when jurisdiction over the subject-matter is involved. In truth, jurisdiction over the issue is an expression of a principle that is involved in jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. Where, for instance, an issue is not duly pleaded in the complaint, the defendant cannot be said to have been served with process as to that issue. (Cf. Atkins etc. Co. vs. Domingo, 44 Phil. 680). At any rate, whether or not the court has jurisdiction over a specific issue is a question that requires nothing except an examination of the pleadings, and this function is without such importance as call for the intervention of this Court. Furthermore, this question of jurisdiction is unsubstantial. It is well-settled rule that the institution of suffrage is of public, not private, interest, and the court may examine all the ballots after the ballot boxes are opened in order to determine which are legal and which are illegal, even though neither of the parties raised any question as to their illegality. (Yalung vs. Atienza, 52 Phil. 781; Cecilio vs. Tomacruz, 62 Phil. 689; Cosculluela vs. Gaston, 63 Phil. 41). Wherefore, this case is hereby remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. Avaceña, C.J., Abad Santos, Diaz, Horilleno, and Ozaeta, JJ., concur. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation