G.R. No. L-47768




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-47768 June 30, 1941 NORTHERN LUZON TRANSPORTATION, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and DAGUITI NAGCAYCAYSA NGA MANGMANGGUED, respondents. Lockwood, Ampil & Chan and Francisco Ortega for petitioner. Paquia & Lerum for respondent Daguiti Nagcaycaysa Nga Mangmanggued. No appearance for respondent court. LAUREL, J.: This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the "decision parcial" of the Court of Industrial Relations dated August 8, 1940, ordering the petitioner herein, Northern Luzon Transportation, Inc., to re-employ German Valdez, Hilarion Agrava, Espiritu Gonzales, Sebastian Oliva, Filomeno Lamadrid, Segismundo Llapitan, and Felix Lucas, and to pay their salaries from the respective dates of their dismissal to the date of re-employment. On March 20, 1940, the Secretary of Labor certified to the Court of Industrial Relations for arbitration and settlement an industrial dispute between the petitioner and the herein respondent, "Daguiti Nagcaycaysa Nga Mangmanggued," which was forthwith docketed as Case No. 145 of the said court. One of the demands involved in the dispute thus certified relates to the re-employment of certain employees who were previously dismissed by the petitioner, among whom were the employees aforementioned. On April 11, 1940, Atty. Amando C. Bugayong, of the division of the investigation of the Court of Industrial Relations, was commissioned to receive the evidence of the parties with respect to the foregoing demand, and on August 8, 1940, the said court rendered the "decision partial" now complained of, the dispositive part of which is as follows: De las pruebas aportadas en la investigacion y del informe sometido por dicho Comisionado, llegamos a la conclusion de que los despidos de Espiritu Gonzales. Filomeno Llamadrid, Segismundo Llapitan, Sebastian Oliva, Hilarion Agrava, German Valdez, Felix Lucas fueron realmente sin causa justificada y deben ser readmitidas a los mismo puestos que tenian al tiempo de su despido y con los mismos salarios que percibian. . . . Con respeto a los demas, declaramos que su despido fue injustificado y ordenamos a la recurrida que readmita a los mismos, debiendo pagar a cada uno de estos sus respectivos salarios que los correspondian desde la fecha de su despido hasta que sean readmitidos al servicio de la recurridad en la siguiente forma: (a) A Espiritu Gonzales, desde el 27 de diciembre de 1939; (b) a German Valdez desde el 2 de noviembre de 1939; (c) a Sebastian Oliva, desde el 12 de enero de 1940; (d) a Filomeno Lamadrid, desde el 16 de octubre de 1939; (e) Felix Lucas, desde el 23 de octubre de 1939; (f) Hilarion Agrava, desde el 2 de noviembre 1939; y (g) Segismundo Llapitan, desde el 17 de enero de 1940. On August 19, 1940, the petitioner filed motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision, which was denied by the Court of Industrial Relations in its resolution of September 14, 1940. Hence, this petition for certiorari. As grounds for the allowance of the writ prayed for herein, the petitioner alleges that: (a) The said dismissed employees were discharged or separated from the service before any industrial dispute arose between your petitioner and respondent Daguiti Nagcaycaysa Nga Mangmanggued and the Court of Industrial Relations is without power and jurisdiction to order their reinstatement in such a case; (b) Their discharge or dismissal was not due to their union activities and the Court of Industrial Relations is devoid of power and jurisdiction to order the reinstatement employees unless the cause of their discharge was by reason of their union activities; (c) The Court of Industrial Relations is without power to reinstate an employee after he has voluntarily resigned and his resignation accepted, as in the case of Felix Lucas; (d) The Court of Industrial Relations is without power to order the reinstatement of employees separated from the service due to the abolition of their positions on account of continual losses incurred by the employer due to the operation of the service n which they are employed, as in the cases of Hilarion Agrava and German Valdez. To force the employer to reinstate them is to deprive the employer of property without due process of law; (e) The Court of Industrial Relations is without power to order the reinstatement of an inspector of a transportation company who, on account of his disloyalty, has lost the confidence of his employer, the said inspector being the "eyes and ears" of the company and its representative in the lines operated by it, as in the case of Filomeno Lamadrid; (f) The Court of Industrial Relations gravely abused its discretion by ordering the reinstatement of employees who have voluntarily separated themselves from the service by absenting themselves continuously from work against the express orders of the employer, as in the case of Espiritu Gonzales and Segismundo Llapitan. (g) The Court of Industrial Relations abused its discretion seriously when it ordered the reinstatement of Sebastian Oliva, who was discharged for serious irregularities in the performance of his duties as a conductor in not issuing tickets to passengers and for attempted stealing; (h) The Court of Industrial Relations is without power to order the payment of back salaries of the dismissed employees, even assuming that it has the power to order them reinstated, for the reason that such an order is equivalent to an order for the payment of damages caused the employees, and the Court of Industrial Relations has no power to impose the payment of damages in any case, the said power being a purely judicial function. The challenge directed by the petitioner against the authority of the Court of Industrial Relations to order the reinstatement of the employees above-mentioned rests upon the theory that since their dismissal took place prior to the certification of the dispute to the Court of Industrial Relations, and, therefore, not cognizable by said court under section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the said court does not have the power to take cognizance of such dismissal under section 4 of the same Act prior to its amendment by Commonwealth Act No. 559. We are, however, of the opinion that the circumstance that the dismissal or lay-off occurred prior to the certification of the dispute does not affect jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations to pass upon and determine the legality or propriety of the dismissal or lay-off if this question is involved in, or arises from, the dispute thus certified for recognizance and adjudication by the said court. (Bohol Land Transportation Co. vs. BLT Employees Labor Union, G.R. No. 47661, promulgated March 12, 1941.) It is, however, contended by the petitioner that even if the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations over the subject matter of the present controversy were sustained, the said court would have no authority to order the reinstatement of employees dismissed by it unless their dismissal was made on account of their union activity or under the circumstances mentioned in section 21 of Commonwealth Act No. 103. Where dismissals of employees and laborers have given cause for a labor dispute to arise and the same has been duly certified to the Court of Industrial Relations for arbitration and settlement under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the said court may determine the legality or propriety of such dismissals, and, in proper cases, order the reinstatement of the employees so dismissed if in its opinion such relief or demand is necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute, preventing further disputes or doing justice to the parties. As a last point of law raised by the petitioner, it is contended that "the Court of Industrial Relations is without power to order the payment of back salaries of the dismissed employees for the reason that such an order is equivalent to an order for the payment of damages caused the employees, and the Court of Industrial Relations has no power to impose the payment of damages in any case, the said power purely a judicial function." This question is not of first impression in this Court and was laid at rest in the case of Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. 46892, promulgated June 28, 1940, in which we said El ultimo señalamiento de error guarda relation con la parte de la orden del 6 de mayo de 1936 que dispone que la recurrente pague a loss 55 obreros respuetos los jornales que dejaron de percibir durante su separacion del servicio. La recurrente sostiene que este parte de la orden equivale a una sentencia por daños y perjuicios que el Tribunal de Relaciones Industriales no puede pronunciar por carecer de jurisdiccion. La pretension no es meritoria. El Tribunal de Relaciones Industriales, conforme ya se ha dicho, es un tribunal especial y como tal tiene facultad para disponer que la recurrente pague los jornales de sus empleados y obreros que han sodo respuetos. The rest of the questions raised by the petitioner relate to the determination of facts made by the Court of Industrial Relations with respect to the cause of the discharge of the seven employees involved in this controversy. In connection with the discharge of Felix Lucas, it is claimed by the petitioner that this employee had voluntarily resigned and that his resignation was accepted. The Court of Industrial Relations in holding that his discharge was without justifiable cause stated the following in its resolution of September 14, 1940: En cuanto al despido de Felix Lucas, resulta a que este era un lider obreritas que trabajada con la recurrida desde hacia dos años como chauffeur; que en cierta ocasion los Srs. Minnich y Miranda, Gerentes de la recurrida, le investigaron acerca de sus actividades unionistas e hicieron cierta requisa de sus papeles para poder encontrar algo concerniente a la union, admitiendo Felix Lucas que el era uno de los miembros de la union recurrent; que despues de aquel incidente, le mandaron a San Fernando para hacer trabajos de barrendero y otros trabajos inadecuados y enteramente distintos del que antes tenia; que el 23 de octobre de 1936. Felix Lucas dimitio y durante la investigacion, al ser preguntado porque dimitio, contesto que lo hacia como protesta al acto de discriminacion de que habia sido victima, quitandosele del puesto de chauffeur y dandole trabajos impropios e inadecuados a su offcio como el de barrendero o basurero. Bajo estas circunstancias, creemos que la compañia recurrida ha precedido de una manera impropia e injusta contra Felix Lucas, haciendole objeto de democion para que dejara el servicio de la compañia. As to Filomeno Lamadrid, it is alleged by the petitioner that he was caught sleeping in a bus at Km. Post No. 348 at a time when he should be performing his duties as an inspector, as a result of which he was discharged. The Court of Industrial Relations in ordering the reinstatement of this employee based its action on the following findings of fact: Refiriendonos al despido de Filomeno Lamadrid, resulta que este de oficio inspector de la recurridad y se alega que fue despedido por haber sido hallado dormido en el bus, segun informan los Branch Managers Puzon y Borja. Los reports de Puzon y Borja coinciden con el report de Filomeno Lamadrid, con la unica diferencia de que en el report de Borja, se decia que Llamadrid y el conductor del truck ambos esteban dormodos. Una de los testigos declaro que Filomeno Lamadrid no esteba dormido sino que solamente tenia la cabeza apoyada en uno de los asientos delanteros del truck, si bien otro afirmo que estaba acostado. No estimamos probado sificientemente el hecho de que el inspector Lamadrid estuviera realmente dormido, pero el resultado de este incidente fue el conductor que se dijo que tambien estaba dormido no fue suspendido ni despidido, ni bien se separe de la union, como miembro de la misma, pero por lo contrario, el inspector Lamadrid, que era el fundador de la union recurrente y actualmente es secretario-tesorero, fue despedido. No encontramos prueba que justifique que Filomeno Lamadrid, el inspector despedido, estuviere realmente dormido durante su viaje, y hallamos en el proceder de la recurrida cierto discrimen por el diferente trato dispensado al conductor al no dispedirle tambien. With reference to the case of Espiritu Gonzales, it appears that this employee was operated on for appendicitis and was confined in the hospital from September 16, 1939. It is alleged by the petitioner that he was discharged because of his failure to report for work after his release from the hospital when requested to do so in spite of the fact that he had fully recovered from his illness at the time. The Court of Industrial Relations found that this employee was asked to go back to work on November 5, 1939, one month and eight days after his release from the hospital and concluded that "este hecho no justifica su despido, pues que la ausencia o no presentacion el trabajo fue debida a su enfermended." With regard to the case of Sebastian Oliva, who was a conductor in one of the buses of the petitioner, it appears that he was discharged allegedly for having attempted to defraud the petitioner, in that while making a trip from Km. Post No. 718 to Km. Post No. 742, between Camalaniugan Junction and Aparri in the province of Cagayan, he did not issue any tickets to six of his eleven passengers. The fact, however, is that he was entirely innocent of this charge as shown in the following findings of the Court of Industrial Relations in connection with his incident: Otro de los despedidos fue Sebastian Oliva, empleado como conductor en uno de los trucks de la Compañia recurrida que hacia viajes a Aparri. Segun las pruebas, en el dia de autos algunos pasajeros pidieron tickets hasta el kilometro 718 como su punto de destino y Oliva asi lo hizo, pero al allegar al referido kilometro, los dichos pasajeros no desembarcaron del truck no obstante el conductor haberles avisado que debian bajar por haber llegado al kilometro 718; que los pasajeros dijeron que habian pedido pasaje hasta el sitio de Canayon en la creencia de que Canayon estaba en el kilometro 718. Durante la discusion que se entablo entre el conductor y los pasajeros, llego un inspector de la compañia quien creyo que Oliva trataba de defraudar a la compañia y por tal motivo se incauto y los tickets que tenia dicho conductor; pero resulta que dichos pasajeros se decidieron a proseguir el viaje hasta Aparri y fue entonces caudo el conductor no tuvo mas remedio que cobrales la tarifa correspondiente, que es diez centimos, pero el conductor no pudo expedir dichos tickets, porque el inspector selos incauto. Bajo estos hechos, no estimamos que dicho conductor haya tenido intencion alguna de defraudar a la compañia, y por lo tanto, no consideramos justificado su despido. As we do not find any valid reason for disturbing the findings of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations as set forth above, we decline to disturb them and the action taken by the Court of Industrial Relations in ordering the reinstatement of Felix Lucas, Filomeno Lamadrid, Espiritu Gonzales, and Sebastian Oliva is hereby affirmed. With respect to the case of German Valdez and Hilarion Agrava, the facts surrounding their dismissal are not controverted. It appears that prior to the discharge of these two employees, the petitioner was operating two boats, launch No. 1 and launch No. 2, in connection with its service as a public utility on the Abulog River. Valdez and Agrava were then employed as boatmen in launch No. 1. Due, however , to the fact that the operation of these two boats was a losing proposition, the operation of launch No. 2 was suspended indefinitely. Primitivo Viloria and Marcos Mayang, the boatmen assigned to launch No. 2, were then transferred to launch No. 1, and Valdez and Agrava were discharged. The Court of Industrial Relations is ordering the reinstatement of these two men made the observation that "lo logico hubiera sido que Viloria y Mayang, fueran los despedidos, toda vez que estos eran los que operaban la lancha Num. 2. cuya operacion fue suspendida por la compañia, y no los que ya venian operando desde antes la lancha Num. 1, a menos que hubiera algun motivo para semejante proceder lo cual no es ha establecido." We are of the opinion that this conclusion of the Court of Industrial Relations is erroneous. Where, as in the present case, it becomes necessary for an employer to reduce its personnel due to losses in the operation of its business, its right to determine who among its employees should be retained or dismissed should not be interfered with unless it could be shown that the employer, under cover of this right, is proceeding against the employees in an unjust or capricious manner. The action of the Court of Industrial Relations, therefore, ordering the reinstatement of German Valdez and Hilarion Agrava is hereby reversed. As to the dismissal of Segismundo Llapitan, it is alleged by the petitioner that this employee went on leave of absence on account of the illness of his child but failed to return to his work when requested to do so by the petitioner. No findings of fact is made by the Court of Industrial Relations regarding this employee. The conclusion in said court's "decision parcial" of August 8, 1940, that his dismissal was without justifiable cause, is one of law and is devoid of factual basis. The case, as to this employee, should be remanded for express finding of facts and statement of the reason for the action of the Court of Industrial Relations. The order appealed from is confirmed with respect to Felix Lucas, Filomeno Lamadrid, Espiritu Gonzales, and Sebastian Oliva; it is reversed as to German Valdez and Hilarion Agrava; and the case as to Segismundo Llapitan is remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, With the foregoing instruction, without pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered. Avanceña, C. J., Diaz, Moran, and Horrileno, JJ., concur. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation