G.R. No. L-46097




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-46097 October 18, 1939 TEOFILA ADEVA VIUDA DE LEYNEZ, petitioner, vs. IGNACIO LEYNEZ, respondent. Conrado V. Sanchez and Ambrosio Padilla for petitioner. Ilao and Enriquez for respondent. LAUREL, J.: This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro denying probate of the will of the deceased Valerio Leynez, on the ground that its attestation clause does not conform to the requirements section 618, as amended, of the Code of Civil Procedure. The attestation clause of the will is worded as follows: Suscrito y declarado por el testador Valerio Leynez, como su ultima voluntad y testamento en presencia de todos y cada uno de nosotros, y a ruego de dicho testador, firmamos el presente cada uno en presencia de los otros, o de los demas y de la del mismo testador Valerio Leynez . El testamento consta de los (2) paginas solamente. The question presented is, under section 618, as amended, of the Code of Civil Procedure, is this attestation clause legally sufficient? The pertinent portion of this section of the Code is as follows: . . . the attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, an the later witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other. The alleged defect in the attestation clause of the controverted will is that it fails to state that the testator and the three witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the manner prescribed by law, because it merely states "firmanos el presente cada uno en presencia de los otros, o de los demas y de la del mismo testador Valerio Leynez." In deciding this question the Court of Appeals, however, ruled: A la luz de las jurisprudencias arriba citadas en la clausada de atestiguamiento discutida en el asunto de autos no encontramos un cumplimiento sustantial del requisito exigido por la ley, de que en ella se haga constar que el testador y los testigos han firmado unos en presencia de otros, todas y cada una de las paginas usadas del testamento, requisito que no se puede establecer por medio de su prueba aliunde. Against this conclusion of the Court of Appeals, petitioner puts forward the contention that it has decided a question of substance in a way not probably in accord with the law and the applicable decisions of this court (Rule 47, paragraph e [1] of Supreme Court.) The rule of liberal construction of the applicable law should, petitioner avers, be held to apply in the case at bar, and in support of her content on she invokes a long array of cases (Abangan vs .Abangan, 40 Phil., 476; Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez, 42 Phil., 145; Aldaba vs. Roque, 43 Phil., 378; Unson vs .Abella, 43 Phil., 494; Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios, 46 Phil., 922; Nayve vs. Mojal, 47 Phil., 152; De Gala vs .Gonzalez, 53 Phil., 104; Rey vs. Cartagena, 56 Phil., 282; Dichoso de Ticson vs. De Gorostiza, 57 Phil., 437; Sebastian vs. Paganiban, 59 Phil., 653; De Guzman vs. Celestino, G.R. No. 35273, April 25, 1932; Policarpio vs. Baltazar, G.R. No. 36349, November 14, 1932; Malate vs. Olea, G.R. No. 36154, December 16, 1932; In re Estate of Jennings, 1933, G.R. No. 38758). To this line of cases those of Rodriguez vs. Yap, G.R. No. 45924, May 18, 1939, and Grey vs. Fabie, G.R. No. 45160, May 23, 1939, may perhaps be added. Respondent, on the other hand, equally invokes a number of cases wherein, he contends, the rule of strict construction was made to prevail. (Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405; In re Estate of Neuark, 46 Phil., 841; Saño vs. Quintana, 48 Phil., 506; Gumban vs. Gorecho, 50 Phil., 30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil., 481; Rodriguez vs. Alcala, 55 Phil., 150.) This Court has already taken notice of these different views within, in Dichoso de Ticson vs. De Gorostiza (57 Phil., 437, 439-440), it frankly made the following observation : "The truth is that there have been, noticeable in the Philippines two divergent tendencies in the law of wills — the one being planted on strict construction and the other on liberal construction. A late example of the former views may be found in the decision in Rodriguez vs. Alcala ([1930], 55 Phil., 150), sanctioning a literal enforcement of the law. The basic case in the other direction, predicated on reason, is Abangan vs. Abangan ([1919], 40 Phil., 476), oft-cited approvingly in later decisions." It is fairness to recognize the existence of opposing currents of legal thought, a situation which perhaps has brought about a certain degree of confusion in this field. It is also fairness to avow, however, that a more careful examination of the cases will show that, while the two tendencies mentioned in easily discernible, the conflict in many cases is more apparent than real, and the variance, if at all, in the application of the principles involved was due in some instances to the marked differentiation of facts and the consequent personal or collective criteria in particular cases.lâwphi1.nêt We have taken pains to examine the numerous cases relied upon by the petitioner and those relied upon by the respondent, and while we do not deem it necessary to make a detailed comparison between them, we find no difficulty in selecting what we consider is the reasonable rule to apply in this case at bar. It is, of course, not possible to lay down a general rule, rigid and inflexible, which would be applicable to all cases. More than anything else, the facts and circumstances of record are to be considered in the application of any given rule. If the surrounding circumstances point to a regular execution of the will, and the instrument appears to have been executed substantially in accordance with the requirements of the law, the inclination should, in the absence of any suggestion of bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean towards its admission to probate, although the document may suffer from some imperfection of language, or other non-essential defect. This, in our opinion, is the situation in the present case, and we, therefore, hold that the requirement that the attestation clause, among other things, shall state "that the testator signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of three witnesses, and that the witnesses signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other," is sufficiently complied with, it appearing that the testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of the will according to the stipulation of the parties. (Record on Appeal, stipulation, pp. 10, 14, 15); and this fact being shown in the will itself, and there being, furthermore, no question raised as to the authenticity of the signature of the testator and the witnesses. An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent form, a record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2 ed., sec. 132.) A will, therefore, should not be rejected where its attestation clause serves the purpose of the law. The law-making body, in recognition of the dangers to which testamentary dispositions are apt to be subject in the hands of unscrupulous individuals, has surrounded the execution of the wills with every solemnity deemed necessary to safeguard it. This purpose was indicated when our legislature provided for the exclusion of evidence aliunde to prove the execution of the will. We should not, however, attribute the prohibition as indicative of a desire to impose unreasonable restraint or beyond what reason and justice permit. It could not have been the intention of the legislature in providing for the essential safeguards in the execution of a will to shackle the very right of testamentary disposition which the law recognizes and holds sacred. The pronouncement of this Court in Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476, 479), expresses the sound rule to which we have recently adhered in principle. (Rodriguez vs. Yap, G.R. No. 45924, promulgated May 18, 1939; and Grey vs. Fabie, G.R. No. 45160, promulgated May 23, 1939): The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded. It follows that the writ of certiorari should be, as it is hereby, granted and the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed, with the result that the controverted will, Exhibit A, of the deceased Valerio Leynez, shall be admitted to probate. So ordered, with costs against the respondent-appellee. So ordered. Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and Concepcion, JJ., concur. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation