Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45826 June 27, 1938
DAMASO P. PEREZ, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
CEFERINO HILARIO, Judge of First Instance of Cagayan, ET AL., respondents.
Domitilio G. Abordo for petitioners.
Conrado V. Singson for respondents.
AVANCEŅA, C.J.:
On May 1, 1937 the respondents originally filed a complaint, civil case No. 2165, in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan against the petitioners concerning priority in the location of certain mining claims situated in Lalloc Cagayan.
This petition for certiorari filed against the respondents and the Judge of First Instance of Cagayan prays that all the proceedings had in civil case No. 2165 be annulled. It is alleged that the Judge of First Instance of Cagayan lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of said case by virtue of section 61 of Commonwealth Act No. 137, which says:
SEC. 61. Conflicts and disputes arising out of mining locations may be submitted to the Director of the Bureau of Mines for decision: Provided, That such decision may be appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce within ninety days from the date of its entry. In case any one of the interested parties should disagree from the decision of the Director of the Bureau of Mines or of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, the matter may be taken to the court of competent jurisdiction within ninety days after notice of such action the said decision, after which time without the institution of such action the said decision shall be final and binding upon the parties concerned.
The petitioners contend that, under the provisions of said section, the respondents could not commence their action originally in the Court of First Instance, but should first submit it to the Bureau of Mines. However, the section above-quoted, according to it's plain wording, does not provide that the conflicts therein referred to should be, but simply may be submitted to the Bureau of Mines; and it can not be construed as prohibiting their original submission to the courts of justice whose general jurisdiction cover them. It can not be the intention of the law to with these controversies from the general jurisdiction cover them. It can not be the intention of the law to withdraw these controversies from the general jurisdiction of the courts, in view of its own provision that they may eventually be appealed thereto. On the other hand, since no procedure is provided in taking such appeal, the ordinary procedure should be followed as if the conflicts had been originally brought before them. Thus the parties interested may, if they so desire, have their controversy finally settled, on appeal, by the courts as if it had been submitted to them originally. If such is the case, the requirement that they submit it first to the Bureau of Mines and afterwards to the Department of Agriculture and Commerce, is purposeless and only prolongs the litigation unnecessarily by encumbering it with useless details.
The undoubted purpose of the law in providing that these conflicts may be submitted to the Bureau of Mines is only to afford the parties interested the opportunity to adjust their differences through prompt administrative action if this is satisfactory to them.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is hereby denied with costs against the petitioners. So ordered.
Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
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