Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-41947 January 16, 1936
In re Will of the deceased Silvestra Baron.
VIVENCIO CUYUGAN, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
FAUSTINA BARON and GUILLERMO BARON, oppositors-appellees.
Pedro Abad Santos, Quirino Abad Santos, Francisco M. Ramos, and Aurelio Pineda for appellant.
Arturo Joven for appellee Guillermo Baron.
Vicente J. Francisco and Jesus E. Blanco for appellee Faustina Baron.
BUTTE, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga denying all the petition of Vivencio Cuyugan for the probate of the will of Silvestra Baron.
The petition which was filed on February 1, 1933, recites among other things that Silvestra Baron died on January 30, 1933. The death certificate recites that she was eighty-six years of age and died of heart failure. The petition further recites that she left an estate exceeding in value the sum of P80,000 which she disposed of by will dated December 17, 1932, that she died single without forced heirs.
The will appointed Vivencio Cuyugan, her nephew, as executor and contains the following paragraphs which dispose of her estate:
Que despues de pagados todos los gastos quese han de ocasioner desde que me caiga enferma hasta el entiero de mi cadaver, los bienes y propiedades que he de dejar se repartiran buenamente y en partes iguales mis hermanos Ilamados Guillermo Baron, con exception de todo el dinero en metalico y mi casa de materiales fuertes construida en el barrio del Pilar, San Fernando, Pampanga que actualmente habita mi hermano Guillermo Baron, porque estos los doy de una manera absoluta como herencia de mi sobrino Vivencio Cuyugan.
Que a la muerte de mis hermanos Guillermo y Faustina Baron, todos los terrenos que en virtud de este test tamento les dejo en herencia, los doy herencia a mi so brino VIVENCIO CUYUGAN, por lo que, encargo y prohibo a mis citados hermanos Guillermo y Faustina Baron, que graven o pongan cualquiera clase de obligacion sobre los bienes que les dejo en herencia.
The original of this will is signed "Silestra On" and the copy is signed "Silestra Baron" (t.s.n. pp. 170, 171). Both copies are written in the Pampanga dialect and consist of one sheet and are witnessed in due form by Vicente David, Valeriano Silva and Zacarias Nuguid (known to the testator).
The petition for probate recites:
9. That on the date of the execution of said will, that is to say, on December 17, 1932, the said testatrix was about 80 years old, more or less, and was found and disposing mind, and not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, and was in every respect competent to dispose of her estate by will.
The amended oppositions of Guillermo Baron, brother of the deceased, and Faustina Baron, sister of the deceased, allege in substance first, that at the time of the execution of the alleged will, Silvestra Baron was mentally and physically incapacitated for the execution of a will; and, second, that her signature and alleged consent to the said will was obtained and the attorney who prepared the document and the witnesses who affixed their signatures thereto.
Upon the issues thus drawn by the pleadings of the judge of the Court of First Instance, after and extended trial and a full consideration of the evidence, came to the following conclusion:
Opinamos que influyeron indebidamente e impropia mente en la voluntad ya debilitada de doña Silvestra Baron por su avanzada edad la presencia de sus sobrinos Vivencio Cuyugan y Regino Cuyugan durante el otorgamiento del Exhibit A; la ausencia de Faustina Baron impedida de presenciarlo por algunos soldados de la Constabularia y el Jefe de Policia Municipal, Zacarias Nuguid; la oposicion de Regino Cuyugan a que ella firmase el documento preparado por el abogado Narciso declarando que no habia otorgado testamento el dia anterior a su translado forzoso a San Fernando para que no se hisciese firmar documento analogo y la presencia del cabo Morales y del algunos otros soldados, no solamente cuando se otorgo el testamento, sino cuando ella fue transladada de casa contra su voluntad y cuando se le hizo firmar el Exhibit 10, y por lo tanto, que ella no gozo de una completa libertad para disponer de sus bienes en testamento, o con pleno conocimiento del alcance de su contendido. Solo asi se explica el que ella haya dejado toda la propiedad de sus bienes a sus sobrinos, con quienes habia estado en pleito, con pretericion de sus hermanos, especialmente de la opositora Faustina Baron, con quien habia conviviendo durante 40 años . . . .
Sentadas las premisas de hecho y de derecho que an teceden, el Juzgado no puede menos de llegar a la con ser legalizado como el testamento y ultima voluntad de la finada Silvestra Baron. Cuando existen pruebas suficien tes para concencer al Juzgado de que se ha ejercido in fluencia indebida en el animo de la testadora y que como resultado de dicha influencia indebida esta ha otorgado el testamento de la voluntad de la supuesta testadora sino de los que sobre ella ejercieron la influencia indebida.
An instrument purporting to be a will executed and witnessed in accordance with the formalities required by the statute is entitled to the presumption of regularity. But the burden of the evidence passed to the proponent when the oppositors submit credible evidence tending to show that the supposed testator did not possess testamentary capacity at the time or that the document was not the free and voluntary expression of the alleged testator or that the will, for any other reason, is void in law. The finding that the will was executed under due influence or by the fraud of another presupposes testamentary capacity. In the present case the learned trial judge refused the probate of the alleged will on the ground that it was executed under the due influence of other persons and we think the record warrants his findings in this respect. The trial court also made findings of fact tending to show actual lack of testamentary capacity of Silvestra Baron and we have preferred to base our conclusion on that finding. The testamentary capacity of Silvestra Baron at the time she executed the said purported will.
The evidence shows that the same morning when Silvestra Baron signed the alleged will she suffered a physical collapse of such a serious nature that a physician and a nurse were immediately called in. By reason of her advanced age and the gravity of her illness, she was unable to do anything for herself. Her grandniece, Epifania Sampang, who reached the house about one hour or so after the old lady's collapse, telephoned a message to Vivencio Cuyugan at San Fernando, some fourteen kilometers distant, that Silvestra had an attack and was in a serious condition and requested that a doctor be sent immediately, Doctor Teopaco and a nurse arrived at about ten o'clock and treated the patient with a plaster on her back and ice packs over her heart and the doctor gave her a hypodermic injection in the arm. As the doctor and the nurse were leaving, Vivencio Cuyugan, with an attorney and three witnesses, entered the house prepared to obtain the will of Silvestra Baron. Neither the doctor nor the nurse were presented as witnesses by the proponent. Epifania Sampang, admittedly an intelligent young woman, who was the first to reach Silvestra Baron and remained throughout the morning attended to her, testified that when she reached the house she found her grandaunt lying in bed, very pale and unconscious; that she called to her but she did not answer and only groaned; that her mouth was twisted and her lower lip swollen. She went out to call a doctor but all the doctors in Magalang were out whereupon she telephoned as stated to San Fernando for a doctor.
The subscribing witnesses stated that it was their belief that Silvestra understood the alleged will which she signed, but all of them admitted that although they were in her house about two hours not one of them exchanged a single word of conversation with Silvestra. The subscribing witness Zacarias Nuguid testified in part as follows:
P. Desde que los tres abogados Abad Santos, Silva y David y usted y Vivencio Cuyugan se acercaron a la cama de la finada, hasta que tanto ella como usteded firmaron el testamento, ¿ha pronunciado ella alguna palabra? ¿ha dicho ella algo o no? — R. No recuerdo.
P. Pero, por lo que usted recuerda, ¿ha dicho ella algo o no ha dicho nada? — R. No recuerdo.
P. ¿Usted ha dicho algo a ella? — R. Nada.
P. El señor Quirino Abad Santos ¿le ha dicho algo a ella? — R. Nada. No he oido.
P. Los otros abogados Silva y David ¿le han dicho algo ? — R. No he oido.
P. ¿Ella ha dicho algo a cualquiera de osos tres o a los abogados? — R. No he oido que dijera algo.
P. Si ella hubiese dicho algo a los abogados, asi como los abogados hubieran hablado a ella, usted hubiera oido porque usted estaba cerca, ¿no es verdad? — R. Si señor, hubiera podido oir.
P. Cuando el senor Silva termino de leer el testamento, ¿dijo algo la vieja? — R. No he oido que dijera algo.
There is no evidence that Silvestra Baron took any active part in the preparation of the alleged will except that when she was asked if she wished to include her sister Faustina in the will she said "Yes" in Pampanga. There is no affirmative evidence that she understood the document when it was read to her. The person who read the will to her testified as follows:
R. Despues de leido el testamento, tuve que entregarlo a doña Silvestra, y lo miro algun rato.
P. ¿Y ella, efectivamente, cogio el testamento de manos de usted? — R. Lo entregue a sus manos.
P. ¿Y ella lo cogio con sus manos? — R. Si señor.
P. ¿Y lo tuvo en sus manos leyendo, mirando? — R. Mirandolo asi.
P. ¿Pero, no lo leia? — R. Lo estuvo mirando por mucho tiempo asi.
Standing at her bedside was the attorney with three witnesses and the chief beneficiary, Vivencio Cuyugan, and yet so far as this record shows, not a word was exchanged between any of them and the suffering old woman. We don't know what drug the doctor administered but it is clear to us from the evidence that in her dazed physical and mental condition she had no adequate understanding of what she was doing at that time. She could not even sign her name to the original will properly or correctly, and when this defect was noted by one of the astute subscribing witnesses, he suggested that they have her sign another copy (t.s.n. page 109) which was done.
She never saw the alleged will at any time again prior to her death which occurred forty-four days later. It was immediately taken away by an attorney who kept it in his possession alleging that she had instructed him to keep it secret. There is, however, credible evidence in the record that before her death she had denied to several persons that she made any will.
This belief on her part that she had not made any will explains her failure to do any act of revocation in the forty-four days during which she lingered in this life. The doctrine that where the testator has had an opportunity to revoke his will subsequent to the operation of an alleged undue influence upon him but makes no change in it, the courts will consider this fact as weighing heavily against the testimony of undue influence, has no application to cases in which there has been an initial lack of testamentary capacity. It has no application, moreover, where from the day of execution until the death of the testator his mental condition is such that he cannot judge the propriety of revoking the will. Nor obviously does it apply to a case where the alleged testator harbors the belief that he had not executed the will in question.
In view of the premises, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant.
Hull and Imperial, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., concurring:
The main issue in this case, as I see it, is whether or not Silvestra Baron, a woman of advanced years and in a critical state of health, possesses testamentary capacity to make a will. This was an issue of fact, and resolving it the trial judge reached the conclusion that the testatrix was not of disposing mind. My review of the evidence does not permit me to say that in thus deciding the trial judge was wrong. As was expected, in a case of this character, the oral testimony was conflicting, but in resolving the credibility of the witnesses, a judge as experienced as Judge Hermogenes Reyes was in a much better position to do so than we are. However, I may state that I have been considerably influenced by the testimony of the parish priest, certainly a disinterested party, who stated on the witness stand that in response to his question if she had made a will, Silvestra Baron answered: "There is no will, Father." But from the premise of lack of testamentary capacity, it does not necessarily follow that anything of an unprofessional nature should be imputed to the lawyer who prepared the will and the other lawyers who acted as attesting witnesses. The first named is the justice of the peace of San Fernando, Pampanga, and has an excellent reputation, which is not lessened in the least by his acts in this case, and the last named are reputable members of the bar.
For these reasons and to this extent, I concur.
Vickers, and Recto, J., concur.
VILLA-REAL, J., dissenting:
The lower court refused to probate the will of Silvestra Baron on the ground that when she executed it she was under the undue influence of other persons; but the majority of this court, while admitting the existence of such undue influence, prefers to base its refusal on the ground that she lacked testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of said will.
The facts constituting the undue influence in the opinion of the lower court are summarized in its decision as follows:
Opinamos que influyeron indebitamente e impropiamente en al voluntad ya debilitada de doña Silvestra Baron por su avanzada edad la presencia de sus sobrinos Vivencio Cuyugan y Regino Cuyugan durante el otorgamiento del Exhibit A; la ausencia de Faustina Baron impedida de presenciarlo por algunos soldados de la Constabularia y el Jefe de Policia Municipal, Zacarias Nuguid; la oposicion de Regino Cuyugan a que ella firmase el documento preparado por el abogado Narciso declarando que no habia otorgado testamento el dia anterior a su translado forzoso a San Fernando para que no se hiciese firmar documento analogo y la presencia del cabo Morales y de algunos otros soldados, no solamente cuando se otorgo el testamento, sino cuando se le hizo firmar el Exhibit 10, y, por lo tanto, que ella no gozo de una completa libertad para disponer de sus bienes en testamento, o con pleno conocimiento del alcance de su contenido. Solo asi se explica el que ella haya dejado toda la propiedad de sus bienes a sus sobrinos, con quienes habia estado en pleito, con pretericion de sus hermanos, especialmente de la opositora Faustina Baron, con quien habia estado conviviendo durante 40 años . . ..
And the facts constituting lack of testamentary capacity are condensed in the opinion of the majority as follows:
The evidence shows that the same morning when Silvestra Baron signed the alleged will she suffered a physical collapse of such a serious nature that a physician and a nurse were immediately called in. By reason of her advanced age and the gravity of her illness, she was unable to do anything for herself. Her grandniece, Epifania Sampang, who reached the house about an hour or so after the old lady's collapse, telephoned a message to Vivencio Cuyugan at San Fernando, some fourteen kilometers distant, that Silvestra had had an attack and was in a serious condition and requested that a doctor be sent immediately. Doctor Teopaco and a nurse arrived at about ten o'clock and treated the patient with a plaster on her back and ice packs over her heart and the doctor gave her a hypodermic injection in the arm. As the doctor and the nurse were leaving, Vivencio Cuyugan, with an attorney and three witnesses, entered the house prepared to obtain the will of Silvestra Baron. Neither the doctor nor the nurse were presented as witnesses by the proponent. Epifania Sampang, admittedly an intelligent young woman, who was the first to reach Silvestra Baron and remained throughout the morning and attended to her, testified that when she reached the house she found her grandaunt lying in the bed, very pale and unconscious; that she called to her but she did not answer and only groaned; that her mouth was twisted and her lower lip swollen. She went out to call a doctor but all the doctors in Magalang were out whereupon she telephoned as stated to San Fernando for a doctor.
Examining now the facts which according to the findings of the lower court constituted undue influence, we have in the first place the presence of the testatrix nephews Regino Cuyugan and Vivencio Cuyugan. There was nothing either in the presence of Vivencio Cuyugan or of that of Regino Cuyugan which could have compelled Silvestra Baron to make Vivencio Cuyugan her most favored beneficiary in her will. There is certainly nothing ill in nephews being present at the making of a will. The evidence shows that these two Cuyugans just stood by while the will was being read to the testatrix and when it was presented to her for her signature.
The absence of Faustina Baron, — the sister of Silvestra Baron, in whose company the latter was living, — who, according to the witnesses for the opponents, but denied by the witnesses for the proponent, while the will was being made, was prevented to come into the house by some Constabulary soldiers and the chief of police of San Fernando, Pampanga, Zacarias Nuguid, is another fact mentioned by the lower court as constituting undue influence. Even granting that Faustina Baron was prevented to come to the house while Silvestra Baron was making her will, I fail to see how such act on the part of the Constabulary soldiers could have unduly influenced the testatrix in the making of her will.
The presence of some Constabulary soldiers outside the house and in the kitchen is also one of the reasons which led the lower court to conclude that undue influence was used in making Silvestra Baron sign her will. Silvestra Baron was not an ignorant old lady. She was a landed proprietress, who according to the custom prevailing in the Philippine Islands, managed her won property, and in o doing she had to deal with many farm laborers in such a way as to make them respect her. The presence of Constabulary soldiers in towns and barrios is not a rare occurrence, and country people are accustomed to seeing them around whether on patrol or quarantine duty. There is, therefore, nothing in the mere presence of the Constabulary soldiers in the house of Silvestra Baron at the time of making her will which could have influenced her. Besides, the testatrix must have known the presence of such soldiers before she collapsed, because they had been there investigating the assault and robbery committed against her a few days before. There is no evidence that said soldiers were brought to the house for the purpose of guarding the making of the will.
The fact that the chief of police of San Fernando, Zacarias Nuguid, was brought by Attorney Quirino Abad Santos, whom the old lady had requested to prepare her will, had no more significance than the bringing of the other attorneys to witnesses to the will. There is certainly no evil in making a chief of police a witness to a will, nor is there any law disqualifying him to be such witness.
The alleged attitude of Regino Cuyugan in trying to prevent her aunt Silvestra Baron on December 18, 1932, the day following the making of her will, to sign a document prepared by Attorney Jose A. Narciso revoking her said will, even if it were true, could in no way have influenced her in the making of said will which took place the day previous.
The lower court also found that the will of Silvestra Baron was weakened by old age. In this connection I prefer to reproduce here what is said in 68 Corpus Juris, 440-442:
Old age. — A person possessing the requisites of testamentary capacity is not incapacitated from making a will by old age, although his advanced years to be accompanied by infirmity of mind and body. Nor is he incapacitated by failing a memory, vacillating judgment, childishness, slovenliness in dress, eccentricities or peculiarities in habit or speech, and even delusions or hallucinations if they do not affect the execution of the will, and he is not limited to conventional methods of disposition. The will is not valid where an aged person is so enfeebled mentally as not to understand what he is doing.
If undue influence had been used to compel Silvestra Baron to make the will on the 17th of December, 1932, she could have changed her said will after all the circumstances which according to the court below constituted said undue influence had disappeared. After the making of her will Silvestra Baron was left alone in her house in the company of her nephew Regino Cuyugan, her grandniece Epifania Sampang and her sister Faustina Baron. Upon gaining access to the house and learning that her sister Silvestra Baron had signed some papers, Faustina Baron started immediately to look for Attorney Jose A. Narciso, and with him went to the house of Attorney Valeriano Silva who upon being questioned informed the latter that the old lady had signed a will. Thereupon efforts were made to have the will revoked, and to this effect Attorney Jose A. Narciso prepared a document which the old lady refused to sign as we have already stated. On the 20th of December, 1932, the old lady was taken by her brother Guillermo Baron, one of the opponents, to her own house in San Fernando, Pampanga, occupied by said Guillermo, and there she stayed for forty days before her death. During that time she signed on two different occasions two documents, one ratifying the making of her will and the other appointing her nephew Vivencio Cuyugan her attorney in fact. An old lady who after making her will remains in the house of her sister, free from any outside influence, refuses to sign a document purporting to be a revocation of her will, lives for forty days in her own house in San Fernando, Pampanga, in the company of her brother, and there signs two important documents, cannot certainly be said to have been unduly influenced when the made her will.
In Brownlie vs. Brownlie (93 A.L.R., 1048), the Supreme Court of Illinois said the following:
. . . The undue influence which will invalidate a will must be directly connected with the execution of the instrument, be operating when the will was made, and thereby prevent the testator from exercising his own wish and will in the disposition of his estate. (Flanigon vs. Smith, 337 Ill., 572; 169 N.E., 767; Chaney vs. Baker, 304 Ill., 362; 136, N.E., 804; Goff vs. Gerhart, 316 Ill., 513; 147 N.E., 419; McGrady vs. McGrady, 298 Ill., 129; 131 N.E., 251.) The fact that the beneficiaries of a will are those by whom the testator was surrounded and with whom he stood in confidential relationship at the time of executing his will is no ground for inferring undue influence. (Michael vs. Marshall, 201 Ill., 70; 66 N.E., 273; Rutherford vs. Morris, 77 Ill., 397.) The influence must be directed towards procuring the will in favor of certain parties and must be such as to destroy the testator's freedom of will and purpose. (Pond vs. Hollett, 310 Ill., 31; 141 N.E., 403; Gregory vs. Richey, 307 Ill., 219; 138 N.E., 669; Blackhurst vs. James, 304 Ill., 219; 136 N. E., 754, Snell vs. Weldon, 239 Ill., 279; 87 N.E., 1022.) Proof of undue influence must be consistent with the exercise of undue influence and also be inconsistent with its absence. (Cunningham vs. Dorwart, supra; Compher vs. Browning, 219 Ill., 429; 76 N.E., 678; 109 Am. St. Rep., 346.)
In the case of Torres and Lopez de Bueno vs. Lopez (48 Phil., 772), this court in an opinion written by Justice Malcolm, defines undue influence as follows:
Undue influence as used in connection with the law of wills, may be defined as that which compels the testator to do that which is against the will from fear, the desire of peace, or from other feeling which he is unable to resist.
In Applehans vs. Jurgenson (67 A.L.R., 857), the Supreme Court of Illinois said:
The undue influence which will avoid a will must be directly connected with the execution of the instrument and operate at the time it is made. The influence must be specially directed toward procuring the will in favor of a particular party or parties, and it must be such as to destroy the freedom of the testator's will and render the instrument obviously more the offspring of the will of another or others that of his own. (Ughetti vs. Ughetti, 334 Ill., 398; 166 N.E., 90; Ray vs. Koenigsmarck, 329 Ill., 588; 161 N.E., 124; Farmer vs. Davis, 289 Ill., 392; 124 N.E., 640; Hurd vs. Reed, 260 Ill., 154; 102 N.E., 1048; Larabee vs. Larabee, 240 Ill., 576; 88 N.E., 1037; Snell vs. Weldon, 239 Ill., 279; 87 N.E., N.E., 1022; Wickes vs. Walden, 228 Ill., 56; 81 N.E., 798; Woodman vs. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 211 Ill., 578; 71 N.E., 1099; Roe vs. Taylor, 45 Ill., 485.) The evidence failed to establish these requirements. The law does not require that a testator, in making disposition of his property, shall be humane or even just. If he possesses the requisite mental capacity, he has the right to make an unequal distribution of his property among his heirs or to give it entirely to strangers. (McGrady vs. McGrady, 298 Ill., 129; 131 N.E., 251.)
We have seen that none of the facts which the lower court found to constitute undue influence is such as to cause fear, desire of peace, or any other feeling which Silvestra Baron was unable to resist.
As to the effect of an opportunity of revocation upon an alleged undue influence, we read in 28 R.C.L., 151, the following rule:
106. Opportunity of revocation. — Where the testator has had an opportunity to revoke his will subsequent to the operation of an alleged undue influence upon him, but makes no change in it, the court as a general rule considers the effect of the testimony of the undue influence as destroyed.
From the foregoing definition of undue influence, and the existence of an opportunity to revoke without taking advantage of it, I come to the conclusion that when Silvestra Baron signed her will she was not under any undue influence, and that if she had ever been in such during the forty days which she survived the making of said will. The fact that not only she had not done so but that she made a power of attorney in favor of her nephew Vivencio Cuyugan, the chief beneficiary under her will, and ratified the making of said will, is conclusive proof that no undue influence had been exerted to compel her to sign her will.
Another fact which led the trial court to conclude that undue influence was exercised upon Silvestra Baron is that in her will she left most of her property to her nephews leaving nothing to her brother and sister Faustina Baron except a life usufruct.
In the case of Pecson vs. Coronel (45 Phil., 216), this court said the following:
Although family ties in this country are very strongly knit, the exclusion of relatives, who are not forced heirs, from the inheritance is not an exceptional case. The inhabitants of the Archipelago do not appear to be averse to the freedom to make a will enshrined by article 783 of the Civil Code, which has been in force in the Philippines since the year 1889. But even if the appointment of a beneficiary do not seem to be the most usual and ordinary because the beneficiary is not a relative of the testatrix who has relatives by blood, this alone will not render the appointment void per se.
In 68 Corpus Juris, 452, we read the following:
The fact that a will may be unnatural, unfair, or unjust creates of itself no presumption that the testator was incompetent at the time of its execution. No presumption of mental incapacity arises from the fact that the will makes an unequal distribution of property among the next of kin, or that it gives property to persons other than the natural objects of the testator's bounty. Any departure form the usual course in which a person prompted by ordinary instincts and natural impulses would have his property go is presumed to have been made by the testator because of reasons rationally conceived which were satisfactory to him, and on the probate of a will the fact the will is unnatural does not shift the burden to the proponent. According to some decisions, however, where a will is an unnatural one it is the duty of the proponent on the probate of the will to give some reasonable explanation of its unnatural character.
In the present case there is evidence to the effect that Silvestra Baron trusted her nephews, specially Vivencio Cuyugan, more than her brother Guillermo Baron and her sister Faustina Baron. Faustina Baron herself testified that after the assault and robber on December 9, 1932, Silvestra Baron entrusted to her nephews Ventura Cuyugan and Vivencio Cuyugan the combination of the safe where she kept her valuables and documents and gave them the duplicates of the keys to the interior compartments and drawers (pp. 254, 255, t.s.n.). That Silvestra Baron did not trust her sister Faustina Baron may be inferred from the latter's own testimony on page 291 (t.s.n.) to the effect that before the 17th of December, 1932, she did not dare to suggests to her sister Silvestra Baron to make a will because the latter did not like to hear anything about the matter, but she told Faustina that she had already made her will long time ago. If to this we add the fact that a complaint was signed by Silvestra Baron against her sister Faustina and the latter's son Emilio Lacson for the assault and robbery committed against her, then we have a full explanation why in her will Silvestra Baron bequeathed to her nephews almost all her property leaving to her brother and sister nothing but a life usufruct.
Passing now to the question of lack of testamentary capacity or disposing mind, which is the ground preferred by the majority opinion on which to base its rejection of the probate of the said will, we find in the first place the alleged failure of the proponent to call as witnesses the doctor and the nurse who attended Silvestra Baron immediately after she collapsed, apparently inferring that had they testified their testimony would have been unfavorable to the claim of sanity. The burden of proving sanity, which falls on the shoulders of the proponent of a will, was discharged by Vivencio Cuyugan when he put to the witness stand Attorney Quirino Abad Santos, the drawer of the will, and attorneys Vicente T. David and Valeriano Silva, and the chief of police of San Fernando, Pampanga, Zacarias Nuguid, the three witnesses who signed the will. They testified unanimously that when testatrix signed her will she was of sound mind, judging from her appearance and the manner she signed it. "An attesting witness to a will may base an opinion of the testator's mental capacity upon his appearance at the time of executing the will. (Brownlie vs. Brownlie, 93 A.L.R., 1041.) This testimony was sufficient to make and did make a prima facie case, (68 Corpus Juris, 450), and the burden of going forward to show testamentary incapacity having shifted to the contestants (68 Corpus Juris, 451). It was not therefore the duty of the proponent to call the doctor and the nurse who attended Silvestra Baron when she collapsed to show that she was of sound mind but of the contestants to show incapacity.
That Silvestra Baron did not become unconscious as the result of her fall is shown by the very testimony of Epifania Sampang who said, referring to her grandaunt: "Estaba inconsciente, lanzaba quejidos, decia: 'Faustina, Faustina'; mandaba buscar a la vieja Faustina." If the testatrix was really unconscious as the result of said fall she would not have been able to call her sister Faustina by her name, nor could she have given orders to locate her. Because her grandaunt did not answer her when she called her, Epifania Sampang imagined that she was unconscious. Thus, all the evidence concerning the unconscious state of Silvestra Baron in the morning she made her will consisted of the testimony of Epifania Sampang alone. The doctor who attended Silvestra Baron after her fall was the one qualified to testify as to her mental condition and not her grandniece. The contestants whose duty it was to call said doctor to prove unconsciousness failed to do so.
In the case of Torres and Lopez de Bueno vs. Lopez, supra, this court said:
On January 3, 1924, when the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, made his will, he was 76 years old, physically decrepit, weak of intellect, suffering from a loss of memory, had a guardian of his person and his property, and was eccentric, but he still possessed that spark of reason and of life, that strength of mind to form a fixed intention and to summon his enfeebled thoughts to enforce that intention, which the law terms "testamentary capacity." Two of the subscribing witnesses testified clearly to the regular manner in which the will was executed, and one did not. The attending physician and three other doctors who were present at the execution of the will expressed opinions entirely favorable to the capacity of the testator. Three other members of the medical profession expressed opinions entirely unfavorable to the capacity of the testator and certified he was of unsound mind. Held: That Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, possessed sufficient mentality to make a will which would meet the legal test regarding testamentary capacity; that the proponents of the will have carried successfully the burden of proof and have shown him of sound mind on that date; and that it was reversible error on the part of the trial court not to admit his will to probate.
While it is true that in the present case no physician testified as to the condition of Silvestra Baron's mind when she signed her will, we have however the testimony of three reputable attorneys to the effect that judging from her appearance and the ways she acted when she signed her will she was of sound mind. This was corroborated by the fact that when the next day Attorney Jose A. Narciso, upon learning that she had made a will, he tried to make her revoked said will which she refused. This in itself is an admission that she was of sound disposing mind. The very finding of the lower court that Silvestra Baron was unduly influenced in the making of her will is an implied admission that she possessed testamentary capacity.
The preponderance of evidence and the implied admission of the lower court show, therefore, the when Silvestra Baron made her will she was of sound disposing mind.
From all the foregoing considerations, I come to the conclusion that Silvestra Baron made her will free from any undue influence and in a sound disposing mind, and, therefore, said will should be probated.
Avanceña, C.J., Diaz and Goddard, J., dissent.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
