Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 42890 September 20, 1935
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GENEROSA DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
Pedro Abad Santos for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
VICKERS, J.:
The appellant Generosa de la Cruz was charged in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga with the crime of murder. She pleaded guilty to the charged on February 28, 1934, but was not sentenced because she was under eighteen. It was ordered that she be confined in the government reformatory until she reached the age of eighteen, when she should be returned to the court for the corresponding sentence.
The appellant was corn October 2, 1916. Therefore at the time of the commitment she lacked only seven months of being eighteen years old.
On September 18, 1934 Director of Public Welfare reported to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga that the conduct of the appellant while in the Training School for girls had been satisfactory, and that she would be eighteen on October 2, 1934. He recommended that the case be terminated, and that an order for her final release be issued. The report was referred to the provincial fiscal, who returned it with the statement that he was not in a position to recommend her release, because, because he believed it would be an injustice to the family of the deceased to have the appellant released within so short a time. In view of this opposition of the provincial fiscal, the court ordered the Director of Public Welfare to bring the appellant into court in order that the proper decision might be issued in the case. The Director of Public Welfare complied with the order of the court, and recommendation for her release was set for hearing, with notice to the fiscal and the attorney for the appellant. The appellant was release on a bond of P5,000. Apparently no evidence was taken. After considering the arguments of the fiscal and the attorney for the appellant, the court ordered that appellant be confined in the government reformatory until she became of age ("El Juzgado vuelve a ordenar la reclusion de la acusada Generosa dela Cruz en el reformatorio del Gobierno hasta que llegue a la mayor edad.")
From that order the appellant appealed to this court, alleging that the lower erred in ordering the confinement of the accused anew in the government reformatory without any sufficient reason, and in not ordering her final release.
The provincial fiscal maintained that since section 3 of Act No. 3203 was not expressly repealed by the Revised Penal Code, the provision therein exempting from an operation of the law case of a minor accused of an offense punishable by life imprisonment or death, such section was still in force and article 80 of the Revised Penal Code was not applicable to the present case. The lower court overruled that contention, correctly holding that the said provision had been impliedly repealed by the Revised Penal Code.
In considering the sixth paragraph of article 80 of the Revised Penal Code the lower court said:
Pero interrpretando literalmente la frase "sera denuelto al tribunal para que pronuncie sentencia definitive de libertad", tendriamos dos inconvenientes: Primero. el que una persona a qien le faltase alguonous dias o menos para cumplir la edad 18 años, puede cometer un delito de asesinato, casi impunemente, porque si observa buena conducta en el reformatorio o institucion donde fuere enviada, el tribunal tendria qu ponerla despues en libertad y sobresser la causa contra ella; y, segundo. el que las facultades del tribunal quedan de este modo delegades al Comissionado de Bienestar Publico, y por este motivo, ha tenido que recurrir al texto ingles de la Ley, habiedo encontrado en el lo siguiente: "He shall be returned to the court in order that the same may order his final release," lenguaje que es diferente del empleado en le texto castellano, porque mientras en este la disposicion es mandatoria, en aquel es discrecional el Tribunal el ordenar su libertad, o no.
It was provided in section 7 of Act No. 3203 that upon the termination of the probation period the minor should be returned to the court for either sentence or dismissal. Said section amended by Act No. 3559 by adding thereto the following paragraph:
In all cases where any such minor delinquent is returned to the court final judgment of either sentence or dismissal the court shall render such final judgment of either sentence or dismissal as in the opinion of the court the records of such minor during his confinement in the institution to which he was committed or during his probation period and the recommendation of the Public Welfare Commissioner shall justify.
Act. No. 3559 was, however, expressly repealed by article 367 of the Revised Penal Code, and it was superseded by the sixth paragraph of article 80, which reads as follows:
If the minor has behaved properly and has complied with the conditions imposed upon him during his confinement, in accordance with the provisions of this article, he shall be returned to the court in order that the same may order in final release.
In repealing Act No. 3559 and substituting therefor the provision we have just quoted, we think it was the intention of the Legislature to make it duty of the trial judge to order the final release of minor who, as in this case, has remained in the training school for the full period for which he was committed and behaved properly, and whose final release has been recommended by the Director of Public Welfare. The law does not require that a minor who has been found guilty of a crime and committed to a training school shall be released when he becomes eighteen, if his conduct has been good, but when he reaches his majority, unless the court has fixed a less period.
It would seem that the lower court erred in its original order in committing the minor to the training school only until the should become eighteen, instead of twenty-one years old; but since the appellant remained in the training school for the period ordered by the court and her conduct during that time was satisfactory, and that Director of Public Welfare reported that fact to the court and recommended her final release, and the report as to her good conduct was unquestioned, it was incumbent upon the court to approve the recommendation. If under these circumstances the minor should be recommitted, it would take away the incentive to good conduct.
For the foregoing reasons, the order appealed from is set aside, and it is ordered that the appellant be released, and the case declared terminated, with the costs de oficio.
Avanceña, C.J., Hull, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concur.
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