Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-42818 March 25, 1935
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CONRADO AGLAHI, defendant-appellant.
The appellant in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
HULL, J.:
The provincial fiscal of Laguna filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of that province under Act No. 1524 inviting attention to the fact that appellant had been given a conditional pardon by the Governor-General on the 3rd of November, 1910, and had been convicted of the offense of estafa committed in 1929.
As appellant at that time was in Bilibid Prison, the court in order to avoid the inconvenience and expense to the Government of bringing him to Laguna for the hearing, directed that appellant should show cause in writing why he should not be committed to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence. Appellant demurred to the complaint, and the trial court thereafter ordered his recommitment to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence. Appellant appeals from that order.
Section 3 of Act No. 1524, which provides for a court hearing and determination of an alleged violation of a conditional pardon, provides in part: "... The Court of First Instance shall issue the order of arrest and proceed with the investigation of the facts, in the presence of the accused and the proper prosecuting official."
The Solicitor-General admits that the record conclusively shows that the court did not comply with the statute and therefore the orders of the court were improper. In this contention of the Solicitor-General we are forced to concur.
The Solicitor-General asks that the order appealed from be set aside and the case remanded to the court below for proper proceedings.
What are those proper proceedings? In general, a violation of a condition in the pardon renders the pardon void, and normally a court of general jurisdiction has authority upon such a condition being brought to its notice, to rule to show cause why the original commitment should not be again placed in full force and vigor.
Where the Legislature by statute has prescribed a procedure, the procedure should be followed although the statute was possibly unnecessary. However, in this case we have the peculiar situation that section 4 of this Act has been expressly repealed by article 367 of the Revised Penal Code. Why the Legislature saw fit to repeal section 4 is not clear, but nevertheless it has expressly so done.
Section 4 of Act No. 1524 provides what the court shall do should it find that respondent has in fact violated his conditional pardon. Does this appeal mean that the Legislature is of the opinion that the court shall not have the power to order the recommitment of a person at large on a conditional pardon made void by the wrongful acts of the respondent? As this question was not argued, it will be reserved for future consideration should occasion arise.
Attention is invited in this connection to section 64, paragraph (i), of the Revised Administrative Code of the powers and duties of the Governor-General, which reads:
(i) To grant to convicted persons reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial, conditional, or unconditional; to suspend sentenced without pardon, remit fines, and order the discharge of any convicted person upon parole, subject to such conditions as he may impose; and to authorize the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence.
If, therefore, the administrative officers believe that respondent has violated the conditions of his pardon and should be re-incarcerated to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence, there exists a speedy and legal method of determining that question.
The order appealed from is reversed and vacated and the case dismissed. Costs de oficio. So ordered.
Avanceņa, C.J., Abad Santos, Vickers, and Diaz, JJ., concur.
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