Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-41974 July 5, 1935
LUDOVICO AREJOLA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GREGORIO LUNA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Manly and Reyes for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellant Director of Lands.
Gabriel P. Prieto for appellee.
VICKERS, J.:
On March 13, 1929 Ludovico Arejola filed this action in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur to recover from the Director of Lands and nine homesteaders, whose names are not stated in the caption of the bill of exceptions, the title to and the possession of a parcel of agricultural land located in the sitios of Poctol, Buyo, Tahan, Pigvisitahan, Manati, Sagcahan, Nagadap and May-buri, in the barrio of San Jose, in the municipality of Minalabac, Province of Camarines Sur, having an area of 184 hectares, 71 ares, and 83 centares, and bounded on the north by the Bicol river and the land of Arsenio Valenciano and Alejandro Villanueva; on the east by the land of Tomas Basmayor and the Bicol river; on the south by the Bicol river, the Sibagat river, and the Taisan brook; and on the west by the land of Serafin Rojano, uncultivated lands, and the estero of Poctol, assessed at P11,080 in accordance with Tax No. 6192.
The Director of Lands in his answer denied the allegations of the complaint and alleged as a special defense that the land in question was part of the public domain and as such was under the direct disposition and management of the defendant Director of Lands; that said land had been applied for by several homesteaders, among them the other defendants in the case; that the plaintiff, recognizing the authority and power of the Director of Lands over lands of the public domain, filed in due from his protest in the Bureau of Lands against the homestead applications of the other defendants; and that after the due investigation, and acting under the authority vested in him by law, the Director of Lands dismissed plaintiff's protest, because his claim was found to be groundless and unsupported by any valid evidence of title.
The answers of the other defendants are not included in the bill of exceptions presented by the Director of Lands.
By agreement of the parties the trial of the case was referred to a referee, and with their consent the clerk of said court was appointed to act as referee.
Upon the completion of the trial the referee filed the following report on July 11, 1933:
Esta esuna accion para reivindicar nuevos lotes de terreno ocupados por los nueve primeros, respectivamente, de los 10 demandados, en virtud de solicitudes de homestead ya aprobadas por el otro demandado, el Director de Terrnos; el demandante alega que todos dichos lotes estan dentro del terreno descrito en el parrafo 2.o de su demanda, y que el ha adquirido este terreno a titulo de compra. Los demandados, en su contestacion, alegan, a su vez, que los lotes en ecustion son terrenos del Estado.
El demandante, habiendo tenido conociemiento de tales solicitudes de homestead, presento protesta contra las mismas ante el Director de Terrenos. Este funcionario, despues de haber hecho investigar el caso por la oficina local del Buro de Terrenos, en cuyo acto el demandante no estuvo presente, y en vista del resultado de dicha investigacion, concluyo que los terrenos objeto de la protesta son terrenos del estado y asi desestimo dicho recurso; de aho la presentacion de la demanda en esta causa.
Las partes convienen en la identidad de los lotes en cuestion excepto en cuanto al lote solicitado por el demandado Antonio Ortega, pues mientras el demandante alega que este lote se halla dentro del terreno descrito en el parrafo 2.o de la demanda, los demandados lo representan como que colinda al este con dicho terreno y, por consiguiente, que esta fuera del mismo (Exhibit 4).
La gran diferencia en la configuracion y orientacion del referido terreno, entre el croquies Exhibit A del demandante, y el plano Exhibit 4 de los demandados, se debe tan solo a que el croquis fue trazado por uno que no es agrimensor aunque, segun demandante, es practico en la medicion de terrenos; al paso que el plano fue levantado por un agrimensor cualificado y empleado del Buro de terrenos.
Se ha establecido por preponderancia de pruebas que el terreno descrito en el parrafo 2.o de la demanda se compone de cinco (5) porciones que se indican en el corquis Exhibit A con los numeros 1, 2, 3, 4 y 5, respectivamente, y que fueron adquiridas por el demandante, y que fueron adquiridas por el demandante por compra; a saber, de Eugenia Huerta, la porcion No. 1 (Exhibit B); de Fabiana Arejola, la porcion No. 2 (Exhibit E-1); de Juana de Dios, la porcion No.3 (Exhibit G); de Nemesio David, la porcion No. 4 (Exhibit 10; y de Antonio San Jose, la porcion No. 5 (Exhibit J).
No cabe duda que los lotes en cuestion, con excepcion de los que se reclaman de los demandados Antonio Ortega (H-50269) y Narciso Sange (H-75961), respectivamente, estan situados dentro de la pieza de terreno que el demandante adquirio por compra como se ha dicho, y que el ha venido poseyendo desde su adquisicion en los años 1893 y 1894, cociendo cal de piedra en los hornos que hay alli, cortando leñas y cañas, y percibiendo paticipacion como dueño de las cosechas de palay y de los demas productos de dicho terreno; y que el demandante puso y tuvo alli a Mateo Deveras, Francisco Bernardino y Felix Solis, como encargados suyos, sucesivamente.
El demandado Antonio Ortega, que declaro tener 72 años de edad, pero que aparece ser de mas de 80, dijo que nacio en el lote que el ocupa y el demandante reclama, y alli alcanzo a su padre; que en su vida jamas ha salido de ese lugar, que ha estado cultivandolo, sembrando palay y otras plantas alimenticias y cocos y demas arboles frutales habiendo al presente en este lote unos 50 pies [ponos] de coco fructiferos desde hace ya muchos años; y que alli ha estado siempre su casa. Esta declaracion del demandado Antonio Ortega no ha sido desmentida por las pruebas del demandante, cuyos testigos han admitido la larga permanencia de Ortega por aquel lugar, aunque para contrariarle de algun modo, tal cual de dichos testigos dijo que Ortega ocupaba anteriormente otro sitio, habiendose mudado a donde esta ahora su homestead hace pocos años no mas; pero no consta de autos razon alguna para que Ortega cambiase de lugar, dejando ahora que ya es viejo el anterior, donde permanecio en toda su vida hasta entonces, y que habia estado cultivando y solicitado a titulo de homestead desde el año 1917. Lo dichopor los encargados del demandante de que Ortega pagaba por su lote un tanto de su producto, al demadante como dueño, no merece credito, pues no hay dato alguno en la causa de que Ortega hiciera lo propio con ninguno de los la causa de que Ortega hiciera lo propio con ninguno de los causantes de dicho demandante. Es evidente que el terreno que Ortega ocupa es terreno del Estado y por ser asi no forma parte de ninguna de las cinco porciones traspasadas en venta al demandante por sus aluidos causantes, ni el demandante pudo haberlo poseido jamas, por haber sido el demandado Ortega quien ha estado en continuada posesion del mismo.
En cuanto al demandado Narciso Sange, es satisfactoria la prueba de que el lote que se le reclama es asimismo terreno del Estado, que su padre, Gregorio Sange, entro a ocupar y cultivar, muchos años antes de fenecer el Gobierno Español, tanto es asi que este demandado Sange, que ahora ya es quincaugenario, nacio en este lote, al igual que el demandado Ortega en el suyo; que el referido padre del demandado Sange siguio desde entonces ocupando y cultivando este lote hasta su fallecimiento occurido en 1906; y que de entre las plantas y arboles sembrados por el difunto quedan en la acutalidad 20 ponos de coco fructiferos y ya viejos. Verdad es que ste demandado (Sange), por haber sentado plaza de soldado, como scout, se ausento de la provincia en 1904, quedando dicho terreno abandonado desde la muerte de su padre en 1906 hasta que el demandado Sange regreso, una vez licenciado del serivicio, en 1914; pero luego que hubo vuelto, y aunque se dedico, como se ha dedicado hasta ahora al oficio de barbero aqui en Naga, tomo posesion de nuevo del terreno, poninedo alli a Pablo Sereno en su lugar y yendo a visitarlo una vez por semana. Todo iba bien para este demandado hasta que habiendolo el solicitado a titulo de homestead en el año 1922, yenterado de ello despues el demandante, este ultimo presento la protesta de que arriba se ha hecho mencion. Como se ve, el hecho de haber quedado abandonado este loe en los años 1906 al 1914 (un periodo de 8 años), aun suponiendo que el demandante lo poseyera durante aquel tiempo, esto no le investe de titulo al ldemandante sobre dicho inmueble; y siendo este el caso, el demandante no tiene accion para reivindicarlo.
Pasando ahora a los lotes reclamados de los demandados Gregorio Luna, Rosalio Viñas, Maximino Lopez, David Sacramento, Isidoro Remetera, Eulogio Arindaing y Policarpio Jardinero, es evidente que todos estos lotes estan comprendidos dentro de los limites del terreno adquirido por el demandante. Estos demandados alegan dichos lotes forman pate asimismo de los terrenos del Estado, y que lossupuestos causantes del demandante ni los encargados de estqn han estado jamas en posesion de los mismos. Esta pretension, sin embargo, esta contradicha por las declaraciones del demandante y sus testigos. Entre ellos Anacleto Naval dijo que en los años 1893 a 1896 se dedico a comprar leñas y cañas en las porciones No. 1, 2 y 3 del croquis Exhibit A, de sus dueños respectivos, llamados Eugenia Huerta, Felipe Mendoza y Marta Candelaria, quienes, segun se ha probado son los causantes del demdante; y que mas tarde, o sea, en los años 1904 y 1905, despues de la adquisicion de dichas porciones por el demandante, el (Naval) volvio alli y sembro cocos para el demandante. Por otra parte Sotero Platon, Secretario del pueblo de Minalabac, Camarines Sur, declaro que en 1894, cumpliendo ordenes superiores, el asistio al gobernadorcillo del pueblo a deslindar los terrenos publicos y privados, levantanto croquis de los mismos, enctonrando, en el terreno descrito en el parrafo 2.o de la demanda, a los causantes del demandante en posesion de sus respectivas porciones.
Vicente Rivera, un agrimensor del Buro de Terrenos, dijo que por orden del Director de Terrenos, practico investigacion sobre ese terreno a raiz de la protesta del demandante contra las solicitudes de homestead de que ya se ha hecho mencion, hallandolo sin señales de cultivo, por lo que infirio que es terreno del Estado, lo cual, segun el, secorrobora por la declaracion ante el mismo de un viejo llamado Felipe Colis, quien — añadio el testigo Vicente Rivera — dijo que ni el demandante ni sus supuestos causantes o encargados habian estado alguna vez en posesion del terreno reclamado en la demanda. Es de notar, sin embargo, que el demandante no estuvo presente ni representado en aquella investigacion, aaunque, segun dicho agrimensor, tres dias antes de la misma, se le hizo decir al demandante por un mensajero de su oficina, que compareciera. Otro dato que afecta el valor de esta declaracion, es que el tal Felipe Colis, de quien el agrimensor Rivera pidio informanciones en aquella investigacion, no es persona desinteresada, por ocupar otro lote del terreno que el demandante reclama (vease Exhibit 4). Por otro lado, Inocentes Ramirez, montero del Buro forestal, declaro que el terreno descrito en el parrafo 2.o de la demanda esta dentro de la zona de concesion de licencia para el corte de leñas a favor de Leandro Villanueva expedida en 1918 (Exhibit 6), citando para apoyar su aserto el croquis oficial Exhibit 7 de dicha zona, en el cual el señlo dicho terreno con un circulo en tinta negra y la marca Exhibit 4. No resulta, sin embargo, de su testimonio que el demandante tuviera concociemiento de dicha concesion para poder presentar protesta contra la misma; y como, por otra parte, esta concesion comprende una zona de mas de dos mil hectareas (pagina 211, transcripcion de las notas taquigraficas), pudo haberse dado el caso de no haber llegado al citado terreno el corte de leñas del concesionario Leandro Villanueva, pues nohay en autos indicacion alguna de que la operacion de dicho corte fuera tan en gran escala. Finalmente, las declaraciones de dos de los testigos de los mismos demandados, a saber Antonio Ortega y Manuel Villanueva, son en favor del demandante. Antonio Ortega dijo haber visto en tiempo del Go bierno Español al padre de Eugenia Huerta (Patricio Huerta) ocupando el terreno al oeste del de Ortega; y Manuel Villanueva, que en el terreno que el demandante dice pertenecer anteriormente a Marta Candelaria, el (Villanueva) vio a au tal Sanchez, quien, segun el testimonio no desmentido del demandante, en contrapurebas, era precisamente sobrino de aquella mujer.
En vista de lo que se lleva dicho, el demandante tiene derechode propiedad sobre los lotes de terreno ocupados y oslicitados a titulo de homestead por los demandados Gregorio Luna, Rosalia Viñas, Maximino Lopez, David Sacramento, Isidoro Remetera, Eulogio Arindaing y Policarpio Jardinero, respectivamente, lotes que dejaron de ser del Estado por haberlos poseido el demandante por si y por sus causantes desde tiempo inmemorial, cuando menos desde 1903.
Por todas las considerciones expuestas, se recomienda que se dicte sentencia declarando al demandante co derecho a la propiedad de los referidos siete (7) lotes solicitados y ocupados a titulo de homestead por dichos demandados Gregorio Luna, Rasolio Viñas, Maximino Lopez, David Sacramento, Isidoro Remetera, Eulogio Arindaing y Policarpo Jardinero, respectivamente, lotes que estan comprendidos dentro de la pieza de terreno descrita en el parrafo 2.o de la demanda; y condenando a estos demandados y al demandado Director de Terrenos a restituirlos al demandante, con 7/10 de las costas contra ellos menos el Director de Terrenos; y que sean absueltos de la demanda — los demandados Antonio Ortega y Narciso Sange, con 2/10 de las costas de las costas a favor de los mismos y contra el demandante.
Asi se somete respetuosamente.
Naga, Camarines Sur, hoy a 11 de julio de 1933.
(Fdo.) MANUEL FLORES
Arbitro
(Escribano)
On March 13, 1934 the lower court rendered the following decision:
Visto el informe sometido por el artbitro nombrado en esta causa, y consideradas las pruebas aducidas por las partes en la misma, se aprueba dicho informe en todas sus partes.
En su virtud, se dicta sentencia declarando al demandante con derecho a la propiedad sobre los lotes de terreno ocupados y solicitados a titulo de homestead por los demandados, Gregorio Luna, Rosalia Viñas, Maximino Lopez David Sacramento, Isidoro Remetera, Eulogio Arindaing y Policarpo Jardinero, respectivamente, lotes que estan comprendidos dentro de la pieza de terreno descrita en el parrafo 2.o de la demanda; y condenando a estos demandados y al demandado Director de Terrenos a restituirlos al demandante, con 7/10 de las costas contra dichos demandados menos el Director de Terrenos; y absolviendo de dicha demanda a los demandante.
Asi se ordena.
Dada en Naga, Camarines Sur, marzo 5, 1934.
(Fdo.) EULALIO GARCIA
Juez, Decimocuarto distrito Judicial
The Director of Lands excepted to the decision of the court, and filed a motion for a new trial on the ground that the decision was not supported by the evidence and was contrary to law, which motion was overruled. The Director of Lands excepted to said ruling, and filed a bill of exceptions, which was approved and forwarded to this court, together with the evidence submitted to the referee.
The other defendants also filed a bill of exceptions, which was approved and forwarded to this court, where they asked for and obtained permission to rely upon the bill of exceptions presented by the Director of Lands.
Plaintiff also perfected a bill of exceptions, but his appeal was dismissed on November 13, 1934 because of his failure to file his brief within the period provided by the rules of court.
The Solicitor-General in representation of the Director of Lands and the attorneys for the other defendants make the following and assignments of error:
I. The lower court erred in admitting and considering Exhibits B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, and M of the plaintiff-appellee.
II. The lower court erred in declaring that with the exception of the lot occupied by the defendant Antonio Ortega, the parties agree on the identity of the land in question.
III. The lower court erred in holding that the great difference between the sketch Exhibit A and sketch Exhibit 4 is due merely to the fact that Exhibit 4 was made by a qualified surveyor while the other was made by one who is not a surveyor.
IV. The lower court erred in holding that the land claimed by the plaintiff-appellee and described in paragraph 2 of the complaint is made up of five portions indicated in Exhibit A and were acquired by the plaintiffs-appellee by purchase from Eugenia Huerta, Fabiana Arejola, Juana de Dios, Nemesio David, and Antonio San Jose, and in condemning the appellant homesteaders to deliver the possession of the land they are respectively occupying to the plaintiff-appellee.
V. The lower court erred in declaring that the lots occupied by the defendant-appellants Gregorio Luna, Rosalio Viñas, Maximino Lopez, David Sacramento, Isidoro Remetera, Eulogio Arindaing, and Policarpio Jardinero are the private property of the plaintiff-appellee and in not holding that said lots are part of the public domain.
VI. The lower court also erred in admitting the testimony of Sotero Platon with respect to the supposed segregation of public lands from private lands in 1894 and in holding in effect that the land in question was possessed by plaintiff-appellee's alleged vendors at the time of that supposed segregation.
VII. The lower court erred in not giving due weight and consideration to the decision of the Director of Lands.
VIII. The lower court erred in supposing that Leandro Villanueva did not cut firewood from the land in question under the license issued to him by the Bureau of Forestry.
IX. The lower court erred in denying the defendant-appellant's motion for new trial.
As we have already stated, the trial of the case was referred with the consent of the parties to the clerk of the court as referee, who rendered his report on July 11, 1933. The report of the referee was approved by the lower court and judgment was rendered in accordance therewith about eight months after the report was filed.
Section 139 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that upon the completion of the trial, the referee shall report, in writing, to the court the facts found by him and all such of his rulings as the parties shall request him to report; and section 140 provides that upon the filing of the report or as soon as conveniently may be thereafter, the court shall render judgment in accordance with the report, as though the facts had been found by the judge himself, unless the court shall, for cause shown, set aside the report, or order it to be recommitted to the referee for further findings.
Rule 31 of the Rules of Courts of First Instance reads as follows: "Upon the filing of the report of commissioners in partition or expropriation proceedings or of a referee the parties shall be notified by the clerk, and they shall be allowed shall be notified by the clerk, and they shall be allowed ten days within which to file exceptions or signify grounds of objection to the findings, if they so desire, unless a different period is fixed by the court."
In the case of Kriedt vs. E. C. McCullough & Co. (37 Phil., 474), this court held that section 140 of the Code of Civil Procedures places upon the litigant parties the duty of discovering and exhibiting to the court any error that may be contained in the referee's report; that the proper procedure for the purpose of exhibiting error in the report of a referee is for the aggrieved party to except to such parts of the report as are alleged to be erroneous; that exceptions to the report of a referee are intended to answer a purpose analogous to the function served by assignments of error in appellate procedure; that such exceptions should be specific, and should be filed after the report of the referee has been brought into the clerk's office and before the report has been adopted by the court and made the foundation of its judgment; that there is a presumption in favor of the findings of the referee but they are not conclusively presumed to be correct, and his conclusions may be set aside if error is shown in a manner conformable with proper practice; that the weight to be attributed to his findings of fact depends largely on the peculiar conditions of each case; that if the report of the referee is alleged to be erroneous by reason of facts which do not appear in the report itself or in the documents or records which were used by the referee, the aggrieved party should make a motion to recommit the report or ask that the error be corrected by the court itself, as the situation may require.
The foregoing decision as to the procedure to be followed in dealing with a referee's report was followed, affirmed, and emphasized in Santos vs. De Guzman and Martinez (45 Phil., 646), where it was said that if a party desires to challenge the findings of a referee, he must do so by timely and specific exceptions to the referee's report; that if he fails to make such exceptions and the report is confirmed by the trial judge, he is bound by the findings and cannot be heard to dispute their truthfulness or escape the legal consequences flowing therefrom; that questions relating to the report of a referee can be reviewed only where the record discloses the exceptions taken thereto; that the record in that case failed to disclose if the parties were notified of the presentation of the referee's report; and that though the law is likewise silent on the subject of the parties litigant should receive notice of the filing of the report of the referee so that they may, if they so desire, take exceptions thereto.
In the foregoing cases it was held that notice of the filing of the referee's report must be sent to the parties for the purpose of giving them an opportunity to present their objections.
Although it is true that in the present case the record does not affirmatively show that such notice was sent to the parties, it is also true that the referees's report was filed almost eight months before the lower court acted on it. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the clerk of the court performed his duty and notified the parties of he filing of the referee's report. Furthermore, the report of the referee was not acted on by the lower court until almost eight months after it had been filed. The parties therefore had more than ample time in which to file their objections thereto. (Santos vs. De Guzman and Martinez, supra; Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Ossorio, 150 Phil., 864.)
The case of Baltazar and Limpin vs. Limpin and Director of Lands (49 Phil., 39), is to be distinguished from the present case. In that case the referee made an inspection of the land in controversy and rendered a report favorable to the applicants. No timely and specific exceptions to the referee's report were taken. Instead, without any further proceedings, the trial judge handed down a decision in which he concurred in part with the report of the referee and dissented in part from the report. From that decision the applicants, who were favored by the report of the referee but were not favored by the decision of the trial judge, appealed to this court. In that case the doctrine of Kriedt vs. E.C. McCullough & Co. and Santos vs. De Guzman and Martinez was reaffirmed. It was held, however, that the trial judge retained a discretion to accept the report of the referee in part and set it aside in part or reverse it entirely even were no exceptions to the referee's report were taken, and the case then under consideration was distinguished from the aforementioned cases, because the trial judge had not confirmed the report of the referee in its entirety, but had set it aside in part.
In the present case the lower court, after considering the referee's report and the evidence presented by the parties, adopted the findings of the referee and approved the report in its entirety. The defendants took no exception to the report, and as was held in the case of Santos vs. De Guzman and Martinez, supra, they are bound by the findings and cannot be heard to dispute their truthfulness or escape the legal consequences flowing therefrom. Since we are required to accept the findings of the referee, which were adopted by the lower court, the decision appealed from must be affirmed.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the lower court is affirmed, without a special pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
Avanceña, C.J., Hull, Goddard, and Diaz, JJ., concur.
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