Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32558 October 15, 1930
VENANCIO SAN GABRIEL petitioner-appellant,
vs.
MIGUEL RIOS, respondent-appellee.
Angel H. Mojica for appellant.
Provincial Fiscal Belmonte for appellee.
STATEMENT
The petitioner alleges that up to October 27, 1928, the respondent was temporarily holding the office of chief of police of the municipality of General Trias, Province of Cavite, by virtue of a temporary appointment which is attached to, and made a part of, the petition, marked Exhibit A.That when the respondent was given this appointment, the petitioner was the only one who was eligible and qualified to hold the office. That on October 27, 1928, the respondent was removed by the municipal president by an order which is attached to, and made a part of , the petition, marked Exhibit B. That on October 28,1928, the petitioner was duly appointed chief of police of said municipality, and at once accepted his appointment and took his oath of office on October 30, 1928. That by reason therof, the petitioner had been holding the office of chief of police up to and until March 1, 1929, when he was illegally ousted by the respondent, who was reappointed by the provincial board of Cavite by resolution approved by that board, marked Exhibit C. That the petitioner demanded of the respondent possession of said office and of all its papers, but that he refused to deliver them, and has continued to exercise the office of chief of police to the exclusion of the petitioner, by reason of which he was damaged in the sum of P400.
Petitioner prays that the respondent be ordered to vacate the office and to return it to him, and that he have judgment for P400 as damages and costs.
After the respondent's demurrer to the petition was overruled, he filed an answer in the nature of a general and specific denial, and as a special defense alleged that the petitioner was never legally appointed chief of police, for the reason that his appointment was disapproved by the municipal council of General Trias when it was made; that the respondent has all of the qualifications to hold the office and was legally appointed by the provincial board on February 25, 1929, in accordance with the provisions of section 2259 of the Administrative Code; that the resolution of the board is final and conclusive; that the court has no jurisdiction; and that the petitioner has neither interest nor personality to institute the present action.
The case was tried and submitted upon a stipulation of facts based upon which the lower court dismissed the petition, and on appeal the petitioner assigns the following errors:
I. The trial court erred in not declaring the appointment of Miguel Rios dated October 14, 1928, as chief of police of General Trias, Cavite, illegal. 1awph!l.net
II. The trial court erred in holding that the provincial board is empowered under section 2259 of the Administrative Code as amended to appoint members of the municipal police in case of disagreement between the municipal president and the municipal council as regards the appointee of the former.
III. The trial court erred in not declaring the petitioner entitled to the position of chief of police of General Trias, Cavite.
JOHNS, J.:
Among other things, the parties stipulated:
Be it resolved, That the petition of the Municipal President to appoint Mr. VENANCIO San Gabriel as Chief of Police of this municipality be disapproved.
Be it resolved further, That this question of appointments of Mr. Rios and Mr. San Gabriel as Chief of Police be referred to proper authorities requesting as to who shall be legally entitled to the position. (See Exhibit D.)
Section 2259 of the Administrative Code, as amended provides:
APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS OF POLICE FORCE. — The chief of police and other members of the force shall be appointed by the president, with the consent of the municipal council. In case of disagreement between the president and the municipal council regarding the appointment of the chief of police, if such disagreement extends over more than three months after the submission of the nomination by the president, the provincial board shall take action and decide such disagreement, and its decision shall be final.
That is to say, the power to appoint a chief of police is vested in the municipal president, but the appointment when made is subject to the consent and approval of the municipal council, and the appointment does not become valid until such time as it approved by the council, and it is stipulated that the appointment was never approved by the council, and that in truth and in fact it was disapproved on the day it was made. It must follow that the petitioner had no legal right to the office of chief of police, and as a sequel he had no legal right to maintain quo warranto against the respondent. Under this view, it is not necessary to discuss or decide any of the remaining question presented on the appeal. It having been stipulated that the appointment of the petitioner was not only never confirmed, but in truth and in fact was rejected by the council on the day it was made, the judgment of the lower court, dismissing the petition, is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Street, Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
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