G.R. No. L-31035




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-31035 October 12, 1929 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JULIA ORTIZ LUIS, defendant-appellee. Dionisio de Leon and Nat. M. Balboa for appellant. Constancio Padilla for appellee. STATEMENT Plaintiff is a domestic banking corporation with its principal office in the City of Manila and a branch office in Cabanatuan. For a cause of action, that it is the absolute owner of a parcel of rice land evidenced by transfer certificate title No. 1825 regularly issued by the register of the deeds of Nueva Ecija, containing an area of 16 hectares. That the land was seized and distrained by the Government for and on account of taxes for the years 1921, 1922, 1923, 1924, 1925, and 1926. That on May 28, 1926, the plaintiff redeemed the land and paid the Government P301.82. That it is paying the annual land taxes, and that no other person has ever paid taxes thereon from the year 1921 up to date. The defendant against the will and without the consent of the plaintiff, has been in possession of the land. That her possession is wrongful and unlawful. That the products of the property is 300 cavanes of palay per annum. Plaintiff prays for judgment that it is the owner and entitled to the possession of the land and for an accounting. For answer the defendant made a general and specific denial, and as a special defense alleged that she is in the possession of 168 hectares of land in the same barrio, all covered by transfer certificate of title No. 1639 of the office of the register of deeds of Nueva Ecija, which covers and includes the land which plaintiff claims, and has never been delinquent in the payment of taxes. That defendant's land was formerly registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of the defendant's vendor. That the land occupied by the plaintiff was formerly a homestead within the land of the defendant. But in the land registration proceedings, the homestead was cancelled by the Court of First Instance, and it was for this reason that the homesteader refused to pay the taxes, and that a public inspector managed to have this homesteader's title mortgaged to the bank. Defendant prays that plaintiff's complaint be dismissed, with costs. From a judgment for the defendant, the plaintiff appeals and assigns the following errors: The learned trial court erred: 1. In not declaring that Narciso Pascua, the original predecessor in the interest of plaintiff, has the better title to and the right of the land herein involved. 2. In not declaring that Romero and plaintiff were and are purchasers in good faith and for value and their title to and the right of the said land cannot, under the very findings of the facts of the trial court, be prejudiced and defeated. 3. In absolving the defendant from the complaint with costs against the plaintiff. 4. In not sentencing the defendant to immediately vacate the property described in the complain and deliver the same to plaintiff; to render an accounting to plaintiff of all the products and benefits received by said defendant from and after she took wrongful possession of said property up to and including the date of actual delivery of said land to plaintiff, with costs. JOHNS, J.: In 1910 Narciso Pascua, from whom plaintiff claims and deraigns title, filed an application for the land in dispute as a homestead, which was accepted by the Director of Lands. After such filing and before final proof, Leon Zarate and Juan Berenger applied for the registration of 168 hectares of land in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, which included the homestead of Pascua, who with the Director of Lands, represented by the Attorney-General, appeared and contested the land registration proceedings of Zarate and Berenguer. On December 28, 1914, and after a hearing, the court ordered the registration of the land in favor of Zarate and Berenguer and dismissed the opposition of Narciso Pascua and the Director of Lands. On appeal that judgment was affirmed by this court March 13, 1918.¹ Notwithstanding that proceeding and those decisions, on August 20, 1918, the Director of Lands issued a homestead patent to Narciso Pascua for the land in dispute. February 2, 1919, Narciso Pascua sold the land to Severo J. Romero, a public land inspector and employee of the Bureau of Lands, who in the same month and year, and for an expressed consideration of 2,000, mortgaged the land to the plaintiff for 1,200, which foreclosed the mortgaged and acquired title to the property, through a sheriff's sale. The question is thus squarely presented whether or not the homestead patent issued to Pascua, known in the record as plaintiff's Exhibit A, through which plaintiff claims title, is prior and superior to the Torrens title of the defendant, known in the record as Exhibit 1. At the time the homestead patent was issued on August 20, 1918, the land therein described was previously declared to be private land, not only by the Court of First Instance, but also by this court. As the appellee points out, proceedings for the acquisition of a homestead patent are not in rem, but a land registration case is and is directed against any and all the persons, "including the Government of the Philippine Islands and any of its dependencies"1awph!l.net It also appears in the homestead patent issued to Pascua that the tile is "subject to any and all vested and accrued rights." The legal question involved on this appeal is squarely decided against the plaintiff in the case of De los Reyes vs. Razon (38 Phil., 480). In a well written, exhaustive opinion, this court says: 1 HOMESTEADS; PATENTS. — A homestead patent which attempts to convey land to which the Government had no title at the time of its issuance vests no title in the patentee as against the real owner. 2 ID.; ID.; REGISTRATION OF PATENT; CONCLUSIVENESS OF CERTIFICATE OF TITLE. — A certificate of title issued to the grantee of the homestead patent pursuant to the provisions of section 122 of the Land Registration Act is not conclusive proof of title and confers no better right than the conferred by the patent. The legal principles laid down in that decision have been approved and followed ever since. That is to say, in the land registration case, both Pascua and the Government appeared and presented their proofs and contested the application of the defendant's grantors for the registration of the land, and after hearing the evidence of all parties, the court decided that the land in question was a private land, and that it should be registered in the name of the applicants as such, and that it was not public land, and denied Pascua's right to his homestead. That decision became final, and on appeal was affirmed by this court. Hence, you have a legal adjudication, in which all parties appeared and filed their respective claims, that Pascua's homestead filing was null and void, for the simple reason that it was then private and not public land. In the final analysis, the legal effect of plaintiff's claim as to nullify that final decision and to again relitigate the identical question which was decided in the land registration case. There is no merit in the appeal. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs. So ordered. Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur. Footnotes ¹ Zarate vs. Director of Lands, G. R. No. 11047, not reported. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation