Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30601 March 21, 1929
ANTONIO CHUA CHIACO, in behalf of Ong Tio, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, respondent-appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellant.
Quintin Llorente for appellee.
STATEMENT
October 6, 1927, Ong Tio, a Chinese woman, arrived at Manila and sought admission and residence in the Philippine Islands, claiming that she was the wife of Antonio Chua Chiaco, who was a native born citizen of this country, although of Chinese parentage. September 20, 1928, a hearing was had before a board of special inquiry which decided that the applicant was not entitled to admission, by reason of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. From this decision an appeal was taken to the Insular Collector of Customs who confirmed the decision of the board. October 4, 1928, on behalf of his alleged wife, Antonio Chua Chiaco filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging that Ong Tio was illegally deprived of her liberty by the Insular Collector of Customs. As a result of a hearing, that court decided that Ong Tio had the legal right to enter here and reside with her husband, from which the Insular Collector of Customs appealed and contends that the court erred in the making of that decision.
JOHNS, J.:
The Attorney-General cites and relies on Rule 10, subdivision 1, paragraph 1, of the Rules of October 1, 1926, governing the admission of Chinese, issued by the Bureau of Immigration of the United States Department of Labor, which provides:
Alien Chinese wives of American citizens are not admissible to the United States because of the marital relationship, and obviously cannot be permitted to enter otherwise than of their own individual status under the Immigration Act of 1924. Alien wives of citizens of the Chinese race, who are themselves of races eligible to citizenship, are admissible in certain instances as non-quota immigrants (sec. 4, Immigration Act 1924), in others as entitled to preference under the quota alloted to the country of their nationality (sec. 6, Immigration Act 1924), and, in the absence of these exceptions, as immigrants under the general quota alloted to the country of their nationality. (See pp. 47 and 58 of the pamphlet entitled 'Treaty, Laws, and Rules governing the Admission of Chinese'.)
And says that the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, which is the law in these Islands, was amended by the Immigration Act of 1924, section 25 of which now reads as follows:
ACT TO BE IN ADDITION TO IMMIGRATION LAWS
SEC. 25. The provisions of this Act are in addition to and not in substitution for the provisions of the immigration laws, and shall be enforced as a part of such laws, not inapplicable, shall apply to and be enforced in connection with the provisions of this Act. An alien, although admissible under the provisions of this Act, shall not be admitted to the United States if he is excluded by any provision of the immigration laws other than this Act and an alien, although admissible under the provisions of the immigration laws other than this Act, shall not be admitted to the United States if he is excluded by any provision of this Act.
He cites the case of Chang Chan vs. Nagle, Commissioner of Immigration (268 U. S., 346, 347), decided on May 26, 1925, in which that court held:
1. Chinese women, being themselves ineligible to citizenship, do not become citizens of the United States by marrying American citizens. (Rev. Stats., Sec. 2169; Act of Sept. 22, 1922, c. 411, 42 Stat., 1022, page 351.)
2. Chinese women who, before the date of the Immigration Act of 1924, married American citizens of the Chinese race permanently domiciled in this country, were debarred by the Act from coming here to join their husbands (no treaty right being involved), since section 13 forbids admission of aliens ineligible to citizenship, with certain exceptions which do not include such wives.
3. Such Chinese wives, coming here to join their husbands, are immigrants as defined by section 3 of the Act.
4. That consular officers must issue them visas does not signify that such wives must be admitted — in view of sec. 2 of the Act, expressly declaring that an immigration visa shall not entitle an immigrant to enter if upon arrival he is found inadmissible under the immigration laws.
5. The provision of sec. 4 of the Immigration Act, 1924, classifying wives and minor children of citizens of the United States residing here, etc., as non-quota immigrants, cannot be incorporated among the exceptions of sec. 13 upon the theory that it was omitted by oversight.
6. The hardships of a case, and suppositions of what is rational and consistent in immigration policy cannot justify a court in departing from the plain terms of an immigration act.
Based thereon, he contends that the judgment of the lower court should be reserved.
The petitioner contends that in applying for admission Ong Tio does not claim Filipino citizenship; that she came here to live with her husband and to enjoy his company, care and attention; that the Immigration Act of 1924, cited by the Attorney-General does not apply to the Philippine Islands, and points out that sec. 28 of Act of 1924, among other things, provides:
Sec. 28. As used in this Act. —
(a) The term "United States," when used in a geographical sense, means the territories of Alaska and Hawaii, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands; and the term "Continental United States" means the States and the District of Columbia;
And points out that the immigration laws now in force in the Islands are "Chinese and Exclusion Laws" as reenacted and extended by the Act of Congress of April 29, 1902, and the Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, and the Immigration Act of 1924 is not enforceable.
Rule 9a, subdivision 1, of the Rules of May 1, 1917, governing the admission of Chinese, issued by the Department of Labor, provides:
The lawful wife of an American citizen of the Chinese race may be admitted for the purpose of joining her husband, and the lawful children of such a citizen partake of his citizenship and are therefore entitled to admission. In every case convincing proof of citizenship and relationship shall be exacted.
Section 5 of the Organic Act, known as Jones Law, provides:
That the Statutory Laws of the United States hereafter shall not only apply to the Philippine Islands, except when they specifically so provide, or it is so provided in this Act.
We agree with the respondent that the United States Act of 1924 does not apply to the Philippine Islands, and that the Chinese and Exclusion Laws" now enforced here were those which were reenacted and extended by the Act of Congress of April 29, 1902, and the Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917.
It is very significant that the section 28 of the Act of 1924 above quoted does not mention or refer to the Philippine Islands, and that sec. 5 of the Jones Law above quoted specifically provides that the statutory laws of the United States hereafter enacted shall not apply to the Philippine Islands when their application is not specifically provided for in the act.
It follows that the Chinese wife of a Filipino citizen of a Chinese race has a legal right to admission and to reside with her husband in this country, not on the theory that by the reason of the marriage, she is a citizen of this country, but by the reason of the fact that her husband is a citizen of this country.
The decision of the board from which the appeal was taken finds in substance, and the brief of the Attorney-General assumes, that the petitioner and Ong Tio are husband and wife. The only proof in that point is the oral testimony of the petitioner and Ong Tio, both of whom testified that they were legally married according to the Chinese customs of Teng Tang, China, on Feb. 10, 1927. That which is not contested by the Attorney-General. Be that as it may, in this case of cases, to prevent fraud and collusion, the evidence of the contracting parties should be corroborated by that of some other person or some official certificate. In other words, there should be some other evidence of a convincing nature which corroborates that of the contracting parties as to existence of the marriage. If in truth and in fact there is a valid marriage in China under the laws and customs of that country, it would be a very simple and easy matter for the petitioner to produce clear and convincing proof of the fact that by either oral or documentary evidence, in addition to that of the contracting parties.
The judgment of the court, granting the writ, is affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
Johnson, Malcolm, Ostrand, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Street, J., concurs in the result.
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