Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30685 July 29, 1929
RATAN SINGH, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, opponent-appellees.
Marcelino Lontok for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
On the 29th day of June, 1927, Ratan Singh, filed an application for citizenship under Act No. 2927 in the Court of First Instance in the Province of Zambales, praying that he be neutralized as a citizen of the Philippine Islands. He alleged that he was born at Sangtipur, Jullunder, Punjab, India and was a subject of Great Britain; and he had all the qualifications required by the Natralization Law (Act No. 2927) as to age, residence, education, conduct, and he did not have any of the disqualifications of the said Act.
After due notice, the hearing was held on March 10, 1928. At the commencement of the hearing, the provincial fiscal of Zambales moved that the application be dismissed on the ground that the petitioner was not possessed of the qualifications required by law in order to be naturalized as citizen of the United States. The motion was denied.
After hearing the evidence presented by the petitioner the Honorable Leopoldo Rovira, the judge, in a very carefully prepared opinion containing a full discussion of the facts and the law, arrived at a conclusion that the petitioner was not qualified to become a naturalized citizen of the Philippine Islands, under the provisions of section 1, paragraph (c) of Act No. 2927, in relation with section 3 of the Acts of the Congress of February 5, 1917; and rendered a judgment against the petitioner, dismissing his application. From that judgment the petitioner appealed.
Counsel for appellant now contends that the lower court erred:
1. In holding that the Province of Baluchistan (India) is not included in the exceptions specified in section 3 of the Act of Congress of February 5, 1917; and
2. In holding that the petitioner is not qualified to become a citizen of the Philippine Islands.
The evidence presented by the petitioner shows that he is a British subject: that he was born in Sangtipur, Jullunder, Province of Punjab, India; and his parents were natives and residents of Kohek, Province of Baluchistan, India; that before coming to the Philippine Islands on February 5, 1911, he was also resident of the said place; that he had all of the other qualifications required by Act No. 2927 as to age, education, moral conduct, etc., and that he did not have any of the disqualifications specified in said Act.
Section 1 of Act No. 2927, entitled "The Naturalization Law," enumerates the classes of persons who may acquire Philippine citizenship. They are:
(a) Natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law;
(b) Natives of the other Insular possessions of the United States;
(c) Citizens of the United States, or foreigners who under the laws of the United States may become citizens of said country if residing therein.
It is evident that the petitioner does not come within the classes specified in paragraph (a) and (b). The question therefore is, whether or not he is included in the class of persons mentioned in paragraph (c) of section 1 of Act No. 2927. Or more specifically: Is the petitioner a foreigner who, under the laws of the United States, may become a citizen of that country residing therein?
The law of the United States regulating the immigration of alien to the United States and their residence therein, is found in the Act of Congress of February 5, 1917, which was expressly made applicable to the Philippine Islands. (Vol. 39, Part 1, U. S. Stat. at Large, pp. 874-876) Section 3 of said Act excludes from admission into the United States various classes of persons, among which are the following:
. . . natives of any country, province or dependency situate on the Continent of Asia west of one hundred and tenth (110th) meridian of longitude east from Greenwich and east of the fiftieth (50th) meridian of longitude east from Greenwich and south of the fiftieth (50th) parallel of the latitude north, . . .
Said section 3 however, establishes an exception in favor of the persons who are natives of —
That portion of said territory (Continent of Asia) situate between the fiftieth (50th) and the sixty-fourth (64th) meridians of longitude east from Greenwich and the twenty-fourth (24th) and the thirty-eight (38th) parallels of latitude north, . . . (Vol. 39, Part 1, U. S. Stat. at Large, p. 876)
From the above-quoted provisions of the Acts of Congress of February 5, 1917, it clearly appears that natives of the Continent of Asia within specified limits are excluded from the admission into the United States, with the exception of natives in the portion of the said continent "situate between the fiftieth (5th) and the sixty-fourth (64th) meridians of longitude east from Greenwich and the twenty-fourth (24th) and the thirty-eight (38th) parallels of latitude north."
Counsel contends in his two assignments of error that the appellant is a native of Kohek, Province of Baluchistan, India, because his parents were natives of the place; that the Province of Baluchistan is found between the 50th and 64th meridians of longitude east from Greenwich and the 24th and 38th parallels of latitude north; that, therefore the appellant is a native of a territory whose residents are not excluded from admission into the United States under the provisions of the saving clause of section 3 of the Act of Congress of February 5, 1917, above quoted, and that, consequently, the appellant is qualified to become a citizen of the United States under said Act of Congress and also of the Philippine Islands under the provisions of Act No. 2927 of the Philippine Legislature in relation to said Act of Congress.
There is absolutely no proof in the record to show that the town of Kohek, Province of Baluchistan, is found in the portion of the Asiatic Continent, whose natives are not excluded from admission into the United States. We have consulted the map of India , particularly the Province of Baluchistan (vol. 14, Ency. Britannica, 11ed. bet. pp. 376-377) for purpose of verifying the assertion of the appellant's counsel. We found, however, that the Province of Baluchistan is inside the specified limits of Asia, whose natives are excluded from admission to the United States, and is outside of the "territory situate between the 50th and the 64th meridians of the longitude east from Greenwich and the 24th and 38th parallels of latitude north,' whose natives are not excluded from admission into the United States, with the exception of a very small portion thereof of the northwest. But neither in this portion nor in any other place of the Province of Baluchistan did we find a place called Kohek. The appellant has thus utterly failed to show that he is native of a place whose residents may be admitted into the United States and may become citizens thereof.
And moreover, the petitioner being a British subject, we are of opinion that the principle jus soli, and not that of jus sanguinis, should be applied in this case. In England questions of citizenship are governed by the principle jus soli. Therefore, in view of the fact that the appellant was born in the Province of Punjab, India, he is disqualified from becoming a citizen of the United States and consequently of the Phil. Islands. In the case of the U.S. vs. Bhagat Singh Thind (261 United States Rep., 204) the Supreme Court of the United States held that the natives of the Province of Punjab, India cannot be naturalized as citizens of the United States. The court said:
A high caste of Hindu, of full Indian blood, born at Amrit, Sar, Punjab, India, is not a white person, within the meaning of the Rev. Stats., sec 2169 relating to the naturalization of aliens.
The action of the Congress in excluding from the admission to this country all natives of Asia within designated limits including India, is evidence of alike attitude toward naturalization of Asians within those limits. (United States vs. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261, United States Rep., 204)
The foregoing refutes conclusively the two assignments of error made by the appellant. The petitioner has failed entirely to establish his case and his application should be and is hereby denied.
The judgment appealed from is, therefore, hereby affirmed with costs. So ordered.
Avancena, C.J., Street, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
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