Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-31686 December 14, 1929
JAO YAN on behalf of Tee Liok Huy, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, respondent-appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellant.
Quintin Llorente for appellee.
STATEMENT
March 24, 1928, Tee Liok Huy arrived at the port of Manila from China and sought admission to this country, alleging that she was the wife of Jao Yan, a teacher, who was a legal resident here, upon which a hearing was had before the board of special inquiry appointed by the Insular Collector of Customs, after which the board rendered a decision denying her motion, which on appeal was affirmed by the Insular Collector of Customs.
July 12, 1928, a petition for a rehearing was filed upon the ground of "newly discovered evidence," which was granted, and after the rehearing, the board of special inquiry rendered the following decision:
This applicant has been refused landing by the board and this decision was sustained on appeal by the Insular Collector of Customs, June 8, 1928. A rehearing was granted in this case for the purpose of presenting newly found evidence. The applicant was refused landing for the reason that her alleged husband had never been to China since the issuance of his L. C. R. No. 19923/23722, on June 6, 1918. The counsel for the applicant presented a certificate signed by the Insular Collector of Customs showing that Jao Yan, the alleged husband of the applicant, was one of the outgoing passengers on board the steamship Taisang, which cleared from this port on or about November 20, 1920. Granting that he visited China in 1920 we are still in doubt as to his claim that he returned here in 1925. He is not able to produce and to present before the board evidence of his returning here at that time. He claimed that he returned here in 1925 in order to make good his claim as to one of his children who is now five years old. Besides, it can be noted from the original hearing of this case that the applicant came to this country alone which make us suspicious as no Chinese will ever permit his wife to travel alone. The board is still of the opinion that the claim of this applicant is false. She is, therefore, refused landing.
She is informed of this decision and is further informed that she will have two days within which to appeal to the Insular Collector of Customs should she feel dissatisfied therewith. The broker is likewise so informed.
On appeal that decision was also affirmed by the Insular Collector of Customs.
March 14, 1929, this petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila which after a hearing granted the writ and permitted the petitioner to land in the Islands as the legitimate wife of Jao Yan. From that decision the Insular Collector of Customs appealed and assigns the following errors:
I. The lower court erred in holding that the customs authorities acted arbitrarily and with abuse of discretion and authority in refusing the applicant Tee Liok Huy permission to land as the wife of Jao Yan.
II. The lower court likewise erred in taxing costs against the respondent Insular Collector of Customs.
JOHNS, J.:
The petitioner presented the evidence of himself and Tee Liok Huy, both of whom testified that they were married in China, as a result of which they had two children, and in its opinion the lower court said:
The uncontradicted evidence of Jao Yan (or Hao Yan) is that he is married to petitioner Tee Liok Huy, by whom he has had two children. The wife's testimony corroborates this.
The lower court also said:
The other ground for excluding the petitioner is that Chinese wives do not travel alone. Times change. When the undisputed evidence shows the immigrant to be the wife a Chinaman lawfully in the country, it should be dangerous to exclude her on account of a highly technical presumption that in 1928, Chinese married women never travelled alone.
It is conceded that the only testimony of the marriage is that of the alleged husband and wife, and that no documentary or written evidence was submitted. Neither is there any other oral nor corroborating proof of any kind of the marriage.
The Attorney-General says:
The customs authorities are not required to accept, as true, statements made by an alien applicant or by his witnesses. (Lim Cheng vs. Collector of Customs, 42 Phil., 876, 879; Tan Chin Hin vs. Collector of Customs, 27 Phil., 521; Gñilo vs. Collector of Customs, 32 Phil., 100; Ekiu vs. U. S., 142 U. S., 651.) Even though such statements are given under oath, the immigration officials are not required to accept them as true. (Jao Igco vs. Shuster, 10 Phil., 448; Tan Puy vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 900; Lim Cheng vs. Collector of Customs, supra; Chin Low vs. U. S., 18 Sup. Court Report, 201.)
Again, this court held, in an opinion promulgated March 21, 1929, in the case of Antonio Chua Chiaco, in behalf of Ong Tio, petitioner, vs. Collector of Customs (53 Phil., 31), that:
The decision of the board from which the appeal was taken finds in substance, and the brief of the Attorney-General assumes, that the petitioner and Ong Tio are husband and wife. The only proof on that point is the oral testimony of the petitioner and Ong Tio, both of whom testified that they were legally married according to the Chinese customs in Teng Tang, China, on February 10, 1927. That is the only evidence of their marriage, the legal proof of which is not contested by the Attorney-General. Be that as it may, in this class of cases, to prevent fraud and collusion, the evidence of the contracting parties should be corroborated by that of some other person or some official certificate. In other words, there should be some other competent evidence of a convincing nature which corroborates that of the contracting parties as to the existence of the marriage.lawphi1.net
That is to say, where the only evidence of the marriage is that of the contracting parties, which is not clear and convincing, and there is no documentary proof or corroborating evidence, the customs authorities are not legally bound to accept the evidence of the contracting parties as conclusive proof of their marriage in China. In case of any doubts, as in this case, they may well require documentary proof of the marriage or corroborating evidence of a clear and convincing nature.
We are clearly of the opinion that the errors assigned are well taken. The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the petition dismissed, with costs. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
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