Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28275 January 10, 1928
BONIFACIO NICOLAS, plaintiff,
vs.
SEVERINO ALBERTO, defendant.
Araneta & Zaragoza and Francisco Capistrano for plaintiff.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for defendant.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an action of quo warranto originally brought in this court to determine the respective rights of the plaintiff and the defendant to the office of justice of the peace of Angat, Bulacan, The question at issue is the legal right of the Governor-General to transfer a justice of the peace of one municipality to another municipality, without the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate.
The facts are stipulated. Bonifacio Nicolas, the plaintiff, on February 9, 1920, was appointed justice of the peace of Angat, Bulacan, by the Governor-General, with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate. Plaintiff qualified for the office shortly thereafter. He exercised its functions up to August 18, 1927, when he was forced to surrender possession to defendant.
Severino Alberto, the defendant, on February 28, 1918, was appointed justice of the peace of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, by the Governor-General, with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate. Defendant qualified for and exercised the functions of the office from the date mentioned to August 19, 1927, when he received an order transferring him to the office off justice of the peace of Angat, Bulacan. Since then, he has acted as justice of the peace of the latter municipality.
It appears further that on April 1, 1927, an administrative complaint was filed by the municipal president of Angat, Bulacan, against plaintiff, The charges were duly investigated by the Judge of First Instance of Bulacan. Judge Teodoro decided to dismiss the complaint with a public remained so that the justice of the peace might "avoid hereafter giving cause for suspicion regarding partisanship and favoring any stated political party in Angat." The municipal president of Angat and about three hundred sympathizers appealed from this decision to the Governor-General. On receipt of the communication, the Secretary to the Governor-General endorsed the papers to the Secretary of Justice "with the information that the records of this office show that the investigation was regular and in order and that the case is closed. However, in view of the friction which exists, His Excellency, the Governor-General believes it would be advisable to transfer this justice of the peace to another municipality when opportunity arises." Then on July 2, 1927, the Acting Governor-General, without the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate, and purporting to act "Pursuant to the provisions of section 206 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2768, and upon recommendation of the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice," ordered the transfer of Bonifacio Nicolas "from the position of justice of the peace of the municipality of Angat, Province of Bulacan, to the same position in the municipality of San Jose del Monte, same province." As of equal date, the Acting Governor-General, likewise without the confirmation of the Philippine Senate, transferred Severino Alberto, justice of the peace of San Jose del Monte, to Angat.
Plaintiff protested against the transfer. He petitioned the Governor-General twice to reconsider it. He has persistently refused to accept designation to San Jose del Monte. On the other hand, the defendant signified his willingness to accept the transfer to Angat and to assume the office of justice of the peace there. Plaintiff only gave up possession of the position of justice of the peace of Angat when peremptorily ordered to do so by the Judge of First Instance of Bulacan. Even then, plaintiff protested against delivering his office to the defendant. The Governor-General has denied the plaintiff's petition for reconsideration.
The court is not concerned with the merits of the complaints against Bonifacio Nicolas as justice of the peace of Angat, Bulacan. It is sufficient for our purposes to know that the investigation of Bonifacio Nicolas was regular; that the decision dismissed the charges with a reprimand; that the case was considered closed; and that he was not removed from office. Likewise, matters of expediency are out of place. The court should be mindful of no consideration other than an earnest desire to give just application of the law to the admitted facts.
The law provides that "One justice of the peace and one auxiliary justice of the peace shall be appointed by the Governor-General, with advice and consent of the Philippine Senate for . . . each municipality, . . . in the Philippine Islands . . . " (Administrative Code, sec. 203; act No. 3107, sec. 1). when a vacancy occurs in the office of any justice of the peace, except in provincial capitals and first-class municipalities, the Judge of the Court of First Instance of the district forwards to the Governor-General a list of names of persons qualified to fill the vacancy. Thereupon the "Governor-General, with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate, shall make the respective appointment from said list." (Adm. Code, sec. 210; Act No. 3107, sec. 1.) A justice of the peace may, following an investigation by the judge of First Instance be reprimanded, or the judge of First Instance may recommended to the Governor-General his removal from office. of his removal and disqualification from holding office and may suspend him from office pending action by the Governor-General. "The Governor-General may, upon such recommendation or on his own motion, remove from office any justice of the peace or auxiliary justice of the peace." (Adm. Code, sec. 229.)
It is thus incontestable that an appointment of a justice of the peace is made by the Governor-General with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate. A removal of the justice of the peace, on the other hand, is made by the Governor-General, without the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate. Interlocked by these two principles stands section 206 of the Administrative Code which, before amendment, provided: "A justice of the peace having the requisite legal qualifications shall hold office during good behavior unless his office be unlawfully abolished or merged in the jurisdiction of some other justice." Act No. 2768 amended said section 206 of the Administrative Code by adding the proviso "That in case the public interest requires it, a justice of the peace of one municipality may be transferred to another." The proviso was inserted in the law, so it has been said, not to give power to appoint justices of the peace to other municipalities without further confirmation from the Senate, but to assert the right of the Government to transfer justices of the peace from one jurisdiction to another even without their consent. (See I Araneta's Administrative Code, p. 350.)
Let us notice again the wording of the amended section 206 of the Administrative Code. The body of the section sanctions the holding of office by justices of the peace during good behavior. The proviso qualifies this by providing "That in case the public interest requires it, a justice of the peace of one municipality may be transferred to another." At once it is noted that the law is silent as to the office or entity which may take the transfer. The law does not say may be transferred "by the Governor-General." The insertion of the words "by the Philippine Senate" would be as justifiable. The more reasonable inference, indeed the only possible legal inference permissible without violating the constitution, is that the justice of the peace may be transferred by the exercise of the appointing power, and the appointing power consists of the Governor-General acting in conjunction with the Philippine Senate.
That is all there is to the case. Just some conceded facts calling for the application of the law. Logically we should stop here. But we proceeded to ascertain the meaning of the proviso to codal section 206 by fitting the proviso into the general scheme of the law.
The justice of the peace is appointed to a specific municipality. The only method by which the appointment can be made is by the Governor-General, with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate. Any other attempted method intended to provide for an appointment through subterfuge or evasion would be in clear violation of organic law. The Organic Act, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, in section 21 provides that the Governor-General "shall, unless otherwise herein provided, appoint, by and with the consent of the Philippine Senate, such officers as may now be appointed by the Governor-General, or such as he is authorized by this Act to appoint, or whom he may hereafter be authorized by law to appoint." When the Organic Act was approved, section 206 of the Administrative Code, unmended, was on the statute books. It was thus beyond the power of the Philippine Legislature by the enactment of Act No. 2768 or any other Act or of the Governor-General by enforcement of law which had been confirmed by the Organic Act.
A justice of the peace is placed in a certain municipality by the Governor-General, with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate. The justice of the peace in any other municipality receives his office from the same source. They serve during good behavior. The only method by which either of them can be gotten out of their positions is by removal. When a vacancy in the position of justice of the peace of any given municipality occurs, the vacant office can only be filled by appointment, that is, by the Governor-General, with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate.
The justice of the peace gets in by appointment. He gets out by removal. There is no half-way in or out method. A transfer of a justice of the peace outside of the municipality to which he was appointed is, in legal effect, a combined removal and appointment. A forced transfer creates a permanent vacancy. One phase in the transfer in tantamount to appointment. The removal does not need the consent of the Senate. The appointment does not need that consent. What may not be done directly may not be permitted to be done indirectly.
The previous decisions of this court intended to safeguard the independence of the judiciary should not be departed from without good person. In the well known cases of Borromeo vs. Mariano ([1921], 41 Phil., 322), and Concepcion vs. Paredes ([1921], 42 Phil., 599), it was announced, as to judges of First Instance, that they are not appointed Judges of First Instance of the Philippine Islands but are appointed Judges of the Courts of First Instance of the respective judicial districts of the Philippine Islands. They hold these positions of Judges of First Instance of definite districts, it was said, until they either resign, reach the age of retirement, or are removed through impeachment proceedings. That was the doctrine of the majority decisions. But even under the thesis of the learned dissenting opinion in Borromeo vs. Mariano, supra, it was still sustained that a new appointment by the Governor-General, with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate, would be necessary to make a valid transfer. Mr. Justice Villamor said: " . . . the executive power to effect transfers of judges is subject to the approval of a restraining body, . . . the Senate . . . . According to law, the Governor-General has the discretion to make transfers of judges . . . with the consent of the Senate." In Concepcion vs. Paredes, supra, where the attempt to secure a transfer of judges by drawing of lots was thwarted, it was further said that "there can be no valid appointment to an office so long as the appointing power, in this instance the Governor-General and the Philippine Senate, and not the Secretary of Justice, is not exercised. . . . The law before us would require a drawing of lots for judicial positions, while the organic law would require selection for judicial positions by the Governor-General with the assent of the Philippine Senate."
The same doctrine has been used to keep the legislative branch from trespassing on the executive domain. Recent examples come readily to mind. For instance, the Philippine Senate, with power to punish an appointive Senator for disorderly behavior but without power to remove him, sought to get around the law decreeing a suspension for one year, but this court in both majority and minority opinions held that the suspension was equivalent to expulsion and could not be sanctioned. (Alejandrino vs. Quezon [1924], 46 Phil., 83.)
What we now have to do is to carry forward the same principle and, applying it just as serenely, protect a branch of the Legislature from an absorption its power by the Chief Executive. Facts change but principles remain immutable.
The Attorney-General endeavors to demonstrate the purpose of the Legislature by citing the legislative history of the bill which later became Act No. 2768. The Attorney-General shows that when the house bill was submitted to the Senate an amendment was approved by inserting the following: "Siempre que su nombramiento, en virtud del traslado, sea confirmad por el Senado." Later the amendment was eliminated and the bill approved in its present form. It may, therefore, be that the Legislature had in view, by refusing to accept the amendment, precisely what is now contended for, which is to place the power of transfer in the hands of the Governor-General without legislative restriction. An equally permissible supposition is that the Legislature thought the amendment unnecessary and superfluous because of the plan meaning of the bill without it. The subject is so confused that no help can be derived from this source.
The representatives of the Attorney-General also offer an argument which, we are sure, the law officer of the Government, on further reflection, would not desire to sanction. It is said that "It is not pertinent to claim for the justices of the peace that judicial independence which is often invoked for judges of first instance. It is within the judicial knowledge of this Honorable Court that justices of the peace in the Philippine Islands are not equipped with the same mental and moral qualifications as judges of first instance and that their conduct in office in many instances leaves much to desired." But the mental or moral equipment of the incumbents of the office and their conduct while in office, are entirely beside the question. A justice of the peace is a member of the judiciary. Of that office, this court has said that it "is one both ancient and honorable . . . the justice of the peace has become an important judicial officer." (Narcida vs. Bowen [1912], 22 Phil., 365.) The humble occupant of the office of justice of the peace in the most remote and insignificant municipality is entitled to the same measure of respect as any member of this tribunal. A marshaling of justices of the peace to march at the command of the Chief Executive would constitute just as effective interference with judicial independence as would a similar attempt to transfer a member of the Supreme Court to some other jurisdiction.
We decide the question by holding that in case the public interest requires it, a justice of the peace of on municipality may be transferred to another only by the Governor-General, with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate. Hence, it results in a decision to the affect that the plaintiff is lawfully entitled to the office of justice of the peace of Angat, Bulacan.
Judgement shall issue ousting the defendant from the office of justice of the peace of Angat, Bulacan, and placing the plaintiff in possession of the same. Without finding as to costs, it is so ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Street, J., dissents.
Separate Opinions
JOHNSON, J., dissenting:
The majority opinion is the boldest piece of judicial legislation to be found in the annals of jurisprudence.
The only question presented to this Court for solution is: May the Governor-General transfer a justice of the peace from one municipality to another?
Section 206 of the Administrative Code of 1917 provides that "a justice of the peace having requisite legal qualifications shall hold office during good behavior unless his office lawfully abolished or merged in the jurisdiction of some other justice (of the peace): Provided, That in case the public interest requires it, a justice of the peace of one municipality may be transferred to another."
Said section 206 now reads by virtue of the judicial legislation, as follows: "A justice of the peace having the requisite legal qualifications shall hold office during good behavior unless his office be unlawfully abolished or merged in the jurisdiction of some other justice (of the peace): Provided, That in case the public interest requires it a justice of the peace of one municipality may be transferred to another;" and provided, further, that in case the public interest requires it a justice of the peace of one municipality may be transferred to another, by the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate.
The majority opinion has done, judicial legislation, exactly what the Legislature itself refused to do when that question was squarely presented to it. Recently an effort was made by the Philippine Senate to amend said section 206, by adding a proviso thereto, "that in the case the public interest requires it a justice of the peace of one municipality may be transferred to another by the advice and consent of the Senate." But such amendment was rejected. The court, in the majority opinion, has now done exactly what the Philippine Senate refused to do. The reason for the amendment to said section 206 made by the court can only be found in an effort to handicap the Executive Department of the Government in the due enforcement of the laws of the Philippine Islands and the administration of justice. There is just as much reason for holding that the suspension or removal of a justice of the peace must receive the confirmation of the Senate as there is for holding that his transfer from one municipality to another must receive the approval of the Senate. The removal or suspension of a justice of the peace is a more severe penalty imposed upon him for incapacity, immorality or dishonesty than his transfer from one municipality to another when the public interest requires it.
The result of this decision, if the Executive Department of the Government is to maintain its self-respect, will be that thereafter justices of the peace will be removed and not transferred when the public interest requires it. Politics and court political have ruined many good men who might be of great value to the public in other localities and under different surroundings.
It is stated that said section 206 does not provide that the transfer may be made by the Governor-General. If that statement has any merit at all as an argument, it must mean that the Governor-General cannot transfer a justice of the peace and it must lead to the conclusion that the order of transfer in question is illegal for lack of authority. If the lack of authority is the reason for its illegality, then the argument that the order must be confirmed by the Senate is hardly necessary.
I am not one of those who believe that the office of a justice of the peace or that f any other judicial officer is so high or sacred it cannot be touched when by practices of immorality, political intrigue, dishonesty, disregard for the law, lewdness, and deviation from probity and integrity, renders a continuance of his services repugnant to public interest and the highest interests of the state.
The courts have no legislative powers. In the interpretation and construction of statutes their sole function is to determine, and, within the constitutional limits of the legislative power, to give effect to the intention of the legislature. The courts cannot read into a statute something which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature as gathered from the statute itself. To depart from the meaning expressed by the words of a statute, is to alter the statute, to legislate and not to interpret. The responsibility for the justice or wisdom of legislation rests with the legislature, and it is the province of the courts to construe, not to make the laws.
Every statute is understood to contain, by implication, if not by express terms, all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate the rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, and also such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms.
When a statute confers certain powers upon the executive department of the government, the courts will give weight to the contemporaneous construction placed upon such a statute by the executive department, whose duty it is to enforce it. Courts will and should respect the contemporaneous construction placed by the executive department of the government, whose duty it is to enforce it.
In a government of separate and independent departments — executive, legislative and judicial — with separate and distinct functions, one department will not attempt to interfere with the performance of the executive duties of another. To permit and interference would destroy the independence of the separate departments and would make one subject to the control of the others. For the judiciary to interfere with the executive department in the enforcement of a plain provision of the statute, would in effect destroy the independence of the department and would make it subject to the ultimate control of the judicial department. Such a conclusion or condition was never contemplated by the organizers of the government.
The courts should proceed with the greatest caution in the interpretation of statutes conferring express, clear and unambiguous authority upon the executive department of the government. The courts should never declare a statute void unless its invalidity is beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case the legislative department of the government refused to give to the statute in question the meaning which the majority opinion seeks t give it.
In my opinion the petition should be denied and the Executive Department of the Government should be permitted to enforce the plain letter and spirit of the law without let or hindrance by the judiciary. The petitioner has shown himself unworthy to occupy his former position.
VILLAMOR, J., dissenting:
From the facts set out in the majority decision, the question to be determined is whether or not the consent of the Senate is necessary for the validity of the transfer of a justice of the peace from one municipality to another, made by the Governor-General by virtue of the discretional power conferred on him by the law to order such transfer in the interest of the public.
The law applicable t the case is section 206 of the Administrative Code as amended by section 1 of Act No. 2768, which is as follows:
SEC. 206. Tenure of office — transfer from one municipality to another. — A justice of the peace having the requisite legal qualifications should hold office during good behavior unless his office be lawfully abolished or merged in the jurisdiction of some other justice: Provided, That in case the public interest requires it, a justice of the peace of one municipality may be transferred to another.
In connection with the amendment of section 206 of the Administrative Code by Act No. 2768, it is in point to consider that said amendment was at first drafted by the Senate in the following form:
SEC. 206. A justice of the peace having the requisite legal qualifications shall hold office during good behavior unless his office be lawfully abolished or merged in the jurisdiction of some other justice: Provided, That whenever the Government deems it wise, the justice of the peace of one municipality may be transferred to another." (Vol. 2, Journal of the sessions of the Philippine Senate, pp. 592-593.)
When the bill came up in the Senate for discussion and approval, Senate Rodriguez proposed an amendment to it, adding immediately after the word "another" the following: "provided that his appointment, by virtue of the transfer, be confirmed by the Senate." This amendment was approved by the Senate, but when the amended bill was referred to the House of Representatives, Senator Rodriguez's amendment was rejected, so that the bill was approved in the following form:
SEC. 206. A justice of the peace having the requisite legal qualifications shall hold office during good behavior unless his office be lawfully abolished or merged in the jurisdiction of some other justice: Provided, That in case the public interest requires it, a justice of the peace of one municipality may be transferred to another. (Vol. 13, Journal of the sessions of the House of Representatives, p. 554.)
With this substitution, the bill was returned to the Philippine Senate, where it was unanimously approved as amended by the House of Representatives.
Such is the bill that became a law, and it thus that section 206 of the Administrative Code was amended in the 1926 edition.
As may be seen, the majority decision adds to the law the requisite of a confirmation by the Senate, a requisite that the Legislature deliberately omitted. I deem it unnecessary to adduce arguments to show that the courts should not excercise legislative functions. This is a self-evident proposition and for this reason I am constrained to dissent from the majority decision.
Both parties in their briefs speak of the difference between transfer and appointment, and of the consent of the transferred judge, citing the decision in the case of Borromeo vs. Mariano (41 Phil., 322). Having expressed at length my humble opinion on these points in the case, I desire to reproduce here, in order to avoid, repetition, the reasoning I there adduced.
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