Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21570 August 30, 1924
Intestate estate of Julia de la Peña, deceased.
DIEGO DE GUZMAN, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,
vs.
RUFINO SEVILLA, ET AL., opponents-opponents.
Juan F. Gonzalez for petitioners-appellants.
Alfredo Santos for opponents-appellants.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
This is an appeal from an order dated July 20, 1923, of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija denying the petition both of the petitioners and of the opponents for declaration of heirs and denying also the authority to sell certain property, which was applied for by the former. Both parties have appealed from this order, each assigning errors thereto.
This case is concerned with the inheritance of the deceased Julia de la Peña.
The evidence shows that this Julia de la Peña was daughter of Julio Sevilla and Catalina de la Peña, who were not married. The petitioners have introduced evidence to the effect that Julia de la Peña was an adulterous child because Julio Sevilla was married with Josefa Gutierrez who was alive at the time. The fact is that Julia de la Peña was a child of unmarried parents, and therefore she was not a legitimate child, nor does she appear to have been legitimated, and is, at most, an acknowledged natural child, supposing it not to have been proven that she was an adulterous child, as alleged by the petitioners.
Now, the persons entitled to succeed a natural child in an intestate succession are the father or mother who acknowledged it (art. 944, Civil Code), and in default of either, its natural brothers (art. 945, Civil Code). It was not proven nor it is contended that the petitioners or the opponents are parents or brothers of the deceased Julia de la Peña; and with the exception of the relatives mentioned in said articles 944 and 945 of the Civil Code, no other relative of the natural child has the right to succeed it, as is clearly provided by article 943 of the same Code.
It is, therefore, clear that neither the petitioners nor the opponents can be declared heirs of the deceased Julia de la Peña without a will.
We find no error in the order appealed from, except in its last disposition which says "In lieu thereof, the estate is awarded to the State." We think this awarding is premature because the requirements of sections 750 to 752 of the Code of Civil Procedure have not previously been complied with.
The order appealed from is affirmed in other respects, without pronouncement as to costs, with instruction to the lower court to furnish the provincial fiscal of Nueva Ecija a copy of this decision for such action as may be proper under the aforesaid sections 750 to 752 of the Code of Civil Procedure. So ordered.
Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, and Ostrand, JJ., concur.
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