G.R. No. L-13236




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-13236 October 21, 1918 CHUN CHONG on behalf of Chun Lei and Chun Ken, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, respondent-appellee. Thos. D. Aitken for appellant. Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee. JOHNSON, J.: It appears from the record that the said Chun Chong, Chun Lei and Chun Ken arrived at the port of manila on the steamship Loongsang, January 2, 1917, and requested permission to land in the Philippine Islands. They were detained as aliens and their right to land was inquired into by a board of special inquiry. Said board, after hearing the evidence decided (a) that Chun Chong was a citizen of the United States and was therefore entitled to enter the Philippine Islands; (b) that Chun Lei and Chun Ken were Chinese aliens, were without the necessary credentials and were not entitled to enter the Philippine Islands. From that conclusion, an appeal was taken to the Insular Collector of Customs, and the decision of the said board was affirmed. later, Chun Chong, on behalf of Chun Lei and Chun Ken, presented a petition for the writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the Insular Collector of Customs alleging (a) that he is a citizen of the United States; (b) that he is the father of the said Chun Lei and Chun Ken who were, respectively, of the ages of 27 and 20 years; and (c) that the said children were illegally detained and deprived of their liberty by the Insular Collector of Customs. To the said petition was attached the record made by the Department of Customs. After a consideration of said record, the lower court reached the conclusion that the decision of the Department of Customs denying the admission of the said Chun Lei and Chun Ken should be and was affirmed. From that decision, the petitioner appealed to this court. The rule is so well established that no Chinese subject or citizen can enter the territory of the United States without what is generally known as the "Section 6 Certificate," that the citation of authorities in support thereof is no longer necessary. To that general rule, however, there are certain well recognized exceptions. Among said exceptions may be mentioned the wife and minor children of Chinese residents in territory of the United States. They may enter the territory of the United States without the section 6 certificate. (U. S. vs. Gue Lim, 176 U. S., 459; Chua Shun vs. Collector of Customs, 32 Phil., 28 Phil. Rep., 175; Lee Jua vs. Collector of Customs, 32 Phil. Rep., 78; Gñilo vs. Collector of Customs, 32 Phil. Rep., 1900; Yap Tian Un (Sun) vs. Collector of Customs, 32 Phil. Rep., 487; Dy Eng Hoa vs. Collector of Customs, 32 Phil. Rep., 490.) The rule that the courts will not take jurisdiction for the purpose of modifying or reversing the decision of the Department of Customs, upon a question effecting the right of Chinese aliens to enter the territory of the United States until it is conclusively established that there has been an abuse of power, authority or discretion by that department, is also so well established that we deem it no longer necessary to cite authorities in support thereof. The courts have from time to time attempted to define what would amount to an abuse of the power, authority or discretion on the part of the Department of Customs (Ang Eng Chong vs. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. Rep., 614; Lee Jua vs. Collector of Customs, 32 Phil. Rep., 24.) It must follow from what has been said that the only question presented by this, as well as in every other analogous case is; Did the Department of Customs abuse its power, authority or discretion in denying Chun Lei and Chun Ken the right to enter the Philippine Islands? Chun Chong claimed (a) the right, which was granted, to enter the territory of the United States because he was a citizen of the United States; and (b) that Chun lei and Chun Ken were his legitimate minor sons and therefore they also had a right to enter the territory of the United States with him. After hearing the evidence, the Department of Customs reached the conclusion that Chun Chong was a citizen of the United States and was therefore entitled to enter the Philippine Islands. The Department of Customs denied the right of Chun Lei and Chun ken to enter the Philippine Islands for the following reasons: (a) That there was a conflict between the testimony given by the father and the children with reference to the purpose of their coming to the Philippine Islands; (b) that the father, in coming to Manila, traveled first class while the alleged sons traveled second-class; and (c) that the alleged children did not resemble the alleged father nor each other. 1awph!l.net With reference to the first ground upon which the Department of Customs denied Chun lei and Chun ken the right to enter, it may be admitted that there is, perhaps, some conflict in the testimony of the father and the two sons relating to their purpose of coming to Manila. The father said that he brought his two alleged sons to Manila because he wanted them " to study and learn business here." Chun Lei testified that he came to the Philippine islands "to study some business; p[perhaps he would go to school, that he would work for anybody," Chun ken testified that he was coming to Manila to engage in business, and when asked what kind of business he said, "may be to labor or merchant's business," that he would do whatever his father told him to do. Even though it be admitted that there is a slight contradiction in the declarations of the father and sons with reference to the purpose of their coming to Manila, is the conflict of sufficient importance to discredit and to render of no value, in weighing the testimony, when such declarations are compared with the positive and unequivocal declarations of the father and his two alleged sons, that their relation is that of father and sons, and especially in view of the fact that the relation of father and sons is supported by the positive and undisputed testimony of two other witnesses whose reliability and credibility has not been questioned in the slightest degree? In view of such positive proof and such slight contradictions, was it an abuse of authority for the Department of Customs to disregard all of the testimony on the question of the relation of Chun Chong and his alleged sons? May the Department of Customs, or an ordinary court even, arbitrarily, and without giving any reason therefor, disregard positive and uncontradicted testimony of witnesses, in reaching their conclusions and expect to e supported by reviewing authorities? May the Department of Customs disregard undisputed testimony and capriciously reach a conclusion contrary thereto, without giving a sufficient reason therefor, and not be held to have abused its power or discretion? In the case of Sing Jung Talento vs. Collector of Customs (32 Phil. Rep., 82), as well as in other cases, it was held that "the mere fact that the Collector of Customs refused to believe the witnesses presented by the appellant, is not of itself an abuse of authority or discretion." (Tan Chin Hin vs. Collector of Customs, 27 Phil. Rep., 521; Chin Woy vs. U.S. 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 201; Gñilo vs. Collector of Customs, 32 Phil. Rep., 100.) While that is the undisputed rule, we are of the opinion and so decided, in order to avoid capricious and arbitrary rulings, that when the proof upon any particular question is direct, positive and undisputed, and when there is nothing in the record to show its lack of probity, that the Department of Customs, when it does not accept such proof, must give its reasons therefor if such reasons do not appear of record. In that way, and in that way only, may the reviewing authority have before it the exact data which induced the conclusions reached by the Department of Customs, and be able to reach a conclusion that parties interested have not been denied a right, by an abuse of authority, to which they are justly entitled under the law. With reference to the second ground, to wit, that the alleged father traveled first-class and the alleged children traveled second-class on their trip to manila, upon which the board of inquiry based its conclusion, it may be said that that fact does not necessarily, when the family customs of the Asiatic oriental is taken into consideration, discredit the positive declaration of the witnesses that the relation of father and sons existed. With reference to the third ground, to wit, that the alleged sons do not resemble the alleged father nor each other, it may be that a physical comparison may e made between a minor Chinese, an applicant for admission into the territory of the United States, with his allege father, for the purpose of showing parental relationship, providing the fact of such comparison is made a part of the record. (Chua Yeng vs. Collector of Customs, 28 Phil. Rep., 591.) But it does not follow that if there is no resemblance between the alleged son and father, that that fact alone would constitute sufficient proof to show that the alleged parentage did not exist. The mere absence of parental resemblance would not be sufficient reason for declaring that the parentage did not exist. The mere absence of parental resemblance would not be sufficient reason for declaring that the parentage did not exist. Parentage, lineage and legitimacy cannot be made to depend upon parental physiognomy or bodily marks of similarity. Such a rule would deprive a great many people of their inheritance There is scarcely a family among any of the nationalities, where there are a number of children, where one or more of them, due to heredity perhaps, does not resemble either of their immediate parents. Lineage can not depend wholly upon the presence or absence of paternal similarity of physical appearance. (Chua Yeng vs. collector of Customs, 28 Phil. Rep., 591.) It certainty cannot be contended, in making such comparison, that if there is no resemblance whatever between the alleged son and the alleged father, that that fact alone would constitute sufficient proof that the alleged parentage did not exist. Our conclusions are, upon all of the foregoing and a careful examination of the evidence, that the proof shows positively, directly and is not disputed by any competent and measurable proof of record, that Chun lei and Chun Ken are the legitimate minor sons of Chun Chong and therefore have the right to enter the Philippine islands, territory of the United States, as his minor legitimate sons. Therefore, the judgment of the lower court, as well as that of the Department of Customs, ordering the deportation of Chun Lei and Chun Ken, is hereby revoked and it is hereby ordered and decreed that said persons have a right to enter the territory of the United States, and without any finding as to costs. So ordered. Arellano, C.J, Torres, Street and Fisher, JJ., concur. Separate Opinions MALCOLM, J., dissenting: I dissent. I do not think that the customs authorities have been shown to have abused their discretion. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation