Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12981 November 6, 1918
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE BARRIOS OF SANTO CRISTO, CONCEPCION and SAN JOSE, BALIUAG; SEGUNDO RODRIGO and AMBROSIO CRUZ, objectors and appellees. SILVESTRE BALAGTAS, DOMINGO N. CRUZ, and VICENTE N. SANTOS, objectors-appellants.
Hartigan & Welch for petitioner and appellant.
Vicente Foz for objector and appellant Silvestre Balagtas.
No appearance for the other appellants.
Delgado & Delgado for objector and appellee Ambrosio Cruz.
No appearance for the other appellees.
STREET, J.:
On July 25, 1913, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila made application to the Court of Land Registration, for the registration of 550 parcels of land lying in the province of Bulacan. Various decisions respecting groups of parcels of these lands were rendered from time to time between November, 1914, and March, 1916. The present appeal involves questions relative to four of these decisions, the applicant being an appellant with respect to each, while the opponents, Silvestre Balagtas, Domingo N. Cruz, and Vicente N. Santos, have also appealed from so much of the last decision as disallows their oppositions. These various appeals will be dealt with in this opinion separately.
PARCELS 16, 18, 38, AND 39.
It appears that in the year 1881, Julian Buyson, imbued with religious fervor, constructed a chapel (visita) upon a lot belonging to himself in the barrio of Santo Cristo, in the municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan. Upon August 1, of the year mentioned, he donated this property for the use of the inhabitants of the barrio in their devotions. The document in which this donation was expressed is as follows:
I hereby declare that on this day the visita (chapel) of the Holy Christ was finally constructed; that, inasmuch as I am the only one who has been to any expense for its construction as well as the one who has bought the lot whereon it stands, I hereby transfer the ownership and possession of the said visita to all the residents of this barrio; that I make this as a donation inter vivos which none of my heirs can question, in view of the fact that this visita shall be consecrated to devotions and offerings in behalf of my soul; that this donation shall be for the benefit, firstly, of the Holy Christ an, secondly, of the residents of said barrio that they may hold Him as their Patron in their devotions; that the antechamber designed for public school purposes shall be at all times used as such; that the ownership of said visita and the lot whereon it is built shall belong to this barrio, without anybody being able to interfere with such ownership. I declare this to be the truth, and in witness thereof, I sign this document, this first day of August, eighteen hundred and eighty-one.
About the same time a similar pious donation was made by the same donor in the barrios of Concepcion and San Jose. Parcel No. 16, in the plan, is the parcel situated in the barrio of Santo Cristo, included in the document of donation quoted above. Parcel No. 18, in the plan, covers the parcel donated to the barrio of Concepcion. Parcels 38 and 39, in the plan, comprise the parcels donated to the barrio of San Jose. In the original decision of March 31, 1915, no mention is made of lot 38; but the decision was afterwards amended, by agreement of the parties, so as to embrace parcel 38, this being in fact a part of the property donated to the barrio of San Jose.
The material facts relative to the property covered by these three gifts are fully and clearly stated in the opinion of the trial court, written by Judge M. V. del Rosario. We quote from this opinion as follows. omitting unnecessary citations of the exhibits upon which these findings are in part based:
The donation of each of these visitas (chapels) to the respective barrios having been made, the donor drew up the regulations governing the organization for the administration and possession of the visitas by the respective barrios, instituting therein an hermano mayor (person in charge), a steward, and a secretary, to be elected by the respective barrios, who should be in charge of the visita and be responsible therefor to the barrio, and who should also be responsible for the fostering of the religious devotion among the residents thereof.
The organization mentioned in the foregoing paragraph having been constituted, and the visita having been administered by the hermano mayor, steward, and secretary of each barrio, the donor, during his lifetime, reserved to himself the right to inspect and attend to the preservation of the visitas and the fostering of the worship therein, giving to himself the title of honorary president of all the councils in the respective barrios.
x x x x x x x x x
Since the date of the erection of the visita, in each barrio the hermano mayor, steward, and secretary, have collected the contributions given the residents of each barrio, repaired the buildings, prepare the programs for the town festivals, engaged a priest to say the mass, paying said priest or giving him alms for such service, been in charge of the keys of the chapel opened whenever mass was to be celebrated therein. The parish pries of Baliuag never took part in the elections of the hermanos mayores, stewards, and secretaries. No mass was celebrated in any of the visitas since their erection, without the knowledge, consent, and permission of the so called hermanos mayores, stewards, and secretaries. The witnesses for both the petitioner and the opponent are in accord as regards these facts.
The chapel or visita, besides being used for religious service and devotion by the inhabitants of the respective barrios in the celebration of their catholic festivals, was also used as a public school for the benefit of each and all of the children in the respective barrios.
The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church never kept its sacred ornaments for religious services or mass in each of the chapels. On the other hand, said ornaments brought by the priest requested to say the mass in each chapel, were taken back afterwards to the Parish Church of Baliuag.
No mass was ever said in any of the chapels in question on holidays except when, by request, and with the knowledge, consent, and permission of the dignataries of the cofradia (brotherhood), fraternity, congregation, or trust duly organized in each barrio, a mass was therein celebrated during the festival in each barrio.
Upon these facts the trial court refused to register the parcels here in controversy in the name of the applicant, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila; and we are of the opinion that in so doing no error was committed. The case is in many respects similar to that involved in the controversy over the parcel 30, lot 13, in the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa vs. Municipality of Taal (38 Phil. Rep., 367). We held in this case that the circumstance that a Catholic pries has held services in a chapel building for a long period at the request of the congregation does not prove title in the church, where it appears that the building was erected and maintained by the donations and contributions of the congregation.
We are unable to accept the proposition that the donation evidenced by the document executed by Julian Buyson in 1881, and other documents explanatory of the purposes of the donation executed later by him, prove a donation to the church. On the contrary, we think that the documents prove that the donor intended that the inhabitants of the barrio should be the beneficiaries of the gift, and that the officers elected in the manner stated in the trial court's findings were intended to serve the function of trustees for the purpose of effectuating the purposes of the donation. The original document quoted above shows that the donation was made with a view to the benefit of the donor's soul, but there is nothing to show that his soul was instituted as donee or beneficiary of the gift.
For the purpose of the determining whether the applicant is entitled to have this property registered in its name, it is wholly immaterial to consider whether the gift created a valid trust or was void for lack of certainty in the donee (article 650, Civil Code). The desire of the donor to perpetuate the sanctuary for all time does not supply a sufficient foundation upon which to base the conclusion that the real done was the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church.
It is, however, insisted by the appellant that the court erred in permitting certain individuals, as representatives of the inhabitants of the barrios, to appear and oppose the registration of the parcels in question, and that the court also erred in recognizing the barrios as possessing a legal entity, and therefore, they could not, technically speaking, appear as a distinct personality in the registration proceedings. It is also clear that the testimony adduced in the case fails to prove the existence of a cofradia or hermandad [brotherhood] in the various barrios. Still less does it prove that the property donated by Julian Buyson was vested in any such association; and at any rate it is apparent that the donations in question did not vest the property in any cofradia or hermandad. These considerations, however, are in our opinion in no wise determinative of the case. The court, rightly, we think admitted certain inhabitants of the barrio, as persons interested in effectuating the intention of the donor to appear and oppose the application. The mere circumstance that an opponent cannot show title in himself such as would justify registration of the property in his own name, does not discapacitate him from opposing registration in the name of another. The Land Registration Law enumerates the persons and entities in whose names registration can be affected; but there is no disposition of law limiting the right of opposition to any particular class or classes of persons. All that is necessary to enable anyone to exert the faculty of opposition is that he should appear to have an interest in the property (Act No. 496, sec. 34); and it is immaterial whether this interest is in the character of legal owner or is of a purely equitable nature as where he is the beneficiary in a trust. It is the duty of the court in each case to register, or refuse to register, the title in the name of the applicant, according as the latter may or may not prove title in himself.lawphil.net
LOT 194 (BULACAN FISHERIES)
This appeal refers to the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan rendered on June 23, 1915, in an opinion also written by Judge M. V. del Rosario, which excluded from the decree of registration a certain portion of land described in the petition as lot 194. Segundo Rodrigo, the opponent and appellee herein, presented opposition as to the inscription of the northeastern portion of the land, or the area comprised within the points numbered 13 to 95 on the plan accompanying the petition. The land claimed is found north of points 40, 39, 38, 37 and 36 of Exhibit I of the opposition. The Director of Lands also filed opposition as to the registration of lot 194. After hearing the case and after two ocular inspections had been made on the land, the court dismissed the opposition of the Director of Lands, and decreed the registration of lot 194 with the exclusion of the portion claimed by Segundo Rodrigo. The court held that the applicant is not entitled to the registration of the portion claimed by Rodrigo, as said portion is not in the possession of the applicant but of the opponent; that the applicant has not shown a sufficient right of ownership or possession of the land; that the pilapil [a narrow earthern barrier], or malecon, existing on the land is the boundary line between the property of the church and that of the opponent; and that certain stone monuments found on the land do not affect the claim of the opponent. From this decision, an appeal was duly prosecuted by the applicant.
The testimonial proof is conflicting, and the trial court, after hearing the witnesses and making two ocular inspections, has decided against the applicant. We find nothing in the case which would justify us in reversing his decision. Indeed, upon a careful perusal of the evidence, we reach the same conclusion, as is stated in the opinion of the lower court, namely, that the applicant has not proven its title to the portion of land claimed by the opponent Segundo Rodrigo, with sufficient certainty to justify registration thereof in its name. If, as the appellant seems to suppose, the disputed property is now in its possession, the title will in time become indefeasible under the provisions of section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure an the application can then be renewed (Henson vs. Director of Lands and Commanding General of the Division of the Philippines, 37 Phil. Rep., 912). The proof contained in the record now before us does not in our opinion justify registration.
LOT 488 (NORZAGARAY CHURCH SITE.)
This also is an appeal of the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila from a decision of the trial court, rendered by Judge M. V. del Rosario, excluding from decree a portion of the land claimed as the church lot in Norzagaray.
Upon the foundation of the pueblo of Norzagaray in the later decades of the Spanish regime, the church appears to have acquired a parcel of land which embraced the church, convent, atrio [church yard], cemetery, and an additional portion of appurtenant glebe. It was bounded on two sides by a wall, which separates the land from the lots of adjoining owners. On the north, in front of the church and convent, a low wall separates it from the street; on the east, it is bounded by a street called Calle Calumpang, along which since the American occupation several houses of light material have sprung up. On the hearing of the application opposition was presented by Ambrosio Cruz, who claimed that the part on which the houses are erected is his property.
After hearing the evidence, and viewing the site, his honor held that all of parcel 488 should be registered in the name of the applicant, except the portion claimed by the opponent Ambrosio Cruz, as to which the court came to the conclusion that the latter was the owner, and ordered the same excluded. From the action of the court in thus excluding this portion of the lot, the applicant appealed.
Upon a careful examination of the proof relating to this appeal we are constrained to hold that the applicant's case for the registration of the entire lot 488 is made out by a preponderance of the evidence and that the opposition of Ambrosio Cruz is not sustainable. The trial judge possibly attributed to much weight to the circumstance that the stone wall running along part of the north side of the lot, instead of continuing all the way to Calle Calumpang, turned in at the point where a drainage ditch, the supposed western boundary of Ambrosio Cruz's claim, debouches into the street. From this circumstance, the court concluded that the ditch was the western boundary of the church property. The preponderance of the evidence shows that it extends on to Calle Calumpang.
The applicant's witnesses testified in effect that the entire parcel has been occupied by the church for many years before the American occupation; that prior to the revolution the side facing Calle Calumpang was bounded by a wooden fence along the street line, and at that time there were no houses on the land; that after the revolution, when the inhabitants returned to the town, several families squatted on the part now claimed by Ambrosio Cruz, some with the parish priest's previous permission. No rent was paid by these occupants to the church; but the parish priest declared the whole lot as church land for purposes of taxation.
The church appears to have acquired the entire property many years ago from the father of Ambrosio Cruz, and this circumstance has been seized upon by the latter as the basis of a pretension that he had obtained the controverted portion by inheritance. We conclude, however, that the title of Ambrosio Cruz's father was transferred to the church in the latters's lifetime, and that Ambrosio has merely availed himself of the situation created by the settling of several squatters on the property to assert a claim superior to that of the church. It will be noted that none of the present occupants appear as opponents and Ambrosio Cruz has not been accustomed to collect rent from them. Neither has he seen fit during all these years to declare the property for taxation.
Our conclusion is that the opposition is without merit and that the whole lot should be registered as church property in the name of the applicant. The decision of the lower court of January 19, 1915, must therefore be reversed in so far as it excludes the controverted portion from registration.
BUENADICHA ESTATE.
APPEAL OF SILVESTRE BALAGTAS
The Buenadicha Estate is composed of various parcels and lots, purchased by the predecessors in title of the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, and forming a mass of about 740 hectares lying within three municipalities, Pulilan and Calumpit, of Bulacan Province, and Apalit, in the Province of Pampanga. The applicant acquired its title in 1908 from one Catalino Tengco. The validity of the applicant's title to the property has not been challenged in these proceedings except as herein-below stated; and the trial court found that the documents and other proof presented clearly prove that the applicant is the owner of all of this land, with the exception of a portion consisting of about 119 hectares claimed by the government. This portion, which was excluded from registration, is a part of lot 498, and the controversy relative thereto will be considered in the next part of this opinion. We here deal with the claim of Silvestre Balagtas, who has appealed from the decision of Judge P. M. Moir, rendered September 21, 1915, dismissing his opposition to the registration of a part of parcel 495 (lot 1). There were two other opponents to the registration of parts of the same parcel whose claims were likewise dismissed by the trial court, to-wit, Domingo N. Cruz and Vicente N. Santos, and these opponents likewise appealed but no assignment of error has been made in their behalf and the appeal as to them must be considered abandoned.
Silvestre Balagtas appears in the capacity of representative of the deceased spouses Apolonio Balagtas and Maria Naragdag Cruz; and he asserts that the estate which he represents is the owner of a parcel, consisting of some 27 hectares, 83 areas, and 82 centares in the barrio of Zapang Bayan, in the municipality of Calumpit, which has been improperly included by the applicant in its petition for registration.
The principal basis of this opposition consists of a document (Exhibit 6), which is a copy of a possessory information extended in September, 1893, in favor of Mario Naragdag (the predecessor in title of the appellant Silvestre Balagtas) covering 9 parcels of land in the municipality of Calumpit. Silvestre Balagtas alleges that parcel 7 is wholly or partially included in parcel 495 of this application. The trial court rather curtly dismissed this contention by holding that the land described in Exhibit 6 is not shown to be within lot 495-a of the application. We discover no sufficient ground for doubting the propriety of this conclusion; and in our opinion Exhibit T of the applicant, properly considered, does not, as the appellant supposes, add any weight to his contention. We think, as did the trial court, that the documents exhibited by the applicant, taken in connection with other evidence adduced at the hearing, must prevail over the vague and uncertain proof submitted by this opponent. The judgment of the trial court will, therefore, be affirmed in so far as it disallows the opposition of Silvestre Balagtas.
THE ARCHBISHOP'S APPEAL.
The 740 hectares of land comprised in the Buenadicha Estate lie partly in the province of Bulacan and partly in the province of Pampanga; and, in order to secure the contemporaneous registration of the whole, two separate registration proceedings were instituted at the same time by the applicant, The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. The Director of Lands appeared and entered an opposition in both proceedings with reference to 119 hectares claimed by the municipality of Apalit, in Pampanga, as a public reservation. The land which is the subject of this opposition lies almost wholly in the limits of the municipality of Apalit, but it appears that about 7 hectares of the supposed reservation lie in the municipality of Pulilan, in the province of Bulacan.
At the hearing, the trial court sustained the opposition of the Director of Lands with respect to the 119 hectares in question, and excluded the same from registration in the name of applicant. A decision to this effect was entered in the proceeding which had been instituted in each of the provinces mentioned, and the applicant has appealed from both. It results that there are now pending in this court two causes concerned with the registration of the same reservation ( R. G. Nos. 1298 1 and 1298 2) and involving the same questions of fact and of law. Though the decision now to be made relates only to so much of the reserve as lies within the Province of Bulacan, the points to be decided will necessarily be determinative of the questions raise in the other appeal. We accordingly proceed to discuss the case relative to the title to the land covered by said reserve without regard to its location within the limits of one province or the other.
It appears in evidence that the municipality of Apalit has for a number of years claimed to be the owner of a fishery located within the limits of the Buenadicha Estate, and, in the year 1906, the municipal president of Apalit declared, for purposes of taxation, a municipal fishery with an area of 19 hectares in the barrio of Santo Rosario de Tabuyoc. In 1911, the municipal authorities caused a survey to be made covering the land which the municipality claimed. The area shown by this survey is not 19 hectares but 119 hectares, and the property purports in said survey to be located in the barrio of Malaruat, instead of in the barrio of Santo Rosario de Tabuyoc. In 1912, the applicant procured an official survey of the Buenadicha Estate to be made, and upon this plan was noted a claim of the municipality of Apalit, in Pampanga, and 7 hectares in the municipality of Pulilan, in Bulacan, or 119 hectares in all.
On February 26, 1913, the Governor-General, by his Executive Order No. 26, reserved for municipal purposes as public domain the 119 hectares, which had been previously surveyed at the instance of the municipality of Apalit. In pursuance of the order reserving said land, and in conformity with the provisions of Act No. 648, in connection with Act No. 627 of the Philippine Commission, steps were taken to bring the reserve within the operation of the last name Act; and on March 24, 1913, the judge of the Court of Land Registration issued the notice contemplated in section 2 of Act No. 648, in relation with section 3 of Act No. 627, stating that the land within the limits of the reservation had been reserved for public purposes and that all claims for private lands and interests therein within the limits stated must be presented for registration under the Land Registration Act within six months, i. e., before September 24, 1913.
In apparent response to this notification the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila filed its application for the registration of the Bulacan property affected by the reserve proceedings on July 25, 1913, and for the registration of the Pampanga property on August 5. Both applications were thus filed well within the limits of the period of six months specified in the notice issued from the Court of Land Registration in March preceding.
Upon June 23, 1914, the Court of Land Registration entered a declaration to the following effect in the reserve proceedings:
The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, by virtue of Executive Order No. 26, series of 1913, reserved for public civil purposes and withdrew from sale or settlement a parcel of land hereinafter particularly described, and on February 26, 1913, the Judge of this Court was duly notified of this Executive Order. A notice was issued by said Judge on the 24th day of March, 1913, to all persons having or claiming an interest in the land reserved, requiring them to cause to be presented to this court, within the time specified in said notice, and application for the registration of the title to the land claimed by them.
Here follows a recital of the publication of notice and of the fact that the Attorney-General had moved that the land in the reservation be declared public property. The declaration then proceeds.
It appears from an examination of the record of the above-entitled case that no application has been presented to this court for the registration of lands within the limits of the aforesaid reservation, notwithstanding the fact that the maximum period of nine months has already expired.
The land reserved in this case, as it appears in the last mentioned notice issued by the court, is described as follows:
A parcel of land situated in the barrio of Malaruat, municipality of Apalit, Province of Pampanga, Island of Luzon, P. I.
Here follows the detailed description by metes and bounds. The declaration then proceeds.
Wherefore, under the provisions of Act No. 648, in connection with section 4, Act No. 627, it is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed:
(a) That the parcel of land hereinabove described and all the interests therein within the aforesaid limits are public lands, and
(b) That all claims for private lands, buildings and interests therein within the limits of said civil reservation be, and the same are, forever barred, and the lands, buildings and interests therein are public and not private property.
The recital in this declaration to the effect that no application had been presented to the court for the registration of any land within the limits of the reservation was, as we have already seen, entirely incorrect. The mistake was apparently due to a misdescription of the property in the papers relating to the civil reserve whereby the reservation was incorrectly described as being in the barrio of Malaruat instead of in the barrio of Santo Rosario de Tabuyoc.
However this may be, the judicial declaration, decree, or whatever it may be called, was entered in the reserve proceedings, as above-stated. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila was not then represented in the Court of Land Registration in the proceedings in which the declaration in question was made; and no appeal was taken on behalf of the applicant from said decree.
The proceedings in the Court of Land Registration having been thus concluded on June 23, 1914, the Director of Lands appeared at the hearing of the two registration proceedings which are now the subject of appeal and resisted the registration of the land in the name of the applicant on the ground that the land included in the reservation is public land. To support this contention the declaration of the Court of Land Registration of June 23, 1914, in the matter of the civil reserve, is relied upon as a conclusive adjudication in favor of the government.
The Court of First Instance sustained this contention; and, although it apparently found as a fact that the municipality of Apalit had no right to more than from about 19 to 24 hectares and a fraction at most, nevertheless, the Court of Land Registration having decreed 119 hectares, this action was decisive and the applicant's right was destroyed. The propriety of this decision must now be determined.
The Act under which the reservation in question was created is No. 648 of the Philippine Commission. The first section of this Act — now incorporate in subsection (d) of section 64 of the Administrative Code (1917) — gives the Governor-General the authority to reserve land of the public domain from settlement or public sale; and the second section of Act No. 648 provides a means whereby private parties having an interest in any land within the limits of the reserve may be required to apply for registration of their claims in conformity with the provisions of the Land Registration Act. To this end the provision in question adopts the procedure describe in sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 of Act No. 627.
The last named Act relates to military reservations and land which the United States Government may desire to acquire in the Philippine Islands for military purposes. Its title is as follows:
An Act to bring immediately under the operation of the Land Registration Act all lands lying within the boundaries lawfully set apart for military reservations and all lands desired to be purchased by the Government of the United States for military purposes.
Sections 1 and 2 of this Act are as follows:
SECTION 1. All lands or buildings, or any interest therein, within the Philippine Islands lying within the boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be military reservations shall be forthwith brought under the operations of the Land Registration Act, and such of said lands, and interests therein as shall not be determined to be public lands shall become registered land in accordance with the provisions of said the Land Registration Act, under the circumstances hereinafter stated.
SEC. 2. Whenever the Commanding General of the United States Army, Division of the Philippines, shall certify to the Civil Governor that all public lands within limits by him described in the Philippine Islands have been reserved by the President of the United States for military purposes, and are lawfully announced and declared military reservations, it is hereby made the duty of the Civil Governor in writing to notify the judge of the Court of Land Registration that such public lands have been reserved for military purposes and announced and declared to be military reservations, and that all private lands, buildings, or interests therein, within the limits described, ought forthwith to be brought within the operation of the Land Registration Act, and to become registered land within the meaning of said the Land Registration Act.
Section 3 Provides that immediately upon receipt of notice from the Governor-General it becomes the duty of the Court of Land Registration to issue a notice announcing and declaring "that claims for all private lands, buildings, and interests therein within the limits aforesaid, must be presented for registration under the Land Registration Act within six calendar months from the date of issuing the notice, and that all lands, buildings, and interests therein within the limits aforesaid not so presented within the time therein limited will be conclusively adjudged to be public lands, and all claims on the part of private individuals for such lands, buildings, or an interest therein not so presented will be forever barred."
Section 4, in the part here material to be quoted, provides as follows:
All claims for private lands, buildings, and interests therein within the limits of such military reservation not presented to the Court of Land Registration within six months from the date of the notice in the previous section provided, shall be forever barred, and the lands, buildings, and interests therein shall be deemed to be public and not private property.
Section 5, which is the section regulating the procedure, provides as follows:
Upon the filing of claims and applications for registration in the Court of Land Registration, the same procedure shall be adopted as is by the Land Registration Act provided for other claims and applications; but in case of all claims and applications which are finally dismissed, the judgments shall be that the lands embraced therein are public lands unless the same shall be included within other claims or applications which are favorably acted upon by the court. It shall be the duty of the court to expedite proceedings under this Act, and give to them precedence over other claims for registration under the Land Registration Act shall be applicable to proceedings, under this Act.
Upon examination of the parts of Act No. 627 above quote, it will be noted that, judging from the title of the Act an the broad language used in section 1, the apparent intention of the Legislature was that all of the land in a reservation should be registered in conformity with the provisions of the Land Registration Law. If this were true, the effect of applying the provisions of the Act to any reservation would be (1) that the Government would acquire a Torrens title to so much of the land as is not included in valid claims presented by other persons and (2) that any person submitting a claim to any of the land within the period allowed by law would acquire a Torrens title t so much as should be adjudicated in his favor.
This inference is, however, shown to be incorrect by subsequent provisions of the Act, notably by section 3, which clearly reveals a different idea, namely, that the only part of the reservation for which a Torrens title is to be secured is that which may be registered in the names of persons presenting their claims within the prescribed period. As regards the part not so claimed, and which remains public domain, no Torrens title is, or can be, issued in favor of the government. As to this the most the court can do is to make a pronouncement to the effect that the land is public land and that persons having an interest therein who have not presente their claims within the prescribed time are barred.
It will thus be seen that Act No. 627 contemplates a sort of cadastral proceeding wherein private owners may be forced to come in and register their titles, under penalty of forfeiture of all right in the land included in the reservation in case they fail to act. The validity of a law of this character can not be questioned; and this court has uniformly upheld the Act now under consideration. (Jose vs. Commander of the Philippine Squadron of the United States Navy, 16 Phil. Rep., 62; Lagariza vs. Commanding General of the Division of the Philippines, 22 Phil. Rep., 297.)
Inasmuch as Act No. 627 provides a method whereby the owner of property may be effectually deprived thereof, it follows that, in order to accomplish such result, the provisions of the law must be strictly pursued and should not be extended beyond the express terms of the statute. Now, the operative fact which this law contemplates as the ground for barring a person's right to land in a public reservation is the failure of the owner, after notice given, to apply for the registration of his property; and we are of the opinion that where he applies for the registration of the property within the time allowed by law, his right must be determined in the registration proceeding and that he cannot be prejudiced by an declaration made by the court in the reserve proceedings ignoring his rights. It is not the judicial declaration in the reserve proceedings, or proclamation — for it is really nothing more than a proclamation promulgated through the court — which deprives the owner of his property, but his failure to apply for the registration of his property.
Indeed the entire action of the court in these reserve proceedings — as distinguished from the registration proceedings which may spring therefrom — would appear to partake of an administrative rather than of a judicial character. The Governor-General notifies the court of the action taken in establishing the reservation. The court thereupon proceeds to issue the required notice, and informs all persons who may be interested in the property that they may take the steps necessary to protect themselves. In the end, the court may, we assume, do what was done in this case, that is, declare that the land contained in the reservation is adjudged to be public land and that all private claims thereto are barred. Such a declaration cannot, in our opinion, in any wise adversely affect the rights of any person who has complied with the condition named in the law as essential to his protection.
We have said above that we assume that the court may properly in the end make a declaration that the land within the reservation, not made the subject or registration proceedings, is adjudged to be public land. A close examination of the statute shows that this assumption goes somewhat beyond the letter of the statute, and it may be that such declaration is in fact uncalled for and wholly superfluous. If so, of course, be without judicial force.
In this connection it must be admitted that the language of the notice prescribed in section 3 of Act No. 627 seems to contemplate that the land in the reservation not claimed by private owners will be adjudged to be public land. Similar words are found in section 7, relative to land which the military authorities wish to acquire by purchase. But there is no provision in the Act which expressly requires the court to make, in the reserve proceedings, any final judicial declaration or decree whatever. Upon this point one should not be misled by what is contained in section 5. The proceedings there mentioned have reference exclusively to what is done in the registration proceedings instituted by private persons pursuant to notice and which spring out of the reserve proceedings, not to what is or may be done in the latter proceedings. It is, however, in our opinion unimportant whether the entering of a final judicial declaration in the reserve proceeding is authorized or unauthorized; for whatever its character, it cannot operate to deprive a person of his property who has complied with the statutory condition requisite to protect it.
It should be noted that Act No. 627 does not contemplate or authorize the filing of an opposition in a reserve proceeding. The proper procedure is for the person concerned to file an original application to register under the provisions of the Land Registration Law, as was done in this case. The trial judge was, therefore, in error in supposing, as he did, that the party interested should not only apply for registration but should also enter active opposition in the reserve proceedings. As correctly observed by the Attorney-General, in the brief filed for the government in this appeal, the statute treats the application for registration as the equivalent of an opposition. The contentious litigation is conducted in the registration proceeding, not in the reserve proceeding; and it will be observed that the appeal conceded in the closing words of section 5 is an appeal to be taken in the registration proceedings.
From what has been said it follows that the action of the trial court in sustaining the opposition of the Director of Lands to the registration of 119 hectares in the civil reserve created under Executive Order No. 26 (of 1913) must be reversed; and the cause will be remanded in order that the Court of First Instance may determine whether the applicant has proved a goo title to any part or all of the reservation lying within the confines of the province of Bulacan an may enter a decree accordingly.
DISPOSITION OF THE SEVERAL APPEALS.
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs, against the appellant, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, as regards parcels 16, 18, 38, and 39, the registration of which was refused in the decision of March 31, 1915. The judgment of the lower court is also affirmed, with costs, against the same appellant as regards the land affected by the opposition of Segundo Rodrigo in the decision of June 23, 1915. The decision as to Lot No. 488 (the Norzagaray Church Site), entered on January 19, 1915, is reversed, but without costs, in so far as it excludes the portion of land claimed by Ambrosio Cruz from registration; and it is ordered that the entire church site be registered in the name of the applicant, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. The judgment of September 21, 1915, is affirmed in so far as it disallows the opposition of Silvestre Balagtas, Domingo N. Cruz, and Vicente Santos, with one-fifth part of the costs of this appeal against Silvestre Balagtas. The judgment of September 21, 1915, is reversed in so far as relates to the land contained in the civil reserve hereinbefore mentioned, but without any express adjudication of costs; and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Malcolm and Fisher, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 This same case.
2 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Reyes et al., decided November 7, 1918, not published.
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