G.R. No. L-12590




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-12590 March 30, 1917 TAN PUY, plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, defendant-appellee. Williams, Ferrier & SyCip for appellant. No appearance for appellee. MORELAND, J.: Two Chinese subjects, Tan Tek and Tan Un, sought permission to enter the Philippine Islands. They were refused admission by the customs authorities. They thereupon proceeded in habeas corpus before the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila where they were again defeated in the attempt to obtain entry. An appeal was taken from the decision of the Court of First Instance. Application is now made to this court for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain bail during the time required to present the appeal to this court and to obtain a decision thereon. We believe the question has already been decided by this court adversely to the contention of the applicant. In the case of Collector of Customs vs. Harvey and Co Puy (34 Phil. Rep., 503), the question for determination, as stated by the courts, was "whether or not a Chinese alien, who is seeking admission into territory of the Philippine Islands under the Chinese exclusion laws, is entitled to bail during the pendency of his appeal after it has been decided that he is not entitled to enter the territory of the United States." In deciding that question the court said "Upon that question we have an express provision of law. Section 5 of the Act of Congress of May 5, 1892 (27 Statutes at Large, page 25) provides: "That after the passage of this Act on an application to any judge or court of the United States in the first instance for a writ of habeas corpus, by a Chinese person seeking to land in the United States, to whom that privilege has been denied, no bail shall be allowed, and such application shall be heard and determined promptly without unnecessary delay." It would seem clear, therefore, that bail is prohibited to Chinese persons seeking to land in the United States to whom that privilege has been denied. If the law prohibits bail, then the courts are without jurisdiction to grant it. While that case had to do with the power of the Court of First Instance to grant bail pending the appeal to the Supreme Court, the principles governing that case, as enunciated by the court, are sufficiently broad to compel a like decision in the present case, unless we limit them severely in their application. Some suggestion has been made that the words "in the first instance," found in section 5 of the Act of Congress of May 5, 1892, furnish an opportunity for a distinction between the case cited and the present case, it being asserted that bail is prohibited by the statute only when application is made to any judge or court of the United States in the first instance; and that, consequently, the prohibition does not extend to an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance to the Supreme Court, such appeal being considered as a second instance. Such being the case it is argued that, while the Court of First Instance may be prohibited from issuing a writ of habeas corpus under the circumstances named in the statute, the Supreme Court is not thus prohibited as it acts not in the first instance but in the second instance. We do not believe that such a distinction can properly be made. It should be observed that the only remedy of a Chinese person or person of Chinese descent who has been refused admission to the Philippine Islands by the Customs authorities is a proceeding in habeas corpus under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure or of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But it should be observed that there is nothing to prevent the immigrant from making his application for the writ of habeas corpus to the Supreme Court or a judge thereof instead of the Court of First Instance. Indeed, section 526 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof in term time or in vacation and if so granted it shall be enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. Now, if the prohibition of the Act of Congress applies to a proceeding in habeas corpus in the first instance only why should it not apply to the Supreme Court or to a judge thereof when the application for the writ is made to the court or a judge thereof in the first instance? It would appear inevitable that the prohibition of the statute would apply to the Supreme Court or to a judge thereof in the same manner as it applies to the Court of First Instance or a judge thereof when they are both operating in the first instance, under the same authority, and under the same procedure. But is there any reason why it should be held that the Supreme Court is prohibited from granting bail when it operates in a proceeding for habeas corpus in the first instance and not be prohibited when it acts in the second instance, or as an appellate tribunal? The matter of time could not have been the controlling consideration when Congress passed the Act referred to; for, if the parties insist upon it, it is the duty of all courts of the Philippine Islands, whether the Supreme Court or the Court of First Instance, whether upon appeal or upon original application, to take cognizance of and hear proceedings in habeas corpus and to dispatch them with the greatest promptitude. So that an alien may secure a decision from the Supreme Court as quickly as from a Court of First Instance. We can well understand the reason for the prohibition. It would mean a great burden upon the officials of the Government charged with the administration of the Chinese exclusion laws to permit large numbers of Chinese persons seeking admission to the Philippine Islands to enter the Islands and scatter broadcast. If this were permitted complications of importance might arise. Marriages might occur between such applicants and native citizens and children might be born. Great hardships might thus result to innocent persons and social questions might develop which would plague the officials of the Government in the administration of its affairs. Upon the whole we do not feel like declaring that the principle upon which the Co Puy case is decided was wrong or that its application ought to be severely limited. The application is denied, with costs. So ordered. Arellano, C.J., Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur. Separate Opinions CARSON, J., dissenting: I dissent. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation