Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8373 October 15, 1915
KUENZLE & STREIFF, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for appellant.
Hartford Beaumont for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
From the facts it appears that the plaintiff imported certain goods, wares, and merchandise into the Philippine Islands. The Collector of Customs appraised said merchandise and imposed a duty thereon. A protest against the appraisement and valuation was presented by the plaintiff, through its alleged agent. Upon a consideration of the protest, the Insular Collector of Customs denied the same for the reason that it was not signed by the owner, importer, consignee, or agent of the merchandise, or by the duly authorized agent of either of such persons, as required by section 286 of Act No. 355 and by Customs Administrative Circular No. 652.
Against the denial of the protest, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of First Instance. Upon a consideration of the question, the Honorable Charles S. Lobingier, judge, reached the conclusion that the protest had been made by the agent of the plaintiff, in accordance with section 286 of Act No. 355 and Customs Administrative Circular No. 652, and held that the overruling of the protest was not tenable.
The facts in the present case are as follows:
First. That sometime prior to the 6th day of January, 1912, the plaintiff brought into the Philippine Islands certain merchandise.
Second. That the Collector of Customs at the port of Manila appraised said merchandise and fixed its value, for the purpose of collecting the duty thereon.
Third. That on the 6th day of January, 1912, the plaintiff, in a letter to Hartford Beaumont, requested him to file a protest in their behalf with the Collector of Customs, against the appraisement of the merchandise in question.
Fourth. That on the 17th of January, 1912, Hartford Beaumont presented a protest in the following form:
INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS,
Manila, P.I.
SIR: I have to protest against the 5 per cent increase in value made by the appraiser on the goods covered by the entry below identified. This addition is not warranted by the law and the goods should have been passed at the invoice figures without any increase thereon.
Respectfully submitted.
(Signed) KUENZLE & STREIFF,
Importer.
Per HARTFORD BEAUMONT
Fifth. Later, on January 25, the plaintiff wrote a letter to the Collector of Customs, which is as follows:
SIR: We have the honor to inform you that Mr. Hartford Beaumont is authorized to sign all protests and appeals filed with the custom house in our name.
Very respectfully,
KUENZLE & STREIFF, LTD.
By PAUL HUBE, General Manager.
Upon the foregoing facts, the Collector of Customs rendered the following decisions, on the 14th of March, 1992:
This protest is denied for the reason that it is not signed by the owner, importer, consignee, or agent of the merchandise, or by the duly authorized agent of either of such persons, as required by section 286 of Act No. 355, and by Customs Administrative Circular No. 652.
Protest No. 9066 is therefore for the foregoing reasons overruled and denied.
(Signed) H.B. McCOY,
Insular Collector of Customs.
From the decision of the lower court, holding that Hartford Beaumont was the agent of Kuenzle & Streiff, and had entered said protest as such agent, the Collector of Customs appealed to this court, and assigned as error that the lower court committed an error in revoking the decision of the Collector of Customs.
The only question presented is whether or not Hartford Beaumont was the agent of the plaintiff within the meaning of section 286 of Act No. 355, in relation with Customs Administrative Circular No. 652.lawphil.net
From the letter of January 25, above cited, by the plaintiffs to the Collector of Customs, they expressly informed the latter that Beaumont was authorized to sign all protests and appeals filed in the customhouse in their name. There is nothing in section 286 of Act No. 355, nor in Customs Administrative Circular No. 652, which requires that the agent named in said Act shall be appointed with any particular formality. In the absence of such requirement, it would seem that the principal might appoint his agent in any form which might suit his convenience or that of the agent. Circular No. 652 does require that the protest shall be signed in the name of the person, or by his duly authorized agent or broker, in accord with the power of attorney duly filed and recorded in the office of the Collector of Customs, etc. It would seem that, for the purpose of said Custom Administrative Act it would be sufficient if the appointment of the agent clearly indicates that the person so appointed is the agent, with the necessary powers. There is no suggestion in said circular that the authority of the agent should be acknowledged before a notary public. The letter of January 25, above-cited, was delivered to the Collector of Customs before his decision denying the protest upon the ground that Beaumont was not the agent of the plaintiff. Said letter would seem to have been sufficient for the appointment of Beaumont as agent and a sufficient compliance with said Act and the administrative circular. We find no reason sufficient to justify a modification or reversal of the judgment of the lower court. The same is therefore hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
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