Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 10202 September 29, 1914
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, at the instance of the municipality of Cardona, represented by it municipal council, plaintiff,
vs.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN, represented by its municipal council, and L.R. BROWN, defendants.
Modesto Reyes and Eliseo Yamson for the municipality of Cardona.
Office of the Solicitor-General Cusor for defendant L. R. Brown.
No appearance for the other defendant.
MORELAND, J.:
The complaint in this action styled by the plaintiffs themselves as a "complaint in an action of quo warranto."
The plaintiff allege that the municipality of Cardona, Province of Rizal, is a municipal corporation containing within its confines the barrios of Tatala, Balatik, Nambug, Tutulo, Mahabang Parang, Nagsulo, Sampad, and Bonot; that Binangonan is a municipal corporation of the Province of Rizal, which is now exercising or pretending to exercise jurisdiction over the said barrios of Tatala, Balatik, Nambug, Tutulo, Mahabang Parang, Nagsulo, Sampad, and Bonot, although said barrios are not politically within the confines or limits of the said municipality of Binangonan, "thereby usurping the powers and jurisdiction of the municipal council of Cardona within whose limits said barrios are located;" that the defendant L. R. Brown is a district engineer in the Province of Rizal and that he is about to destroy and remove the ancient monuments which mark the limits of the municipality of Binangonan, Province of Rizal, and is now about to construct new monuments in place of the old, but locating them in such manner that the barrios above named will be excluded within those of Binangonan.
The plaintiffs further allege that the power of organizing municipalities and of fixing their territorial limits resides exclusively in the Legislature, having been placed there by the Philippine bill, and that the Legislature has not passed any law or given any authorization to any corporation or person to separate said barrios from the municipality of Cardona and incorporate them in that of Binangonan; that the only authority which the said municipality of Binangonan and the said engineer assert for the changing of the limits of the said municipalities is an Executive Order, No. 66, series of 1914, issued by the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, authorizing and directing that said limits be changed in the manner in which the defendants are now attempting to change them.
The plaintiffs further allege that the Philippine Bill does not authorize the Governor-General or the Legislature to delegate to any person or corporation the power to change the territorial limits of municipalities and that Act No. 1748, under which the said executive order was issued, is therefore, unconstitutional, the Legislature having in that Act attempted to delegate its power to the Governor-General of the Islands; that said executive order is, in effect, an amendment and repeal of the general laws of the Islands organizing provinces and municipalities and fixing their respective limits, and is, therefore, void and of no effect.
The plaintiffs further allege that, aside from being violative of the Philippine Bill, said order does not comply with Act No. 1748 referred to because it does not affirmatively set forth that it is made for the public benefit, as required by section 1 of said Act.
Upon these allegations plaintiffs pray "that judgment be rendered in their favor declaring the municipality of Binangonan an illegal usurper of the powers, faculties, and duties of the municipality of Cardona with respect to the barrios of Tatala, Balatik, Nambug, Tutulo, Mahabang Parang, Nagsulo, Sampad and Bonot; and that the court issue, pending trial, a preliminary injunction against the defendant L.R. Brown, district engineer of the Province of Rizal, ordering him to abstain until the further order of this court from destroying the ancient monuments which mark the municipal limits of Binangonan and Cardona and constructing others in their stead."
The complaint is signed by Modesto Reyes and Eliseo Yamson, "attorneys for the municipality of Cardona." As showing their authority to appear for the government of the Philippine Islands, which is also a nominal plaintiff, the plaintiffs in this case allege "that on the 19th of August, 1914, the undersigned, in the name and representation of the municipality of Cardona, directed a communication to the Honorable Attorney-General asking him to begin the present action of quo warranto, but that said Honorable Attorney-General refused and still refuses to do so."
The only point which we undertake at this moment to decide is whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction upon the facts stated.
Under section 166 of the Code of Civil Procedure one of the conditions precedent to the issuance of a preliminary injunction is that "the complaint must be verified by the oath of the plaintiff or by that of some other person by him duly authorized and who can testify to the truth of the facts set forth in the complaint," in which the action is pending a written obligation on the part of the plaintiff, with sufficient sureties, to the effect that the plaintiff will pay to the party enjoined all such damages as such party may sustain by reason of the injunction, if the court should finally decide that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto." It is provided by section 164 of said code that:
A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established in the manner hereinafter provided, to the satisfaction of the judge granting it:
1. That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of either for a limited period or perpetually;
2. That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the plaintiff;
3. That the defendant is doing, or threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
A simple reading of the complaint and the record will demonstrate that the plaintiffs have not met the requirements of these sections. While we do not examine into the sufficiency of the complaint where no preliminary relief is prayed for, leaving that matter to be brought to our attention by defendant, we do take into consideration the sufficiency of the complaint in respect of the remedy prayed for when we are asked to issue a preliminary injunction. The Code of Civil Procedure, as we have seen, expressly lays that duty upon us; and, under said code, we are not permitted to issue a preliminary injunction unless the facts set out in the complaint show that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for, and it appears that all the other requirements named in the code are fully complied with.
This action is not properly one of quo warranto and the court has no authority under the facts stated to "declare the municipality of Binangonan an illegal usurper of the powers, faculties, and duties of the municipality of Cardona with respect to the barrios of Tatala, Balatik, Nambug, Tutulo, Mahabang Parang, Nagsulo, Sampad, and Bonot." The facts alleged do not bring the case within the provisions of section 197 and following sections of the Code of Civil Procedure which deal with the action of quo warranto. It is not a case where a person has usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public civil office or a franchise within the Philippine Islands, or an office in a corporation created by the authority of the Government of the Philippine Islands, or a case where a public civil official commits or suffers an act which by the provisions of law works a forfeiture of his office, or where a body of persons act as a corporation within the Philippine Islands without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act. The action is not against a corporation founded upon the fact that it has offended against a provision of a statute relative to its creation or renewal, or which alters or amends the same, that it has forfeited its privileges and franchise by non-user, or has committed an act which amounts to a surrender of its corporate rights, privileges, or franchise, or that it has misused a franchise, privilege, or right conferred upon it by law, or that it has exercised a franchise, privilege, or right in contravention of law. The case at bar seems to be, so far as the allegations of the complaint are concerned, an attempt on the part of the defendant to move the boundary lines between two municipalities in such a way as apparently to increase the territory of one and decrease that of the other. If this attempt is illegal, then an action permanently to restrain the effort would perhaps be one of the remedies which plaintiff might revoke; but the action of quo warranto is wholly unfitted to meet the exigencies of the case set forth. It relates solely to persons who usurp, intrude into, or unlawfully hold or exercise a public office or who do or suffer an act which by the provisions of law works a forfeiture of their office. In other words, it applies exclusively to persons who have no title to the office which they pretend to hold and the functions which they assume to exercise. It does not apply to persons who, having a legal title to an office, exercise the functions of that office beyond their proper limits or exceed the power and jurisdiction which is conferred upon that office by law. In the case before us no allegation of usurpation is made which is supported by any fact stated in the petition.
While the action of quo warranto may also be begun against corporation, it is upon the same terms and for the same reasons which authorize it against persons. The corporation must act without being legally incorporated or it must have offended against some provision of law in such a manner as to forfeit its privileges and franchise, or it must have surrendered its corporate rights, privileges, or franchise. In a word, before the action can be begun against either a person or a corporation, it must appear that such person or corporation has no title to the office the functions of which he or it seeks to exercise.
While the defendant municipality may not have legal authority to exercise jurisdiction over the barrios named in the complaint as having been transferred from the plaintiff to the defendant municipality, it is nevertheless admitted that it is a municipal corporation with the power and authority to exercise municipal prerogatives. The fact that it may have attempted to exercise jurisdiction over a strip of territory beyond its limits will not warrant an action of quo warranto, which, under the code, is founded upon the usurpation of an office or franchise.
The motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.
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