Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8187 January 29, 1913
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PANGLIMA INDANAN, defendant-appellant.
Leo T. Gibbons, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
An appeal from a judgment convicting the appellant of the crime of murder, and sentencing him to be hanged.
The accused was at the time of the commission of the crime, the headman of Parang. He is alleged to have committed the murder by inducement. The proofs tend to demonstrate that on the 24th day of March, 1912, the accused sent Induk to bring to the house of the accused one Sariol. The following day, Induk, in obedience to the orders, brought Sariol to the house, whereupon the accused ordered the witnesses, Akiran and Suhuri, to tie Sariol. They obeyed the order in the presence of the accused, who was at the time lying upon a bed in the room. This was about 4:30 in the afternoon. Sariol remained there with his hands tied behind his back until night, when the accused, in the presence of several witnesses, ordered Sariol to be taken to the Chinese cemetery and there killed, the accused asserting at the time that he had an order to that effect from the governor. He gave strict orders to Akiran that he should be present at the time that Sariol was killed, and that he should aid in killing him. To make sure of the work being well done, the accused ordered Akiran to take his (the accused's) bolo with which to assist in the killing. Sariol was taken to the cemetery, in an isolated spot a considerable distance from the road and about 200 yards from the nearest house, and there killed. Kalyakan struck the first blow with his bolo, while Akiran joined in and assisted thereafter. The deceased at the time he was killed had his hands tied behind his back. On returning to the house of the accused after the death of Sariol, Unding told the accused that Sariol had been killed, whereupon the accused said that it was all right and appeared to be very much pleased.
The proofs demonstrate beyond question that the accused was the recognized headman of Parang, and it appears from the testimony of the witnesses, Kalyakan, Suhuri, and Akiran, that he had a very powerful influence over them, hence this power over them was such that any order issued by him had the force and efficacy of physical coercion. One of the witnesses testified: "He (the accused) knows what is good and what is bad, and he is the headman of the governor. He is headman of Parang." And in answer to the question, "He is the biggest chief in the Parang ward?" replied: "There is none, only himself." He further said: "The people do not hesitate to take his orders because he is the headman of the governor." Later, in reply to the question, "If he were to get angry with the people, what would he do to them?" this witnesses answered: "I do not know; might kill them." Another witness, answering the question as to why he did not run away instead of going to the Chinese cemetery as the accused ordered him, answered: "The reason why I did not run away, well, take the same thing as the Government soldiers. They are told to do a thing and they do it." Prior to this time the same witness had said: "If a chief says anything to a man like me and tells me it is by order of the governor and that he has a warrant there, well, a man like me does what he tells me." Another witness declared: "I am afraid of him. I did not believe that he would make me do anything unjust." The same witness afterwards testified in answer to the question: "Would you have killed this man if any other person besides Panglima, the headman, had ordered you to ?" "I would not." Another witness declared: "Well, he was the headman. It was the headman's orders, and if we did not do it, he would get angry with us." This witness, answering the question, "Did Panglima make you think that he was acting under the orders of the Government in causing this man to be killed?" testified: "He said, 'I have a warrant here.' To the question, "And you thought that it was a legal execution, did you?" answered, "Yes, because he (the accused) is not afraid of the governor."
We are of the opinion that the domination of the accused over the persons who, at his orders, killed the deceased was such as to make him responsible for whatever they did in obedience to such orders.
Article 13, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code declares those to be principals in a crime "who directly force or induce others to commit it."
Commenting upon this paragraph, Viada says:
They force another to commit a crime who physically by actual force or grave fear, for example, with a pistol in hand or by any other threatening means, oblige another to commit the crime. In our commentary on paragraph 9 of article 8 (page 28), we have already said that he who suffers violence acts without will and against his will, is no more than an instrument, and therefore is guilty of no wrong. The real culprits in such case, the only guilty persons, are those who use the violence, those who force the other to commit the crime.
One is induced directly to commit a crime either by command, or for a consideration, or by any other similar act which constitutes the real and moving cause of the crime and which was done for the purpose of inducing such criminal act and was sufficient for that purpose. We have already seen in our commentary on paragraph 12 of article 8 that the one who physically commits the crime may escape criminal responsibility by showing that he acted with due obedience to an order; in such case the criminal responsibility falls entirely upon the one who orders, that is, upon him who by his commands has directly induced the other to commit the act. But in case the obedience of the inferior is not due to the superior and therefore not necessary, and does not, therefore, exempt him from criminal responsibility as the physical author of the crime, he who thus, by his command, directly induced him to the criminal act is considered by the law also as principal in the crime.
The pacto by virtue of which one purchases for a consideration the hand which commits the crime makes him who gives, promises, or offers the consideration the principal in the crime by direct inducement, because without such offer or promise the criminal act would never have been committed. But this does not mean that the one who actually commits the crime by reason of such promise, remuneration or reward is exempted from criminal responsibility; on the contrary, we have already seen in our comments on paragraph 3 of article 10 that such circumstance constitutes an aggravation of his crime.
We have heretofore said that in addition to the precepto and the pacto there are similar means by which another may be induced to commit a crime which also make the one who offers the inducement the principal in the crime by virtue of the provisions of article 13, paragraph 2. But it must be borne in mind that these acts of inducement do not consist in simple advice or counsel given before the act is committed, or in simple words uttered at the time the act was committed. Such advice and such words constitute undoubtedly an evil act, an inducement condemned by the moral law; but in order that, under the provisions of the Code, such act can be considered direct inducement, it is necessary that such advice or such words have a great dominance and great influence over the person who acts; it is necessary that they be as direct, as efficacious, as powerful as physical or moral coercion or as violence itself.
The following decisions of the supreme court of Spain illustrate the principles involved and their application to particular cases:
It was held by that court on the 14th day of April, 1871, that one who, during a riot in which a person was killed, said to one of the combatants, "Stab him! Stab him!", it not appearing that he did anything more than say these words except to be present at the fight, was not guilty of the crime of homicide by inducement, the court saying that, "considering that, although the phrases pronounced were imprudent and even culpable, they were not so to the extent that they may be considered the principal and moving cause of the effect produced; direct inducement cannot be inferred from such phrases, as inducement must precede the act induced and must be so influential in producing the criminal act that without it the act would not have been performed."
In a decision rendered on the 10th of July, 1877, the principle was laid down that "a person who advised a married woman whose husband was very stingy and treated her badly that the only thing for her to do was to rob him, was not guilty of the crime of robbery by inducement, for the reason that imprudent and ill-conceived advice is not sufficient."
In a decision of the 22nd of December, 1883, it was held that a father who simply said to his son who was at the time engaged in combat with another, "Hit him! Hit him!", was not responsible for the injuries committed after such advice was given, under the facts presented. The court said: "It being held in mind that the inducement to the commission of the crime by means of which a person may be considered a principal in the same manner as he who executes the act itself can only be founded in commands, sometimes in advice, in considerations, or by inducement so powerful that it alone produces the criminal act. None of these characteristics pertain to the words of Miguel Perez, inasmuch as the circumstances which surrounded the event at the time do not appear in sufficient detail to show with clearness the effects which the words produced, or the relative situation of the deceased and of the one who killed him, or the point to which the fight had progressed at the time the words were spoken. Moreover, the decision of the court below does not show sufficient facts upon which to affirm that Miguel foresaw the use of the firearm on the part of his son when he spoke the words referred to, or, for that reason, that he thereby induced him to use said weapon."
In a decision of the 19th of December, 1896, the court held that the fact "of having proposed to other persons the abstraction of the tickets which were the subject matter of the robbery, at the same time telling them the place where they were to be found, does not constitute inducement to commit the robbery because the proposal to commit the robbery was not sufficiently efficacious to be the cause of the crime, as the crime, under the facts, could have been committed without it; nor was the indication of the place where the money was to be found a sufficient motive to induce the robbery."
The foregoing decisions have been presented for the purpose of showing concrete cases in which the acts of the accused were not sufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute inducement. They not only lay down the legal principles which govern in prosecutions of this character, but they also illustrate in the most valuable way the application of those principles to actual cases.
The following decisions of the same court present instances in which the acts of the accused constitute inducement under the law and illustrate the application of the principles to concrete cases.
In a decision of the 14th of April, 1871, the facts as stated by the court were: "It appeared that Lulu, who was living with Joe and Zozo (a married couple) in the town of X, gave birth to a child on the morning of the 28th of March, the offspring of her illicit relations with William. It had been previously agreed upon by the first three named to deliver the child to William as soon as it was born, with instructions to deposit it in some frequented place so that it might be found and taken up; but Joe changed his mind and handed the child over to the father, telling him, 'Here is your child, do with it whatever you please; throw it into the sea if you choose to,' which the latter actually did." Under the facts the accused was held guilty by inducement.
In a judgment pronounced on the 22nd of January, 1873, it was held that "a woman who, living with a man in scandalous concubinage in the presence of a daughter who continually manifested her disgust and repugnance for such conduct, conceived against the daughter the most profound hatred and conceived the purpose of killing her by most insidious methods, obtaining for that purpose poison and various deadly weapons, and contriving that she and her family and all of the tenants in the house should go to the theater on an evening during which the daughter was sick and obliged to remain at home, in order that her lover might be entirely undisturbed in killing the daughter and that he might not be surprised in the act, such woman is the author and principal of the crime the same as her lover who actually committed the deed."
In a decision of the 6th of July, 1881, the court held that "one who takes advantage of his position as an inspector for the maintenance of public peace and proposes to a private citizen the perpetration of a robbery, with the threat that unless he did commit the robbery he would be arrested as an escaped prisoner, at the same time offering to withdraw the officers from the vicinity of the place to be robbed, and who after the robbery received a part of the booty, was guilty of the crime as principal, although he did not take personal part therein."
In a decision of the 12th of April, 1882, it was said that "an alcalde of a barrio who, accompanied by a number of peace officers, ordered them to stop certain music that was being played in the public street, and after the order had been obeyed and the music stopped one of the persons expressed his resentment against the act whereupon the alcalde ordered the peace officers to attack the man, which they did, inflicting upon him various wounds, was guilty of the crime of lesiones graves by inducement."
In a decision of the 21st of June, 1882, it was stated that "a father who from the balcony of his house cried out in a loud voice to his sons who were fighting with others to kill those with whom they were fighting before they were killed themselves, because they might as well go to jail for a big thing as a little, was guilty of the crime of lesiones graves by inducement by reason of the injuries inflicted under such orders."
In a decision of the 22nd day of December, 1883, the court said, "that the inducement and the commission of a crime whereby the inducer becomes a principal to the same extent and effect as if he had physically committed the crime exist merely in acts of command, sometimes of advice, or agreement for a consideration, or through influence so effective that it alone determines the commission of the crime."
In a decision of the 11th of November, 1884, the court laid down the proposition that the secretary of the ayuntamiento who induced a certain persons to form new lists of compromisarios five days prior to the election of senators was guilty as principal of the crime against the election lists, saying: "It appearing and it being a fact proved that the secretary of the ayuntamiento of Jalom, Miguel Antonio Dura, induced the members of the council to commit the act stated, his participation as principal in the commission of the act is well established according to the provisions of paragraph 2, article 13, of the Penal Code, because such inducement coming from a person of such influence as the secretary of the ayuntamiento in a small village must be considered sufficiently dominant to turn the mind of those induced."
In a decision rendered on the 28th of December, 1886, it was held that a woman who was at enmity with an uncle for having refused to renounce in her favor a donation which a relative had given to him, who made frequent threats to kill the uncle and who finally offered a third person a certain sum of money together with the land involved in the donation if he would kill the uncle, and who told her son that, if they were unable to get anybody else to kill the uncle, he must do it himself as he would thus inherit 15,000 pesetas with which they could flee abroad, and in case he refused to do it he must leave the house because he was a coward, was guilty as principal of the crime of murder committed by the son under such inducement. The court said: "It being borne in mind that the suggestions with which the mother moved the mind of her son to kill the uncle had the force of a real inducement and inclined and decided the will of the son by means of the relations which she bore to him as well as the reward which she held up before him."
In a decision of the 26th of January, 1888, it was held that finding as principal in a crime, him who, "by direct and influential means and taking advantage of the inexperience of a boy of tender age," induces him to commit a crime, was warranted by law, the court saying that "in view of the fact that the inducement exercised by Juan Santiso with regard to the boy, Ramon Carballo, to steal the jewels in question from his grandmother's house shows such a direct and inducing cause of the criminal act that without such inducement the crime would not have been committed."
In a decision of the 9th of April, 1882, the court held "that the inducement referred to in paragraph 2, article 13, of the Penal Code exists whenever the act performed by the physical author of the crime is determined by the influence of the inducer over the mind of him who commits the act, whatever be the source of such influence."
In a decision of the 3rd of February, 1897, it was declared that one was the "principal by inducement in five different larcenies, it having been proved that the inducer, knowing that the oil which was brought to her for sale was stolen by the persons who were seeking to sell it to her, advised them thereupon to continue stealing oil and furnished them vessels in which to carry it and contributed on five different occasions to the realization of the larcenies, it appearing that the physical authors of the crime were boys under 15 years of age and that they acted upon the suggestions of the inducer without discernment or judgment of their own," the court saying that in view of the fact that she knew that the oil which she first purchased from the boys was stolen oil, that the boys were less than 15 years of age, and therefore easily led, that she furnished the vessels in which to carry the stolen property — all indicate conclusively that the five crimes were committed by the influence exercised by the woman, which inducement was not merely that of favoring the execution of the crime but was that which determined its commission."
In a decision of the 31st of May, 1898, it was laid down "that the command of a master to his servant, by reason of the special relations which exist between them, contains the elements of inducement which makes the master who orders such servant to cut wood belonging to a third person, in order that he might benefit thereby, the principal of the crime committed by such servant," the court saying that "in view of the fact that the command of the master to the servant, made within the sphere and under the ordinary conditions of domestic life, when they relate to acts simple and apparently legitimate, contains the necessary elements, directly and sufficiently efficacious, of inducement according to the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 13 of the Penal Code, it appearing that the master, taking advantage of the ascendency and authority which he naturally must exercise over his servant or inferior, ordered him to cut and carry away wood from land which he knew did not belong to him, without disclosing to the servant that circumstance, which concealment gave rise to the influence which the master exercised over the servant in that particular act."
The following decisions of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands apply the foregoing principles to particular cases.
In the case of the United States vs. Galuran (12 Phil. Rep., 339) it appeared that one of the defendants conceived the idea of the robbery of a warehouse and assisted in procuring false keys with which to open it. He took no immediate part in the act of robbery itself. The court in its opinion said:
These facts, which we hold to have been proven, clearly show the guilt of the appellant, Sy-Yoc, as the instigator of the crime herein prosecuted. From him came the initiative in the robbery; he was the first to conceive the idea of its commission, and, being unable or unwilling to carry it out himself, he employed Galuran, impelling him to the material execution of the crime by a promise to pay him P16 for each case of whisky that he was able to steal. The better to induce him to commit the offense, he clearly demonstrated how easily it could be accomplished, instructed him as to the best means of carrying it out, and offered him money to pay for the false key. He thus removed all the difficulties in the way of determination to execute, and the actual execution of the robbery in question. These acts constitute a real inducement made directly for the commission of the said robbery, and place the appellant, Sy-Yoc, in the position of principal in accordance with paragraph 2 of article 13 of the Penal Code.
In the case of the United States vs. Ancheta (15 Phil. Rep., 470) it appeared that the accused induced certain Igorrotes to kill a third person by holding up before them the fact that by such act they would be able to obtain P40 which was then in the house of the victim, as well as the carabao which he owned, saying to them, "If you go to work you only make a little; it is better to kill this man and take his carabao and the P40 which was received from the sale of the house in town." They having made an unsuccessful attempt upon the life of the proposed victim and having returned and explained why they had not been able to kill them, the accused said to them: "Why did you eat my chickens if you are not going to do what I told you to do. I came here to spend the night in Cambaguio because I thought you were going to kill them." The Igorrotes then spent three days clearing some land for another person from whom they received P2.25. About noon of the third day of their work, the defendant went to them and said: "Now you must repeat what I told you to do, and comply with our agreement; I am going to Ululing to-day, and I wish you to kill Tiburcio to-night. You go to the bushes and conceal yourselves in the same place you were concealed before." The murder was committed as proposed. Upon these facts and inducer of the crime, and that he was liable as principal. (Supreme court of Spain, 20th of October, 1881, 7th of January, 1887, 12th of January, 1889.)
In the case of the United States vs. Empinado (17 Phil. Rep., 230) it appeared that the accused had a conversation with Serapio Tapic, a laborer, in which the accused asked him if he knew Antonio Gavato and his associates, to which he replied in the negative. The defendant then said: "I wish to confer upon you a commission, which is as follows: Order must be disturbed in the cockpit of Gavato, and when you arrive there wound any person." It seems that Tapic was reluctant to obey this order, but defendant gave him something to eat and drink until he became intoxicated, and then he gave him a bolo and P10 and said: "Comply with what I have ordered and in case you incur any responsibility I will be responsible to the court, and as soon as you wound any person or persons, return to me and I will defend you." The court held that these facts constituted sufficient inducement to bring the accused within the provisions of article 13, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code.
In the case of the United States vs. Gamao (23 Phil. Rep., 81) the court said:
Mauricio Gamao, nephew of Gil Gamao, was a poor, ignorant fisherman, and more or less dependent upon his uncle for subsistence. On the other hand, Capt. Gil Gamao was, when this crime was committed, a man of great influence in Escalante. He had a great number of people working for him, one of whom was his nephew Mauricio. He was the local political leader of his party. One of his nephews was president of the town. He had two brothers-in-law in the municipal council. Of his nephews, one was chief of police and two others were members of the police force. He had acquired, as we have said, a bitter hatred toward the Roman Catholic Church and the Spanish friars and priests. He called a meeting in his own house on the afternoon of May 15, where the question of murdering the priest was discussed. He was the prime mover in this meeting. He dominated all who were present. He selected his nephew Mauricio to commit the crime and directed him to do it. Mauricio, immediately after murdering the priest, returned to the house of his uncle Gil and reported the fact. The influence exercised by Gil Gamao over his nephew was so great and powerful that the latter, through fear, could not resist it. That Mauricio was directly induced to murder the priest by his uncle Gil we think there can be no question.
In the case of the United States vs. Chan Guy Juan (23 Phil. Rep., 105) it was held that the "one who employs an innocent agent to commit a crime is liable as a principal, although he does nothing himself in the actual commission of the crime."
In the case of the United States vs. Alcontin (10 Off. Gaz., 1888) it appeared that "a married woman suggested to her paramour, with whom she had been maintaining illicit relations that he kill her husband in order that thereafter they might live together freely. The paramour acting upon these suggestions and actuated by a desire to possess the woman for himself without the interference of the husband, killed him. The guilty pair immediately thereafter made their escape and lived together as man and wife until the time of ] their arrest." Upon these facts the court said:
We think that the direct inducement to the commission of the crime is fully established por pacto (for a consideration); that is to say, on the understanding that the woman would live in illicit relations with the murderer after the death of her husband; and por precepto (by precept) which constituted "a real, intentional, direct and efficacious exciting inducement (excitacion) to commit the crime." The propositions and suggestions of the woman constituted something more than mere counsel or advice which her co-defendant was entirely free to accept or not, in that they were coupled with a consideration which, in view of the relations existing between them, furnished a motive strong enough to induce the man to take the life of her husband; and for the further reason that due to these illicit relations she had required such an influence over her co-defendant that her insistent suggestions that he commit the crime had a marked and controlling influence upon his mind.
In the case of the United States vs. Matinong (22 Phil. rep., 439) it appeared that the accused proposed to his companions an assault upon the house of Francisco Tolosa; that armed with a talibon he accompanied them during the assault; that, while the assault was being made, he stood watch at the foot of the stairs of said house so that his companions would not be caught, and that, finally, he accompanied them to the place where the deceased was killed. These facts were held by the court to be sufficient to make the accused a principal by inducement as well as by direct participation.
In the case at bar, the words and acts of the accused had the effect of a command. There does not seem to have existed, however, any official relation between the accused and the persons whom he induced to kill Sariol. While he appears to have been the headman of Parang, those whom he induced held no official position under him and owed him, legally speaking, no obedience. According to tradition and custom, however, the headman seems to have been a person whose word was law and whose commands were to be obeyed. Moreover, the accused represented to those who physically committed the crime that he had a warrant from the governor authorizing, if not requiring, the acts committed, and urged upon them, in effect, that all must obey the commands of the Government. This representation was false, but it produced the same effect as if it had been true. It cannot be doubted that the accused knew the representation was false and purposely and intentionally made it as an additional factor going to insure obedience to his orders.
Even if there should happen to be lacking any element sufficient to bring the acts of the accused within the definition of inducement by command, and we do not believe there is, there would still remain all of the elements necessary to qualify the crime as murder by inducement. From the authorities heretofore cited and the principles laid down therein as those which must govern in the determination of whether or not the acts of an accused constitute inducement under the law, it may be stated as a general proposition that, where the inducement offered by the accused is of such a nature and made in such a way that it becomes the determining cause of the crime, and such inducement was offered with the intention of producing that result, then the accused is guilty by inducement of the crime committed by the person so induced. The inducement to the crime must be intentional on the part of the inducer and must be made directly for the purpose in view.
The verb "induce" is sufficiently broad, generally speaking, to cover cases where there exists on the part of the inducer the most positive resolution and the most persistent effort to secure the commission of the crime, together with the presentation to the person induced of the very strongest kind of temptation, as well as words or acts which are merely the result of indiscretion or lack of reflection and which carry with them, inherently, almost nothing of inducement or temptation. A chance word spoken without reflection, a wrong appreciation of a situation, an ironical phrase, a thoughtless act, may give birth to a thought of, or even a resolution to, crime in the mind of one for some independent reason predisposed thereto without the one who spoke the word or performed the act having any expectation that his suggestion would be followed or any real intention that it produce a result. In such case, while the expression was imprudent and the results of it grave in the extreme, he would not be guilty of the crime committed. Therefore, in applying the principles laid down to concrete cases it is necessary to remember only that the inducement must be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime and that such inducement must be the determining cause of the crime.
In the case before us, as we have seen, the accused falsely represented to the persons who actually committed the crime that he had an order from the Government requiring the death of Sariol and that they were under obligation to carry out that order. It is clear from the evidence that this inducement was offered by the accused directly to the persons interested with the intention of moving them to do his bidding, and that such representation was the moving cause of the fatal act. While it may be said, and is true, that the personal commands of the accused were entirely sufficient to produce the effects which actually resulted and that such commands may be considered the moving cause of the crime, still there is no doubt, under the evidence, that the representation that the accused had in his possession an order from the Government commanding the death of Sariol was also of material influence in effecting the death; and where two fundamental causes work together for the production of a single result and one of those causes would lead to a conviction upon one theory and the other upon another, a conviction is sustainable upon either theory.
There was present premeditation, qualifying the crime as murder. There were present, also, the aggravating circumstances of desplobado and nocturnity.
We are of the firm conviction that the judgment of the court below is well founded, and we accordingly affirm the same, with costs.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, and Trent, JJ., concur.
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