G.R. No. L-6130




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-6130 August 4, 1911 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEONCIO MANUEL, defendant-appellant. Felipe Buencamino for appellant. Acting Attorney-General Yusay for appellee. MAPA, J.: The defendant in this case is charged with a violation of the Election Law, committed as follows: That the said accused voluntarily, unlawfully and knowingly caused his name to be entered in the electoral list prepared by the electoral board of inspectors of the said municipality of Piddig, for the last general elections held on November 2, 1909, which entry was made on October 2, 1909, the accused knowing that he was not entitled to be a voter of the said municipality, and for such purpose did knowingly swear to a false oath before one of the members of the said board, inasmuch as he stated therein that he was qualified to be a voter as being the owner of real estate to the value of P500, knowingly that he did not have such qualification — acts committed in violation of the said Election Law. To prove the charge made, the prosecution presented the registration oath subscribed by the accused and a certified copy of the resolution of the provincial board of Ilocos Norte approving, on appeal, that passed by the board of election inspectors of the municipality of Piddig whereby the said accused was excluded from the list of voters of the municipality mentioned. No other evidence was presented by the prosecution. The ground that the provincial board of Ilocos Norte had for approving and confirming the exclusion of the herein accused from the list of voters prepared and determined upon by the board of election inspectors of the municipality of Piddig, is set forth literally as follows in the aforementioned certified copy: Whereas the private documents and new declarations of ownership of property, not properly prepared, which were presented by Leoncio Manuel, should not have been accepted, and though they be accepted with the public instruments, he would still be delinquent in the payment of last year's land tax, on account of no assessment having been made of the properties referred to by some of the said instruments, which circumstance constitutes a sufficient reason for not permitting him to vote. As is seen, the provincial board of Ilocos Norte does not categorically affirm that the accused does not own real estate to the value of P500, which is the concrete fact that constitutes the alleged falsity of the oath taken by him as a voter. On the contrary, it implicitly allows the inference that the documents presented before it by the said accused prove, if admitted, that he is the owner of real estate worth that amount or more. What is certain is that the decision of the aforementioned provincial board was not grounded on a contrary fact; that is, on the fact of his not having real estate of the value of P500, but on that other fact, which certainly has no importance in this cause because it was not charged in the complaint, namely, that the accused was delinquent in the payment of his land tax. The resolution of the provincial board of Ilocos Norte contains, then, nothing which may corroborate the certainty of the act prosecuted in this case. Moreover, whatever might have been the opinion of the said board with regard to the amount of the real estate owned by the accused, it would not by itself be sufficient to prove in a conclusive manner that the value of the property referred to did not actually reach P500, or, that the accused did not have holdings in the amount required by law to enable him to be a voter. This fact must be proved by direct and positive evidence, and not by the mere opinions upon her weight given to other facts, however authorized they in themselves may be, except when vested with a judicial character. The documents presented by the prosecution do not sufficiently prove that the accused swore falsely on his taking oath that he was the owner of real estate of the value of P500. He, therefore, has a perfect right to an acquittal. The judgment is reversed and the defendant acquitted, with the costs of both instances de oficio. So ordered. Johnson, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation