Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5313 December 10, 1909
JUANA ESPIRITU, plaintiff,
vs.
A. S. CROSSFIELD, judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and VICENTE GUASH, administrator of the estate of Jose Jimenez y Mijares, defendants.
Enrique Llopis for plaintiff.
C. W. Ney for defendants.
JOHNSON, J.:
From the record it appears that on the 2d day of November, 1906, the said Vicente Guash, as administrator of the estate of Jose Jimenez y Mijares, commenced an action in the Court of First Instance against the said Juana Espiritu, for the purpose of recovering the possession of certain personal property described in the second paragraph of said complaint.
The defendant answered the petition of the plaintiff in that action, alleging that she had purchased said personal property of the said Jose Jimenez y Mijares on the 19th of January, 1906.
After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the judge found that the plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of Jose Jimenez y Mijares, was entitled to the possession of said personal property, or the value thereof, in case delivery could not be had, which value was fixed at the sum of P1,000.
From that judgment the defendant (Juana Espiritu) appealed to the Supreme Court.lawphi1.net
After a consideration of the record brought to the Supreme Court, the judgment of the lower court was reversed and the defendant (Juana Espiritu) was absolved, without costs. (Guash vs. Espiritu, 11 Phil. Rep., 184.)
The decision of the Supreme Court was based upon the provisions of section 712 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions, for the reason that the judge below had not found as a fact either that the plaintiff had no other remedy or that there was a deficiency of assets, and for the reason that there was no such allegation in the pleadings in the court below. The effect of the decision of the Supreme Court in that cause was to dismiss the cause of action and to relieve the defendant (Espiritu) from any liability in that action. Final judgment to that effect was rendered on the 24th of September, 1908, in the Supreme Court and the cause was duly remanded to the lower court on 5th of October, 1908, with direction to enter a judgment to the same effect. The cause was received in the lower court on the said 5th of October, 1908.
It must be remembered that the original action (Guash vs. Espiritu) was for the purpose of recovering the personal property described in the complaint, or its value, and that at the beginning of the action in the lower court property was taken from the possession of the defendant (Espiritu) and delivered to the plaintiff, and it is to be supposed that the property was in the possession of the plaintiff at the time of the final judgment rendered in said cause, as well as at the time said amended pleadings was filed in said cause.
It is to be supposed that a judgment was entered in the lower court in accordance with the direction of the Supreme Court. However, notwithstanding the judgment of this defendant from liability, the plaintiff (Guash) obtained permission of the lower court and filed an amended complaint in said cause, thereby attempting to keep alive said cause of action.
On the 22d of July, 1909, the defendant in that action (Juana Espiritu) commenced an original action in this court against A. S. Crossfield, one of the judges of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, and Vicente Guash, administrator, etc., reciting substantially the substance of the facts hereinbefore set out and prayed for the following relief:
In view of all the foregoing the plaintiff petitions the Supreme Court —
(1) To issue a writ of mandamus against the Hon. A. S. Crossfield, judge of First Instance, Manila, directing him to issue and order of execution in connection with the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court, requiring Vicente Guash, administrator of the intestate estate of Jose Jimenez y Mijares to return to Juana Espiritu the personal property taken by the said administrator.
(2) To issue a preliminary writ of prohibition against the said judge of First Instance, ordering him to desist and abstain from further proceedings under the amended and supplementary complaint presented in the civil suit No. 5000 by Vicente Guash, administrator of the intestate estate of Jose Jimenez y Mijares, against Juana Espiritu.
(3) To condemn the defendant herein to the payment of the costs of this action.itc-alf
The theory of the plaintiff (Espiritu) in this action is —
(1) That the original action having been dismissed and she having been relieved from all responsibility in such action, that she was entitled to a return of the personal property, of the possession of which she had been deprived.
(2) That a final judgment having been rendered in such original action, the same could not be revived by the filing of an amendment complaint in said cause.
(3) That the lower court should be directed to issue an execution directing Guash (the plaintiff) to return to her (Espiritu) the possession of the personal property in question.
This contention of the plaintiff in the present action presents, in fact, but one question, to wit, the right of any of the parties to an action to amend their pleadings after final judgment has been rendered in the cause. Upon this question of the right to amend pleadings, the modern codes of procedure in civil actions, as well as criminal, are very liberal. Section 110 of the Code of the Procedure in Civil Actions, in force in the Philippine Islands, provides that —
The court shall, in furtherance of justice, and on such terms, in any, as may be proper, allow the party to amend any pleading or proceeding and at any stage of the action, in either the Court of First Instance or the Supreme Court, by adding or striking out the name of any party, either plaintiff or defendant, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake or inadequate allegation or description in any other respect, so that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be determined, without regard to technicalities and in the most expeditious and expensive manner.
It will be noted that the right to amend covers almost all possible amendments which might be made, but that it limits the time of the amendment, by saying that it shall be made "at any stage of the action." We are of the opinion and so hold that after final judgment has been rendered that the action is closed and the time for amendment is passed.
This court said in the case of Molina vs. De la Riva (8 Phil. Rep., 569):
After judgment is rendered [in the Supreme Court] and the case if returned to the lower court for execution, the party liable under the judgment will not be permitted, in opposition to the execution, to preset for consideration new issues of fact and law upon the question of his liability.
If the parties, after final judgment, should be allowed to amend their pleadings at that time or take an exception to the issuance of an execution upon the final judgment rendered, the cause might never end; there might never be final termination of the litigation, for as often as an order for an execution was issued, if such practice should be permitted, the parties might present an exception and bring the case again to the higher court on appeal, and thus the cause be prolonged indefinitely.lawphil.net Parties litigant, both plaintiff and defendant, should be required to state in the beginning of the action all of the facts upon which they rely for their relief or for their defense, and their amendment should be allowed with great caution, to the end that parties litigant might not use this as a method of procrastination for an unmeritorious cause, solely for the purpose of harassing their opponents.
Of course the Supreme Court in deciding the original action might have reserved to the defeated party (see Sanidad vs. Cabotaje, 5 Phil. Rep., 204) the right to amend their pleadings, and thus not have rendered a final judgment. This is the Supreme Court did not do. It rendered a final judgment closing that litigation, evidently believing that the parties had stated all of the facts upon which they relied for relief and for their defense, and, therefore, there existed no further facts upon which the pleadings could be amended, upon which the parties might rely for relief.
From all the foregoing facts, we are of the opinion and so hold that the prayer of the petition presented by the plaintiff in this action should be and is hereby granted, with costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Mapa, and Carson, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MORELAND, J., concurring in the result:
I concur in the result. I do not believe, however, that the question of amendment, as that subject is treated in the Code of Civil Procedure, is before this court in strict sense. The real question is the jurisdiction of the lower court not only to amend the complaint, but also to do anything whatever affecting the rights of the parties to an action in which this court has rendered a final judgment on the merits. I think we ought to hold squarely that a lower court has absolutely no power or jurisdiction to do anything whatever affecting the merits of an action in which this court has rendered a final judgment on those merits. The power and jurisdiction of the lower court in that action are strictly limited to the directions contained in said judgment.
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