Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 156320             February 14, 2007
RODOLFO ABENES y GACUTAN, Petitioner,
HE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
For review before the Court is the Decision1 dated November 29, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pagadian City, Branch 19, dated June 5, 2000, finding Rodolfo Abenes y Gacutan (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Possession of High Powered Firearm and Ammunition under Presidential Decree No. 1866 (P.D. No. 1866) in Criminal Case No. 4559-98, and of violating Section 261(q) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (B.P. Blg. 881), otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, vis-à-vis COMELEC Resolution No. 2958 (Gun Ban) in Criminal Case No. 4563-98.
Petitioner was charged under the following Informations:
In Criminal Case No. 4559-98 —
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor hereby accuses RODOLFO ABENES Y GACUTAN of the offense of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF HIGH POWERED FIREARM & ITS AMMUNITIONS (Violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294), committed as follows:
On May 8, 1998, at about 10:30 a.m., in Danlugan, Pagadian City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said RODOLFO ABENES Y GACUTAN did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and without any prior authority, license or permit to possess or carry the firearm hereunder described, have in his possession and control the following firearm classified as high powered, with its corresponding ammunitions and accessory, viz:
- one (1) cal. 45 pistol (NORINCO) bearing SN 906347;
- one (1) magazine for pistol cal. 45
- seven (7) rounds live ammunitions for cal. 45,
in gross violation of P.D. No. 1866 as amended by R.A. No. 8294.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
In Criminal Case No. 4563-98 —
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor hereby accuses RODOLFO ABENES Y GACUTAN of Election Offense in violation of Sec. 261 (9)3 , BP 881 (OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE), vis-à-vis COMELEC RESOLUTION # 1958 (GUN BAN), committed as follows:
On May 8, 1998, at about 10:30 a.m. within the Election period which is from January 11, 1998 to June 30, 1998, in Danlugan, Pagadian City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said RODOLFO ABENES Y GACUTAN did, then and there, willfully, and unlawfully, carry in his person a cal. .45 (NORINCO) pistol, bearing serial number 906347, and loaded with seven (7) rounds of live ammunitions, without any prior authority from the COMELEC in gross violation of Sec. 261 (9) of BP 881 (OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE) in relation to COMELEC RESOLUTION No. 2958 (GUN BAN).
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
The facts, as found by the RTC and summarized by the CA, are as follows:
The prosecution showed that three days prior to the May 11, 1998 national and local elections, the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Pagadian City, through its Company Commander Major Pedronisto Quano, created a team composed of seven policemen with a directive to establish and man a checkpoint in Barangay Danlugan at said city, for the purpose of enforcing the Gun Ban which was then being implemented by the COMELEC. SPO3 Cipriano Q. Pascua was the designated team leader.
The team proceeded to Barangay Danlugan, arriving thereat at 8:15 in the morning of May 8, 1998. Team leader SPO3 Pascua coordinated with the Barangay Chairman of Danlugan, and the team put up a road block with the marking "COMELEC GUN BAN". Vehicles passing through the road block were required by the team to stop and their occupants were then politely requested to alight in order to allow routine inspection and checking of their vehicles. Motorists who refused the request were not forced to do so.
At about 10:30 in the morning of the same day, a red Tamaraw FX trying to pass through the check point was stopped by the team and directed to park at the side of the road. As the occupants within the vehicle could not be seen through its tinted windows, SPO1 Eliezer Requejo, a member of the team, knocked on the vehicle’s window and requested the occupants to step down for a routine inspection. The eight occupants, which included the accused-appellant Rodolfo Abenes who is the Barangay Chairman of Tawagan Norte, Labangan, Zamboanga Del Sur, alighted from the vehicle. At this juncture, SPO1 Requejo and SPO3 Pascua noticed that a holstered firearm was tucked at the right waist of Abenes. The firearm was readily visible to the policemen; it was not covered by the shirt worn by Abenes. Abenes was then asked by SPO3 Pascua whether he had a license and authority to carry the firearm, and whether his possession was exempted from the Gun Ban being enforced by the COMELEC. Accused answered in the affirmative. The policemen then demanded for the pertinent documents to be shown to support Abenes’ claim. He could not show any. Hence, SPO1 Requejo confiscated Abenes’ firearm, which was later identified as a Norinco .45 caliber pistol bearing Serial No. 906347, including its magazine containing seven live ammunitions.
Subsequently SPO3 Pascua, using his privately owned jeep, brought Abenes to the PNP Headquarters at Camp Abelon in Pagadian City. Upon reaching the Headquarters, SPO3 Pascua indorsed Abenes to Major Quano who in turn referred Abenes to a certain SPO2 Benvienido Albon for further investigation (TSN, August 24, 1998 [SPO3 Cipriano Q. Pascua] pp. 5-27, [SPO1 Eliezer Requejo] pp. 29-50).
A certification dated May 18, 1998 from the Firearms and Explosives License Processing Section of the PNP, Pagadian City disclosed that Abenes is not a registered nor a licensed firearm holder (Record of Criminal Case No. 4559-98, p. 56).
After the prosecution presented its evidence, [the] accused filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Motion to Dismiss (supra, pp. 72-79), which was denied by the trial court in a Resolution dated March 5, 1999 (supra, pp. 80-82).
In his defense, accused-appellant tried to establish that the firearm did not belong to and was not recovered from him; that the firearm was recovered by the policemen from the floor of the vehicle inside a clutch bag which was allegedly left by an unidentified person who hitched a ride somewhere along the national highway of Tawagan Norte Zamboanga Del Sur and alighted near the Mabuhay Bazaar in Pagadian City (TSN, July 12, 1999 [Noel Rivera], pp. 7-13; September 15, 1999 [Rodolfo Abenes], pp. 11-15; September 27, 1999 [Manuel Sabado Gengania], pp. 9-16).5
On June 5, 2000, the RTC rendered its Joint Decision convicting the petitioner on both charges, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing discussion, this Court hereby finds accused Rodolfo Abenes y Gacutan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294, having been found in possession without license/permit of a Norinco .45 caliber pistol bearing Serial No. 906347 and 7 rounds of ammunitions and sentences him to imprisonment ranging from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION CORRECCIONAL in its MEDIUM PERIOD, as MINIMUM, to EIGHT (8) YEARS of PRISION MAYOR in its MINIMUM, as MAXIMUM and a FINE of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱30,000.00), Philippine currency. Insofar as Criminal Case No. 4559-98 is concerned. The .45 Caliber Pistol aforementioned and the seven (7) rounds of ammunitions are hereby forfeited in favor of the government the same being effects of the Violation of P.D. 1866, amended.
As regards Criminal Case No. 4563-98, this Court also finds herein accused Rodolfo Abenes y Gacutan GUILTY of Violation of Section 264, in relation to Section 261, paragraphs (p) and (q) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code and sentences him to imprisonment for a period of ONE (1) YEAR, and in addition thereto, herein accused is disqualified to hold any public office and deprived [of] the right of suffrage. It shall be understood that the sentence herein imposed shall be served simultaneously with the sentence imposed in Criminal Case No. 4559-98.
The RTC found that, as between the positive and categorical assertions of facts by the two policemen – the witnesses for the prosecution – and the mere denial of the accused and his witnesses, the former must prevail over the latter; that the prosecution successfully proved that the petitioner had no license or permit to carry the firearm through the officer-in-charge of the firearms and explosives office who testified that, based on his records, the petitioner had not been issued a license, and whose testimony had not been impugned by the defense; and that the testimonies of the accused and his two witnesses to the effect that while aboard their private vehicle and on their way to attend an election campaign meeting, they simply stopped and allowed a complete stranger to hitch a ride who was carrying a clutch bag, left the same in the vehicle when he alighted, and which later turned out to contain the subject firearm, were flimsy and unbelievable. The RTC ruled that the defense of alibi or denial cannot prevail over the positive identification by eyewitnesses who have no improper motive to falsely testify against the petitioner, especially where the policemen and the petitioner do not know each other; and, that the petitioner failed to show any license or any other document to justify his lawful possession of the firearm.
The petitioner appealed to the CA claiming that the checkpoint was not shown to have been legally set up, and/or that the frisking of the petitioner who was ordered to alight from the Tamaraw FX, along with his companions in the vehicle, violated his constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure; and, that the trial court erred in believing the version of the incident as testified to by the policemen instead of the version presented by the defense’s witness which is more consistent with truth and human experience.7
On November 29, 2002, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Joint Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that with respect to Criminal Case No. 4559-98, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum to 7 years and 4 months of prision mayor as maximum.
With respect to the validity of the checkpoint, the CA found that not only do the police officers have in their favor the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed, but also that the proximity of the day the checkpoint had been set up, to the day of the May 11, 1998 elections, specifically for the purpose of enforcing the COMELEC gun ban, gives a strong badge of the legitimacy of the checkpoint; that after a review of the records, the evidence adduced by the prosecution prevails over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of the petitioner that he had been "framed"; and, that with respect to the admissibility of the firearm as evidence, the prosecution witnesses convincingly established that the .45 caliber pistol, tucked into the right waist of the petitioner when he alighted from the vehicle, was readily visible, and, therefore, could be seized without a search warrant under the "plain view" doctrine.
The petitioner is now before this Court, raising the following issues:
Given the circumstances, and the evidence adduced, was the check-point validly established?
Given the circumstances, and the evidence adduced, was the petitioner’s constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure violated?
Given the circumstances, and the evidence adduced, did not the honorable court of appeals commit a grave abuse of discretion for adopting the trial court’s unsubstantiated findings of fact?
Given the circumstances, and the evidence adduced, is not the petitioner entitled to an acquittal, if not on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, on the ground of reasonable doubt itself . . . as to where the gun was taken: from the floor of the vehicle or from the waist of petitioner?9
The appeal is partly meritorious. The Court reverses the CA’s finding of his conviction in Criminal Case No. 4559-98.
After a thorough review of the records, this Court is of the view that the courts a quo – except for a notable exception with respect to the negative allegation in the Information – are correct in their findings of fact. Indeed, the version of the defense, as found by the lower courts, is implausible and belies the common experience of mankind. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.10 In addition, the question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine.11 For this reason, its observations and conclusions are accorded great respect on appeal.12
The trial court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight. It is conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not been considered.13 Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, or that the judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves high respect by appellate courts.14 Thus, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the lower courts that the police found in plain view a gun tucked into the waist of the petitioner during the Gun Ban period enforced by the COMELEC.
So too must this Court uphold the validity of the checkpoint. The petitioner insists that the prosecution should have produced the mission order constituting the checkpoint, and invokes Aniag, Jr. v. Comelec,15 where the Court purportedly held that firearms seized from a motor vehicle without a warrant are inadmissible because there was no indication that would trigger any suspicion from the policemen nor any other circumstance showing probable cause.
On both points the petitioner is wrong. In the present case, the production of the mission order is not necessary in view of the fact that the checkpoint was established three days before the May 11, 1998 elections; and, the circumstances under which the policemen found the gun warranted its seizure without a warrant.
In People v. Escaño,16 the Court, through the ponencia of Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., held:
Accused-appellants assail the manner by which the checkpoint in question was conducted. They contend that the checkpoint manned by elements of the Makati Police should have been announced. They also complain of its having been conducted in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner.
We take judicial notice of the existence of the COMELEC resolution imposing a gun ban during the election period issued pursuant to Section 52(c) in relation to Section 26(q) of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). The national and local elections in 1995 were held on 8 May, the second Monday of the month. The incident, which happened on 5 April 1995, was well within the election period.
This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists’ right to "free passage without interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicle’s occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive.
The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said period would know that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs.
The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused against illegal search and seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they were merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious, such as those whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were carrying guns. At best they would merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they would stop, without opening the car’s doors or subjecting its passengers to a body search. There is nothing discriminatory in this as this is what the situation demands.17 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Court agrees with the Solicitor General that petitioner’s reliance on Aniag is misplaced.
In Aniag, the police officers manning the checkpoint near the Batasang Pambansa complex stopped the vehicle driven by the driver of Congressman Aniag. After stopping the vehicle, the police opened a package inside the car which contained a firearm purportedly belonging to Congressman Aniag. In declaring the search illegal, the Supreme Court stated that the law enforcers who conducted the search had no probable cause to check the content of the package because the driver did not behave suspiciously nor was there any previous information that a vehicle hiding a firearm would pass by the checkpoint.
In the instant case, the firearm was seized from the petitioner when in plain view, the policemen saw it tucked into his waist uncovered by his shirt.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.18 The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.19
All the foregoing requirements are present in the instant case. The law enforcement officers lawfully made an initial intrusion because of the enforcement of the Gun Ban and were properly in a position from which they particularly viewed the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, the policemen came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the petitioner where they saw the gun tucked into his waist. The gun was in plain view and discovered inadvertently when the petitioner alighted from the vehicle.
As accurately found by the CA:
xxx It must be emphasized that the policemen discovered the firearm [on] the person of the [petitioner] shortly after he alighted from the vehicle and before he was frisked. SPO3 Pascua’s testimony[,] corroborated by that of SPO1 Requejo[,] convincingly established that the holstered .45 caliber pistol tucked at the right waist of the [petitioner] was readily visible to the policemen (TSN, August 24, 1998, pp. 18, 37). Thus, notwithstanding the absence of a Search Warrant, the policemen may validly seize the firearm and the same is admissible in evidence against the [petitioner] pursuant to the "plain view doctrine" xxx.20
Nor can the Court believe petitioner’s claim that he could not have freely refused the "police orders" issued by the police team who were "armed to the teeth" and "in the face of such show of force." The courts a quo consistently found that the police team manning the checkpoint politely requested the passengers to alight from their vehicles, and the motorists who refused this request were not forced to do so. These findings of fact are fully supported by the evidence in the record.
However, the Court must underscore that the prosecution failed to satisfactorily prove the negative allegation in the Information that the petitioner possessed no license or permit to bear the subject firearm.
It is a well-entrenched rule "that in crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof, viz: the existence of the subject firearm, and the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess the same."21
Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon the prosecution. The absence of such license and legal authority constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of firearm, and every ingredient or essential element of an offense must be shown by the prosecution by proof beyond reasonable doubt.22
Witness for the prosecution SPO4 Gilbert C. Senados admitted that his records were outdated, i.e., that his Master List of holders of firearms only covered licenses up to 1994; that it was possible for the petitioner to acquire a license after 1994; and that he issued the Certification, dated May 18, 1998, stating that the petitioner carried no license or permit to possess the guns because he was ordered to do so by his superiors.23
There is no evidence that between 1994 and May 8, 1998, the date the crime was allegedly committed, no license was issued to petitioner.
While the prosecution was able to establish the fact that the subject firearm was seized by the police from the possession of the petitioner, without the latter being able to present any license or permit to possess the same, such fact alone is not conclusive proof that he was not lawfully authorized to carry such firearm. In other words, such fact does not relieve the prosecution from its duty to establish the lack of a license or permit to carry the firearm by clear and convincing evidence, like a certification from the government agency concerned.24
Thus, for failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was carrying a firearm without prior authority, license or permit, the latter must be exculpated from criminal liability under P.D. No. 1866, as amended.
With respect to the charge of violating Section 261(q) of B.P. Blg. 881, as amended, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, the Court is constrained to affirm the conviction of the petitioner, since the prosecution successfully discharged its burden of proof.
Section 261 of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), as originally worded, provides:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. – The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(q) Carrying firearms outside residence or place of business. – Any person who, although possessing a permit to carry firearms, carries any firearms outside his residence or place of business during the election period, unless authorized in writing by the Commission: Provided, That a motor vehicle, water or air craft shall not be considered a residence or place of business or extension hereof.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166 (R.A. No. 7166), amending Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, provides:
SEC. 32. Who May Bear Firearms. – During the election period, no person shall bear, carry or transport firearms or other deadly weapons in public places, including any building, street, park, private vehicle or public conveyance, even if licensed to possess or carry the same, unless authorized in writing by the Commission. The issuance of firearm licenses shall be suspended during the election period. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the foregoing provisions, while it is well-settled that under P.D. No. 1866, as amended, the burden to prove the negative allegation that the accused has no license or permit to carry a firearm lies with the prosecution; under the Omnibus Election Code, however, the burden to adduce evidence that accused is exempt from the COMELEC Gun Ban, lies with the accused.
Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166 is clear and unequivocal25 that the prohibited act to which this provision refers is made up of the following elements: 1) the person is bearing, carrying, or transporting firearms or other deadly weapons; 2) such possession occurs during the election period; and, 3) the weapon is carried in a public place. Under said provision, it is explicit that even if the accused can prove that he is holding a valid license to possess such firearm, this circumstance by itself cannot exculpate him from criminal liability. The burden is on the accused to show that he has a written authority to possess such firearm issued by no less than the COMELEC.
On this point, the petitioner failed to present any form of such authority, and, therefore, his conviction must be affirmed.
Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
Sec. 264. Penalties. – Any person found guilty of any election offense under this Code shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years and shall not be subject to probation. In addition, the guilty party shall be sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage. If he is a foreigner, he shall be sentenced to deportation which shall be enforced after the prison term has been served.
The CA affirmed the penalty imposed by the RTC. However, the RTC failed to apply Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law26 which provides:
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.
Thus, the penalty that should be meted out to petitioner should have a minimum and a maximum period. The Court deems it reasonable that petitioner should suffer imprisonment for a period of one (1) year as the minimum and two (2) years, as the maximum.
Furthermore, under Section 34 of R.A. No. 7166, the subject firearm shall be disposed of according to existing laws, which, in this case, must be read in light of Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Art. 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime.— Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the forefeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it was committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they be the property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be destroyed.1awphi1.net
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The Decision dated November 29, 2002 of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as Criminal Case No. 4559-98 is concerned. Petitioner Rodolfo Abenes Y Gacutan is ACQUITTED from the charge of illegal possession of firearm under P.D. No. 1866, as amended, for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond unreasonable doubt.
With respect to Criminal Case No. 4563-98, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that petitioner is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year of imprisonment as minimum to two years of imprisonment as maximum, not subject to probation; and he shall suffer DISQUALIFICATION to hold public office and DEPRIVATION of the right of suffrage. The subject firearm is CONFISCATED and FORFEITED in favor of the Government.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
|ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
|MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO|
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
1 Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring.
2 Rollo, p. 49.
3 Should be (q).
4 Rollo, p. 50.
5 Id. at 35-37.
6 Id. at 56-57.
7 Id. at 37-38.
8 Id. at 42.
9 Petitioner’s Memorandum, rollo, pp. 127-128.
10 People v. Alba, 326 Phil. 519, 527 (1996).
11 People v. Mercado, 400 Phil. 37, 71 (2000), citing People v. Dianos, 357 Phil. 871, 884 (1998).
12 Id. citing People v. Manuel, 358 Phil. 664, 673 (1998).
13 Id. citing People v. Lozano, 357 Phil. 397, 411 (1998).
14 Id. citing People v. Abangin, 358 Phil. 303, 313 (1998).
15 G.R. No. 104961, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 424.
16 380 Phil. 719, 733-734 (2000).
18 People v. Go, 457 Phil. 885, 928 (2003), citing People v. Musa, G.R. No. 96177, January 27, 1993, 217 SCRA 597, 610.
19 People v. Go., id. at 928.
20 Rollo, p. 40.
21 People v. Lualhati, G.R. Nos. 105289-90, July 21, 1994, 234 SCRA 325, 332; Peole v. Damaso, G.R. No. 93516, August 12, 1992, 212 SCRA 547, 557.
22 People v. Solayao, 330 Phil. 811, 819 (1996), citing People v. Arce, G.R. Nos. 101833-34, 227 SCRA 406, 421.
23 TSN, August 31, 1998, pp. 13-21.
24 People v. Solayao, supra note 22 at 819.
25 See 1 Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code 17 (2001) & Antonio L. Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review 10 (1997).
26 Act No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225.
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