Apparently, the Commission taking into consideration the comments and observations of protestee, was convinced that the amended protest was not admissible as the record failed to yield any formal order admitting the amended protest. 12

4. Protestant filed his Amended Protest on February 15, 1988, although there is nothing on record that shows the same was duly admitted; the record shows, however, that the Protestee submitted his "Comments and Observations on the Amended Protest" in a formal document dated March 3, 1988 and received by this Commission on April 4, 1988. 13

For consideration is the Protestee's Comments and Observations on the Amended Protest dated March 3, 1988, filed by Counsel for Protestee praying that the amended protest dated February 15, 1988, filed by Protestant be denied admission. It appearing from the records of the case that Protestant's Amended Protest was filed in accordance with Sec. 17, Rule X of COMELEC Resolution No. 1996, the Commission hereby denies the herein Protestee's Comments and Observations on the Protestant's Amended Protest.

. . . Besides, the Order of April 7, 1988, admitting the amended protest was questioned only on May 11, 1989, when the herein petition was filed, or way beyond the 30-day reglementary period prescribed in Article IX-A. Section 7, of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE . . . the Commission (First Division) RESOLVES, as it hereby RESOLVES, to DISMISS Election Protest Case No. 88-1 and DECLARES protestee winner of the election protest by a margin of 378 votes in lieu of the original lead of protestee by 417 votee over protestant at the time of the former's proclamation by the City Board of Canvassers of Pagadian City. 14

(a) examination and appreciation of ballots should have been confined to 31 protested precincts per original protest filed January 28, 1988, considering that amended protest was decreed as "not admissible"' in the February 7, 1991, Resolution of COMELEC (First Division);

(b) examination of ballots to determine identical handwritings should be limited to Precincts 19, 22, 8 and 11 as alleged in the original protest;

(c) it was contrary to basic rules for COMELEC to pass upon ballots (in favor of protestee) as identical with each other when they were not even questioned by protestant, thus depriving protestee the right to present controverting evidence;

(d) COMELEC failed to consider its records showing that there were 139 assisted illiterate or disabled voters, hence, to invalidate their votes is technically a disenfranchisement and a subversion of sovereign will;

(e) it is statistically improbable for a candidate to have utilized 332 groups (persons) to write 723 ballots (a ratio of 1 person for 2 ballots);

(f) mathematical computation of protestant in his motion for reconsideration is erroneous and self-serving; and,

(g) COMELEC should have credited 10 more votes for protestee as affirmed/admitted during the revision of ballots.

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission En Banc hereby renders judgment: a. GRANTING Protestant Pulmones' Motion for Reconsideration; b. DENYING Protestee Arao's Manifestation for the dismissal of Protestants Motion for Reconsideration; c. AFFIRMING the factual findings at the Commission (First Division) relative to the examination of the contested ballots of both Protestant and Protestee; d. DECLARING Protestant Warlito Pulmones as the duly elected Mayor of Pagadian City in the January 18, 1988 elections with a margin of 516 votes against Protestee Benjamin F. Arao; and, e. ORDERING Protestee Arao to VACATE his office and surrender the same no Protestant Pulmones once this decision becomes final and executory. 17

The principal relief sought by petitioner is predicated on the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court as provided in Section 11, Article XII-C, 1973 Constitution. It is, explained in Aratuc vs. Commission on Elections (88 SCRA 251), "not as broad as it used to be" under the old Constitution and it "should be confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process" . . . Moreover, the legislative construction . . . of the constitutional provision has narrowed down "the scope and extent of the inquiry the Court is supposed to undertake to what is strictly the office of certiorari as distinguished from review." And in Lucman vs. Dimaporo . . . a case decided under the Constitution of 1935, this Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Concepcion. ruled that "this Court cannot . . . review rulings or findings of hot of the Commission an Elections . . . as there is "no reason to believe that the framers of our Constitution intended to place the [said] Commission — created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself — on a lower level" than statutory administrative organs (whose factual findings are not disturbed by courts of justice, except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings") . . . Factual matters were deemed not proper for consideration in proceedings brought either ":as an original action for certiorari or as an appeal by certiorari . . . [for] the main issue in . . . certiorari is one of jurisdiction — lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction" while "petitions for review on certiorari are limited to the consideration of questions of law."

The aforementioned rule was reiterated in the cases of Ticzon and Bashier . . . Indeed, as early as the year 1938, applying Section 4, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution . . . this Court held that the Electoral Commissions "exclusive jurisdiction" being clear from the language of the provision, "judgment rendered . . . in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except . . . "upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law" . . . Originally lodged in the legislature that exclusive function of being the "sole judge" of contest "relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of members of the legislature was transferred "in its totality" to the Electoral Commission by the 1935 Constitution. That grant of power, to use the language of the late Justice Jose P. Laurel. "was intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature . . . These observations remain valid and applicable to the exercise of that function, as now vested in the respondent Commission by the 1973 Constitution.

. . . This Court has invariably followed the principle that in the absence of any jurisdictional infirmity or an error of law of the utmost gravity, the conclusion reached by respondent Commission on a matter that falls within its competence is entitled to the utmost respect. So it has been reiterated time and time again.