It wig be recalled that the undisputed relevant facts indicate:
(1) that Restituta Tacalinar Guanaco de Pombuena (RESTITUTA, for short) received the questioned lot (no. 304-B), of the Cadastre Survey of the Municipality of Centro, Mizamis Occidental, either as a purported donation or by way of purchase on (February 11, 1927) (with P50.00) as the alleged consideration thereof;
(2) that the transaction took place during her mother's lifetime, her father having predeceased the mother;
(3) that the donation or sale was consummated while RESTITUTA was already married to her husband Juan Pombuena (JUAN, for short);
(4) that on January 22, 1935, JUAN filed for himself and his supposed co-owner RESTITUTA an application for a Torrens Title over the land;
(5) that under date of November 22, 1938 a decision was promulgated in GLRC No. 1638 (Cadastral Case No. 12) pronouncing JUAN ('married to RESTITUTA') as the owner of the land;
(6) that on September 22, 1949 a contract of lease over the lot was entered into between Pershing Tan Queto (TAN QUETO, for short, the herein petitioner) and RESTITUTA (with the consent of her husband JUAN) for a period of ten (10) years;
(7) that on December 27, 1960 RESTITUTA sued TAN QUETO for unlawful detainer (the lease contract having expired) before the Municipal Court of Ozamis City;
(8) that as a consequence of the cadastral case, an Original Certificate of Title (Exh. 10) was issued in JUAN's name ("married to RESTITUTA") on April 22, 1962;
(9) that the unlawful detainer case was won by the spouses in the Municipal Court; but on appeal in the Court of First Instance, the entire case was DISMISSED because of an understanding (barter) whereby TAN QUETO became the owner of the disputed lot, and the spouses RESTITUTA and JUAN in turn became the owners of a parcel of land (with the house constructed thereon) previously owned (that is, before the barter) by TAN QUETO;
(10) that after the barter agreement dated October 10, 1962 between JUAN and TAN QUETO, the latter constructed (See p. 257, Rollo, Vol. II) on the disputed land a concrete building, without any objection on the part of RESTITUTA;
(11) that later, RESTITUTA sued both JUAN and TAN QUETO for reconveyance of the title over the registered but disputed lot, for annulment of the barter, and for recovery of the land with damages.
The two principal issues are clearly the following:
(1) Is the questioned lot paraphernal or conjugal?
(2) In having constructed the building on the lot, should TAN QUETO be regarded as a builder in good faith (and hence entitled to reimbursement) or a builder in bad faith (with no right to reimbursement)?
The finding by both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals that the disputed lot is paraphernal and that TAN QUETO is a builder in bad faith were regarded by Us in Our assailed decision as findings of facts and thus ordinarily conclusive on Us. Assuming they are factual findings, still if they are erroneous inferences from certain facts, they cannot bind this Court.
A second hard look at the circumstances of the case has constrained Us to rule as follows:
(1) The land is conjugal, not paraphernal. How was ownership transferred, if at all, from her mother to RESTITUTA? The oral donation of the lot cannot be a valid donation interviews because it was not executed in a public instrument (Art. 749, Civil Code), nor as a valid donation mortis causa for the formalities of a will were not complied with. The allegation that the transfer was a conveyance to RESTITUTA of her hereditary share in the estate of her mother (or parents) cannot be sustained for the contractual transmission of future inheritance is generally prohibited.
The fact is ownership was acquired by both JUAN and RESTITUTA by tradition (delivery) as a consequence of the contract of sale (See Art. 712, Civil Code) with P50.00 (then a considerable amount) as the cause or consideration of the transaction. The lot is therefore conjugal, having been acquired by the spouses thru onerous title (the money used being presumably conjugal there being no proof that RESTITUTA had paraphernal funds of her own). The contention that the sale was fictitious or simulated (and therefore void) is bankrupt. Firstly, there was a valid consideration therefor. Secondly, assuming that there had indeed been a simulation, the parties thereto cannot use said simulation to prejudice a stranger to said stratagem (like petitioner herein).
One nagging question has been posed. But did not TAN QUETO admit in his Answer that RESTITUTA was the owner of the lot. This is not so. He admitted RESTITUTA was an owner" (not the owner) of the lot, and this is true, for she was a co-owner (with JUAN, and therefore "an owner. " Surely, there is no admission of RESTITUTA's exclusive ownership. And yet this is the basis of the trial court's conclusion that the lot was indeed paraphernal.
(2) Was Tan Queto a possessor and builder in good faith or in bad faith?
Even assuming that despite registration of the lot as conjugal, Tan Queto nursed the belief that the lot was actually RESTITUTA's (making him in bad faith), still RESTITUTA's failure to prohibit him from building despite her knowledge that construction was actually being done, makes her also in bad faith. The net resultant of mutual bad faith would entitle TAN QUETO to the rights of a builder in good faith (Art. 448, Civil Code), ergo, reimbursement should be given him if RESTITUTA decides to appropriate the building for herself (Art. 448, Civil Code).
However, as already previously intimated, TAN QUETO having bartered his own lot and small house with the questioned lot with JUAN (who has been adverted to by a court decision and by the OCT a conjugal owner) may be said to be the OWNER-POSSESSOR of the lot. Certainly he is not merely a possessor or builder in good faith (this phrase presupposes ownership in another); much less is he a builder in bad faith. He is a builder-possessor jus possidendi because he is the OWNER himself. Please note that the Chapter on Possession (jus possesionis, not jus possidendi) in the Civil Code refers to a possessor other than the owner. Please note further that the difference between a builder (or possessor) in good faith and one in bad faith is that the former is NOT AWARE of the defect or flaw in his title or mode of acquisition while the latter is AWARE of such defect or flaw (Art. 526, Civil Code). But in either case there is a flaw or defect. In the case of TAN QUETO there is no such flaw or defect because it is he himself (not somebody else) who is the owner of the property.
WHEREFORE, Our decision promulgated on May 16,1983 is hereby SET ASIDE, and a new one is hereby rendered declaring the questioned lot together with the building thereone, as TAN QUETO's exclusive property. No costs..
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Alampay, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
Cortes, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I vote to uphold the Decision of May 16, 1983 and to deny reconsideration.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my vote in the decision sought to be reconsidered & dissent herein.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I vote to uphold the Decision of May 16, 1983 and to deny reconsideration.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my vote in the decision sought to be reconsidered & dissent herein.
Footnotes
* Affirming the Decision of the Court of Appeals in G.R. No. 39492-R penned by Justice Ramon C. Fernandez concurred in by Justices Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. and Cecilia Munoz Palma which affirmed the Decision of the Trial Judge Geronimo R. Marave.
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