G.R. No. L-44353




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-44353 February 28, 1979 MARTHA FERANIL and PRIMITIVO VILLEGAS, petitioners, vs. HON. GUMERSINDO ARCILLA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch III, City Court of Davao City and SPOUSES ALFONSO CARDENAS and LOLITA CARDENAS, respondents. Leonido C. Delante for petitioners. Hermenigildo C. Cabreros, Jerome C. Joaquin & Jose C. Estrada for respondents. DE CASTRO, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari treated as special civil action (Resolution dated December 17, 1976, p. 117, Rollo), filed by Martha Feranil and Primitivo Villegas who were the plaintiffs in an ejectment case (Civil Case No. 2727-C of the City Court of Davao City), filed on October 3, 1975, with prayer for the issuance of preliminary mandatory injunction, which was granted on October 4, 1975. In their answer filed on October 4, 1975, to the complaint in the aforementioned case, defendants therein, now the herein private respondents, Alfonso Cardenas and Lolita Cardenas, alleged as one of their affirmative defenses the following; 21. That the complaint states no cause of action in that: A The plaintiffs have admitted in par. 5 of the Complaint that "plaintiff Martha Feranil is the prior and legal possessor" rental be increased instead of original agreement of Fifty Pesos (P50.00), should be Eighty Pesos (P80.00) to which defendants agreed). In synthesis, these allegations are admissions of plaintiffs that defendants have juridical title to the possession of the land in dispute as lessees and are not therefore illegally possessing the same; b. Insofar as Primitive Villegas is suing as party-plaintiff, there is no allegation in the Complaint that he was in the actual and/or physical possession of the land which was disturbed by defendants; therefore, said plaintiff has not shown any interest in the nature of the action for forcible entry: 2. That Primitivo Villegas has no capacity to sue as attorney-in-fact of plaintiff Feranil there being no factual allegations in the complaint that he is suing as much and that he. has been specifically authorized to institute and prosecute the present action; (pp. 40- 41, Rollo). Incorporated in the Answer is a Motion to Dissolve the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on October 4, 1975. In a preliminary hearing held on the aforequoted affirmative defenses, as well as the motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, the City Court ruled as follows: IN VIEW WHEREOF, this Court hereby resolves defendants' motions in this manner: (a) Plaintiff Primitive Villegas is ordered dropped from the complaint in his capacity as co-plaintiff; (b) Denying defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff Feranil's motion; (c) Modifying the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by this Court October 4, 1975, to the effect that the same is granted to plaintiff Feranil only; (d) Ordering either plaintiff Feranil or Primitive Villegas to remove whatever improvements that they introduce on the premises in question after the of said writ within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. (p. 48, Rollo). In another order dated November 8, 1975 issued upon consideration of defendants, supplementary motion relative to the issuance of the preliminary mandatory injunction, the City Court dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction issued on October 4, 1975 "for lack of the requisite bond required of plaintiff Feranil without prejudice on her part to pursuing appropriate legal remedies under the Rules of Court. (p. 56, Rollo). From the aforementioned orders, petitioners brought a petition for certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Davao (Branch II). The Court dismissed the petition sustaining the orders of the City Court in an order dated March 31, 1976. (pp. 63-64, Rollo). From said order of dismissal petitioners filed with this Court on August 27, 1976, the instant petition for review on certiorari. In its Resolution dated September 20, 1976, this Court required the respondents to comment on the petition, which they did by filing their comment on October 28, 1976, (pp. 88-l08, Rollo) after which, this Court resolved to treat the petition as a special civil action and considered the case submitted for decision. (Resolution dated December 17, 1976, p. 117, Rollo). The questions for resolution are those as reflected in the assignment of errors set forth in the petition, as follows: A. THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION AND IN CONSEQUENTLY UPHOLDING THE STAND OF THE CITY COURT DROPPING PETITIONER PRIMITIVO VILLEGAS FROM THE COMPLAINT; B. THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION AND IN CONSEQUENTLY UPHOLDING THE STAND OF THE CITY COURT REQUIRING EITHER PETITIONER MARTHA FERANIL OR PRIMITIVO VILLEGAS TO REMOVE WHATEVER IMPROVEMENTS INTRODUCED IN THE PREMISES AFTER THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT BUT BEFORE TRIAL ON THE MAIN ACTION; C. THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION AND IN CONSEQUENTLY UPHOLDING THE STAND OF THE CITY COURT DISSOLVING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE BOND DESPITE EXISTENCE THEREOF. (pp. 28-29, Rollo). . In dropping Villegas from the complaint, the City Court said that "Primitive Villegas, as co-plaintiff, has no valid cause of action of forcible entry against the herein defendants for lack of material averments that he had prior and physical possession of the premises in question ... " (p. 2, Annex "A", Petition). Respondent judge expressed agreement with the above ruling in his order dismissing the petition for certiorari filed against the City Court. (p. 6, Annex "C", Petition, p. 62, Rollo). It is evident that both the City Court and the respondent court focused and riveted their attention to the allegation of the complaint that "plaintiff Martha Feranil is the prior and legal possessor" (par. 2, Complaint, Annex to Comment, p. 109, Rollo) over the lot in question. They entirely lost sight of, and clearly overlooked, the fact that the complaint also alleges that on September 20, 1975, three days before the act of dispossession imputed to the defendants, Feranil and Villegas entered into a contract of lease for the construction of a fruit stand an area of 25 square meters fronting Rizal Street. (par. 6, Complaint, Annex 1, Complaint, p. 110, Rollo), and that since September 23, 1975, defendants have remained and continue to remain, in the illegal possession of the premises. (par. 12, Id). These allegations, together with that of paragraph 13, of the Complaint "that the continuance of the defendants in unlawfully and forcedly (sic) entering the aforementioned property", and that "their unlawful acts of the defendants have unjustly prejudiced the plaintiffs over the reasonable expected earning of the premises ... (par. 15, Id.) make out also a case of unlawful detainer, which is the proper cause of action of Primitive Villegas, who, by virtue of the lease contract, is entitled to the possession of the lot upon which to construct a fruit stand. The allegation in the complaint "that the plaintiffs informed the defendants that what they are occupying is the premises covered by a contract and had advised them to vacate from the premises, but these notwithstanding the defendants refused and ignored, and still continue to refuse and ignore the removal of the hollow blocks and empty boxes in the premises" (par. 16, Id) fulfils also the requirement of demand to vocate from both plaintiffs Feranil and Villegas. It is, likewise, evident that the respondent court, as well as the City Court, was controlled in its appreciation of what cause or causes of action are actually contained in the complaint, by the caption thereof — "Forcible Entry, Damages, with Preliminary Mandatory Injuction". This is plain error, for the real cause of action in a complaint is not what the designation of the complaint stated, but what the allegation in the body of the complaint define or describe. (People vs. Gatchalian, 104 Phil. 664; Que Po Lay vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, 104 Phil. 853; People vs. Agito, 103 Phil. 526; People vs. cosare, 95 Phil. 656; People vs. Abesamis, 93 Phil. 712; People vs. Arnault, 92 Phil. 252; People vs. Defensor, 86 Phil. 591; People vs. Magdowa, 73 Phil. 512; People vs. Oliveria, 67 Phil. 427; Arteche vs. Rosales, et al., 67 Phil. 48; U.S. vs. Burns, 41 Phil. 418; U.S. vs. Lim San, 17 Phil. 273). The designation or caption is not controlling, more than the allegations in the complaint themselves are, for it is not even an indispensable part of the complaint. Consequenlty, we hold that the complaint alleges facts constitutive of a sufficient and valid cause of action in favor of petitioner Primitivo Villegas. 2. On the issue relative to the dissolution of the preliminary mandatory injuction, it should follow from the foregoing observation, that the dissolution of the said writ on the ground that after Primitivo Villegas, who alone is a signatory of the requisite bond has been dropped, the bond has losts its legal efficacy, is without factual or legal basis. With Villegas reinstated as a proper party with sufficient cause of action, the bond signed by him as principal is perfectly valid and effective to support the preliminary mandatory injuction which accordingly, should be restored with full force and effect. 3. The last remaining issue is whether the order of the City Court requiring either petitioner Martha Feranil or Primitivo Villegas to remove whatever improvements introduced in the premises after the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injuction but before trial of the main action is proper. The effect of the preliminary mandatory injunction is to restore the plaintiffs to the possession of the lot in question after the defendants have allegedly forcibly entered it. The possession once restored, entitles them to the full enjoyment thereof, in the same manner and to same extent as they had before the possession had been disturbed by the defendants. The recognition of such right as was in existence in favor of Feranil, to the exercise of which the aforementioned injunction restored them, is perfectly in accordance with the acknowledged legal effect of an injunction, which naturally varies, depending on whether the injunction is prohibitory or mandatory. It should be obvious that with a mandatory injunction, unlike the prohibitory one, the party in whose favor it is issued is placed in the same situation he was before the commission of the illegal act complained of, as if said act has never been committed. In a prohibitory injunction, the specific act sought to be enjoined has not yet been performed, and is one alleged to be illegal, by the pleader. It is enjoined because it would cause irreparable injury if allowed to be committed to the prejudice of the party asking for the issuance of the injunction. The situation before the issuance of the prohibitory injunction is thus preserved in status quo. The status quo to be restored in the case of a mandatory injunction is the situation in which the pleader is before the act already committed and complained of In the present case, the status quo is plaintiff Feranil being their actual possession of her own lot, is free to exercise rights of ownership and possession. WHEREFORE, the order of the respondent court dated March 31, 1976, dismissing the petition for certiorari of the herein petitioner is hereby reversed. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered: (1) that Primitive Villegas be as he is hereby reinstated as plaintiff in the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 2727-C of the City Court of Davao (Branch II); (2) that preliminary mandatory injunction dissolved by the City Court be as it is hereby restored in full force and effect; and (3) the order for the removal of whatever improvements have been introduced in the premises after the issuance of the mandatory injunction be, as it is hereby declared without effect. No special pronouncements as to costs. SO ORDERED. Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur. Melencio-Herrera J., concur in the result. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation