Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-20148             April 30, 1965
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ADMISSION AS CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES.
PABLO LEE alias ENG JIO, petitioner-appellee,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
Manuel Trinidad, Jr. for petitioner-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
The Solicitor General has appealed from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu (in its naturalization case No. 606) declaring petitioner Pablo Lee alias Eng Jio entitled to naturalization as a Filipino citizen.
It is the burden of the State's appeal that the trial court failed to give due weight to the petitioner's use of an alias, without proper authority to do so, and in erroneously holding as duly proved that the petitioner held a lucrative trade, profession or occupation.
We find merit in the appeal.
The exhibits (F, I, J, K, L, M, N, O and P) reveal that the applicant-appellee has been using the names of Pablo Lee and Eng Jio, the latter as an alias; and this is also shown in his application. No showing is made that the use of the alias has been authorized, as required by Commonwealth Act No. 142. The unauthorized use of aliases has been repeatedly held by this Court to be disqualifying (not irreproachable) conduct.
In Wang I Fu vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-15819, promulgated on 29 September 1962, this Court ruled:
... . The use of said aliases is not explained and there is no showing that it has been authorized as required by the Alias Law (Commonwealth Act No. 142). Being violative of the law, We think this act of petitioner is not beyond reproach and is, therefore, a ground for denying his application for naturalization (See Koa Gui v. Republic, G.R. No. L-17317, July 31, 1962; Lim Bun v. Republic, G.R. No. L-12822, April 26, 1961; and Ng Liam Keng v. Republic, G.R. No. L-14146, April 29, 1961).
On the issue of the applicant's having a lucrative trade, profession or occupation, applicant only testified that he is a graduate engineer, employed by the Lu Tai Lumber Co., at a stipend of P250.00 with free board and lodging. Admittedly, applicant owns no real property. It was shown, however, that the Lumber Company is owned by a partnership in which applicant's father has an interest and that the petitioner, who is single, in fact lives with his parents. Moreover, while in Exhibit X the Lu Tai Lumber Company certified, as of 17 July 1961, that the petitioner "is an employee here with this office," no specific salary is mentioned, and the income tax returns (Exhs. Y and B) submitted by the applicant cover the year 1961, which is later than the filing of his application in November of 1960.
All the foregoing circumstances render dubious the applicant's claim to a lucrative occupation. It hardly needs emphasizing that the qualifications of an applicant must be possessed by him at the time he applies for naturalization, and not subsequently.
In the case of Que Choc Gui vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-16184, this court ruled:
Lastly, petitioner's only income is a monthly salary of P150 he claims to receive as salesman in the aforementioned store since June 1, 1958. We have repeatedly declared that such income, allegedly derived from employment in a business enterprise of petitioner's father, is insufficient to establish compliance with the statutory requirement of lucrative occupation or calling (Sy Ang Hoc vs. Republic, L-12400, March 29, 1961; Richard Velasco v. Republic, L-12214, May 25, 1960; Tan v. Republic, L-14861, March 17, 1961; Zacarias v. Republic, L-14860, May 30, 1961).
We agree with the counsel for the government that the evidence for the applicant does not fully satisfy that he possesses all the qualifications required by the law.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed and the application for naturalization is ordered dismissed. Costs against applicant-appellee.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation